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INDIAN THEORIES 0? MEANING 
in the Sanskrit Grammarians and the Philosophic Schools
( A short abstract )
In Indian thought ve find two main approaches 
to the study of the problem of meaning.
The Mimamsakas and the Naiyayikas consider 
the word as an autonomous unit of sense 9 and taka 
the sentence as a oolleotion of words. They face 
many problems that arise In such a naive attitudes 
what is the exact primary meaning of a word, how can 
words convey a syntactically related unified sense, 
what are the conditions of mutual relation of words 
- in a sentence and what exactly is the nature of , { 
verbal comprehension. Different theories are 
enunciated to explain the problems.
 ^Mutual expectancy (akra&kga) , consistency 5 : ; 
(yo/gyata) and proximity (sannidhi) are considered as 
| theSoonditione for syntactic relation. The importance 
of contextual factors and the speaker9s intention is 
also fully appreciated.
2-
According to the abhihitanvaya theory, first 
we remember the isolated word-meanings, and then a 
simultaneous collective memory gives us the same as 
mutually related. The anvitabhidhana theory makes 
the words themselves convey the connected sentence- 
meaning gradually. The problem of the change of 
meaning is also studied and the conditions for a 
metaphorical transfer (lakgana) discussed - mainly 
from a synchronistic point of view.
Bhartrhari»s theory of sphota asserts that 
the fundamental linguistic fact is the sentence 
considered as a single integral language-symbol. Words 
are mere abstractions made from the sentence by 
linguistic analysis, and have only a pragmatic value. 
The apoha theory of the Buddhists also considers the 
words to have no real substanoe. Anandavardhana 
includes in meaning the emotive elements and the 
♦social-cultural* significance of utterances which are 
suggested with the help of contextual factors, and 
advocates their importance in literature. The sphota 
theory gives a welcome corrective to the prevailing 
tendency of laying undue stress on*, words.
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C H A P T E R  I
I H T R 0 D 0 C T I O N
A
X,
The meaning of 1 Meaning1 iB an unsolved 
problem both in linguistics and in philosophy• It has 
attracted the attention of philosophers throughout the 
ages; reflections on the epistemologioal problem as to 
*what is the relation subsisting between thoughts, words 
or sentences, and that which they refer to or mean* 
have occupied the human mind in the east as well as 
in the west. Though the theory of meaning is the 
youngest branch of modem linguistics, it is one of 
its most vigorous branches. In recent years the 
problem of meaning has been studied in its manifold 
aspects by philosophers like Bertrand Russell, Urban, 
Ayer,Wittgenstein and Cassirer, by logicians like 
Carnap, by psychologists like Paul, Wundt, Pillsbury 
and Kohler, -by> anthropologists like Malinowski and 
Sapir, by rhetoricians like Richards and Empson and 
by linguists like Breal, Erdmann, Jespers&n, De Saussure 
Ogden, Stem, Gardiner, Eirth and Ullmann. There is 
such an abundance of material for a study of the problem 
of meaning that one is often left perplexed. The lack 
of a uniform metalanguage has added to the difficulties.
The fundamental problems that face the student 
of semantios are so vast that certain leading linguists, 
especially in America, try to exclude it frdm scientific 
linguistics. Thus, Bloomfield says, "The situations 
which prompt people to utter speech include every object 
and happening in the universe. In order to give a 
scientifically accurate definition of meaning for every 
form of a language, we should have to have a scientifically 
accurate knowledge of everything in the speaker's 
world. The actual extent of human knowledge is very 
small, compared to this." He comes to the conclusion 
that "the statement of meaning is,therefore, the weak 
point in language study, and will remain so until 
human knowledge advances very far beyond its present
s t a t e . T h i s  defeatist attitude is,perhaps, based
■ ■ ; . ■ • . A
on a wrong approach to the problem of meaning, assuming 
that every word in language must have a xiacanrrat definite 
and precise meaning and that we cannot talk sensibly 
about meaning until we are able to define everything 
that is meant by word scientifically. But language is 
being used by ordinary people without any such knowledge, 
and it works quite well.
1. Bioomfield,Language,p.140
In India the various schools of philosophy, 
including those of the Sanskrit Grammarians and the 
Rhetoricians, devoted much thought to the problem^:*, 
of linguistic philosophy and general linguistics and 
evolved different theories "to.'explain the manifold 
aspects of language behaviour. Writers in the west.f. 
while recognizing the importance of Pacini’s method 
in the formal analysis of Sanskrit language into a 
system of roots, stems and suffixes, and acknowledging 
their indebtedness to Pacini in the matter of formal 
analysis, have not paid any serious attention to thi*;
Indian theories about the various aspects of meaning.
The discussions on the problem of meaning by the great  ^
Indian thinkers like Bhart^hari, KUmarilabha-J;-^ and 
Inandavardhana show extraordinary linguistic and 
philosophio acumen and are full of valuable observation
' .* i
which can be of considerable help in clarifying compli­
cated issues in modem discussions ofL the subject*-.-'
* £ some work has already been done towards modem 
expositions of the Indian theories on general linguistics. 
The Linguistic: Speculations of the Hindus and The Philosophy! 
of Sanskrit Grammar^showed to the modem world a glimpse |
'h i
| I
1.P .C .Chakravarti.
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into the vast treasures of Indian contribution on the
problem* Various aspects of the problem of meaning are
discussed in many of the modern expositions of Indian
philosophical systems such as The Six Ways of Knowing
by D.NT.Datta, PurvamimamsaT in its Sources by Ganganatha
Jha, The Nygfya Theory of Knowledge by S.C.Chatterjee,
A Primer of Indian Logic, by Kuppusvami Sastri, and
the Introduction to the Tattvabindu by V.A.Ramasvami
Sastri. Substantial contributions have been made
recently on different problems connected with the Indian
theory of meaning by scholars like Edgerton,Siddhesvara
Varma,K.A.Subrahmania Iyer, Hiriyanna, P.T.Raju and 
1Brough. Much more remains to b e ,done in the same field.
An attempt is made in the following pages to give a 
brief survey of the various theories of meaning held
by the different schools of Indian thought and to bring
out their significance in modern linguistic discussions
on meaning.
In Indian thought we find two main approaches 
to the study of the problem of meaning: khandapakga and
and the akhandapakgat which roughly correspond to the 
Association theory and the Gestalt theory in psychology.
1. See Bibliography for details.
According to the khandapakga or the analytical 
method,a word is considered as an autonomous unit of 
thought and sense and the language studies are made on 
the basis of words, and the sentence is taken to be a 
concatenation of words* In the early stages of linguistic 
studies in India, as elsewhere, attention is found 
focussed on individual words and their isolated meanings; 
the idea that an individual word possesses an individual 
word-meaning is generally current in all schools of 
Indian philosophy in ancient times, and in the case of 
nouns the word is taken as the name of the thing. Thus, 
the regular philosophic ter* for a thing, namely padartha. 
is literally "the meaning of a word, that which a word 
means".^ The Sanskrit term namarupa for a thing also 
suggests the view that objects can be comprehended by 
means of their names or their visible shapes, and that 
the name and the shape constitute the essence of a thing. 
The Nyayasutras discuss the nature of the individual 
words only; the discussions about the factors necessary 
for the understanding of a sentence are found only in 
later Nyaya-Vai&e^ika works. Grammarians like Pai^ini
1. J .Brough,Some Indian Theories of Meaning,TPStl953»P*l63«
7Katyayana and Patanjali are mainly concerned with the 
derivation of the correct forms of words; and Yaska 
and his followers deal with the etymological study of 
word-meanings* It is the Mlmamsa school that started 
a detailed study of sentences and developed elaborate 
canons of interpretation; but even this study was 
mainly on the basis of words and word-meanings, and 
consequently, the relationship between word and sentence, 
between word-meaning and sentence-meaning, remained a 
central problem to this school.
But even in ancient India there were some 
scholars who emphasized the unreal nature of words*
Yaska refers^to the view of Audumbarayaq.a that it is 
the statement as a whole which is regularly present
pin the perceptive faculty of the hearer^ and that the 
four-fold classification of words into noun, verb, 
upasarga and nipata does not hold good. Words are
1* Nirukta ,1.1s indriyanityam vac&nam audumbarayaijLaty• 
tatra catu^vam nopapadyate.
2. For a discussion of this theory, see J.Brough,
Audumbarayana»s Theory of Language,BSOAS,vol*XIV»part I 
Also K,M.Sarma,Vak before Bhartyhari,Poona Orientalist, 
volume VIII.
used for naming, even in everyday life, because of
their universal applicability and their convenience. :
Bhart^hari refers to this view and says that Vartakfa
also held the « «  theory that it is only the sentence
2 *that is regularly present in the mind of the hearer.
Even among those who accepts the autonomy of 
words there are two different views regarding the 
nature of verbal comprehension arising from a sentence.
The Naiyayikas and the BhaJ-fa sohool of Mlma&sakas 
take the naive abhihitanvaya theory, according to which 
first we remember the isolated word-meanings and then 
a simultaneous collective memory gives us the same as 
mutually conneoted. Syntactically related word-meanings 
constitute sentence-meaning. In a sentence each word 
performs the task of conveying its own isolated meaning, 
and stops with that; the syntactic relation is conveyed 
not by the words,but by the word-meanings. The Mimamsakas 
of the Prabhakara school accept the anvitabhidhana theory 
which is an advance on the previous one. According to this
1.Nirukta,l.lj vyaptimatvac ca ftabdasyai^Iyastvac ca 
saAjfiakara^am vyavaharartham loke.
2. YP.ii.345-349
the words themselves convey the oonnected sentence-meaning 
gradually,step by step. The individual words do not convey 
any meaning except in the context of a sentence.
Only the sentence is the unit of speech,though the word 
which is the product of analysis from the sentences 
can be considered as the unit of language. Both these 
theories accepted that the conditions for syntactic 
relation between words in a sentence are mutual expectancy 
(akaAkga),consistency(yogyata) and proximity (sannidhi) 
andf also recognized the importance of contextual factors 
and the intention of the speaker as determining the 
meaning of words.
According to the akhaqdapakga advocated by 
Bhartphari the fundamental linguistic fact is the 
sentence. It takes the sentence as a Gestalt whose parts 
are not relevant to it. The theory owes its inspiration 
-from the theory of Audumbarayana; but Bhartrhari 
developed it as a perfect theory which can explaia all 
the anomalies in language behaviour. He defines the 
sentence as *a single integral symbol*(eko 'navayava^ a^bdefr
10
which is revealed by the individual letters and the 
words that comprise it. The meaning is conveyed by this 
vakya-sphota» the sentence considered as an indivisible 
and integral linguistic symbol. And the meaning conveyed 
by it is an 1 instantaneous flash of insight or intuition* 
(pratibha). The meaning is also parties*. The words 
have no reality of their own; they are only hints that 
help the listener to arrive at the meaning. Many of the 
problems in the study of meaning in linguistics are 
based on the primary assumption that words are the 
counters of thought; but when once that assumption is 
set aside and words given their proper place in the 
language system as unreal abstractions just like roots 
and suffixes, many of these problems fade away. The 
words have a reality only at the pragmatic level. This 
theory of Bhartrhari will be a welcome corrective 
to the prevailing tendency among modem linguists 
to lay undue stress on words.
Anandavardhana took the cue from Bhartrhari 
and developed his theory of Vyahjana or suggestion.
Under the term artha or meaning he included not only
11
the cognitive,logical meaning, but also the emotive 
elements and the1 social-cultural1 significance of 
utterances which are suggested with the help of contextual 
factors. The logicians and the philosophers may be 
satisfied with that portion of the total meaning of
. •' V. ' v U&icjb
an utterance which is precise and accurate and^can be 
objectively studied; but the poets - and also the 
linguists - cannot negleot vast areas of language 
behaviour as unreal or indescribable. Inandavardhana 
lays greai stress on the suggestive element in poetry, 
and advocates the Dhvanj theory,which is vyanjana or 
suggestion applied to poetry. v* ^
The problem of change of meaning is also 
studied by the different schools of thought in India.
But the conditions for a metaphorical transfer of 
meaning are discussed there mainly from a synchronistic 
point of view, unlike the study of the change of 
meaning in the west. It is only in the discussion of 
faded metaphors(nirudhalaksanas) that- a historical 
approach can be seen. Even etymology is not studied 
from a diachronistic point of view. The aim of etymology
v>-:
t h \
is not to find out the origin or the history of a word,
but to understand the real significance of the word.
aIt is not a subject of aniquarian interest,but is of 
great importance to the study of meaning.
The fundamental problem regarding the inter­
relation of facts,speech and thought has not yet been 
solved. Although we can perceive facts, we cannot 
handle them directly in speech or in thought. Language 
indispensable for communication. In the Yogasutra 
of Patanjali it is said that ltal,word, idea and object 
are really distinct entities and that though in ordinary 
experience they are found interrelated, they may be 
separated from one another by a process of abstraction.*^ 
*The very nature of discursive thought is based on the 
non-recognition of this distinctin(between these three 
factors) and on the consequent assumption of a real 
identity among all the three things.*2.
In India all the schools of thought have 
assumed a permanent relation between feabda and artha 
which correspond to the signifiant and signifi& of
XV Gopinatha Kaviraja,The Doctrine of Pratibha in 
An Indian philosophy,ABORT,1924,p.7
2. Ibid.
De Saussure. Severe attack is made on De Saussure in the 
first chapter of The Meaning of Meaning*~by Ogden and 
Richards for emphasizing the relation between signifiant 
and signifi^; they point out that there is no direct 
relation between the word and the referent and that
the relation is only imputed* Ogden - Richards1 basic
Thought or reference
- - - - - - - - - - - - - X  Referent
stands for(an imputed relation) true
Symbol
Sir A.Gardiner, while emphasizing the distinction 
between meaning and the thing-meant, criticises
to the things. His analysis is similar to that of 
Ogden - Richards, though he uses different terms.
He uses the terms word, meaning and thing-meant 
respectively for symbol»reference and referent of
1,Meaning of Meaning,p.ll
2.Theory of Speech and language,pp.29ff> 58ff
: „y;.vv:
It must be noticed that De Saussure * s analysis
of signifiant-signifie relation, as well as the Indian
conception about the permanent nature of the 6abda-artha
relation, confines itself to the left hand side of the
triangle, as the only one where linguistic elements are
directly involved. It is admitted that the relation
between words and the external objects is indirect and
imputed. There is no contradiction between the two
schools. The symbol is directly related only to the
1
thought or meaning, and not to the thing meant.
When the meaning and the thing-meant are
distinguished, i.% is also necessary to distinguish
between the permanent word, the word-engram of la langue
dr the 'word universal'^ on the one hand and the ephemeral
actualized word as it is uttered in la parole. The essentia
word is not 'the somewhat shifty hummock on the contour
2
-0f  a breath-grpup' which vanishes as soon as it is being
uttered, but something permanent in the minds of the
people belonging to the linguistic community. Gardiner
himself is conscious of the logical necessity of accepting
xthis distinction. He says, " a word can be used and reused
1. Ullmann,The Principles of Semantics,p.72
2* - William J.Entwistle,Aspects of Language,p.226
3. op.cit.»pp.69f.
on many different occasions, and ... the same word can 
be employed by all the different members of a linguistic 
community.... It is in fact something relatively 
permanent,widespread and capable of being possessed in 
common by a multitude of individuals. All these consider­
ations prove, beyond the possibility of contradiction, 
that words transcend, and are altogether less evanescent 
entities than the sounds which issue from the speakerfs 
mouth and vanish into nothingness soon after they have 
reached the listener’s ear." According to the Indian 
grammarians, the former is the prakrta-dhvani and the 
latter the vaikrta-dhvani. The Mimamsakas call the 
former a pattern of the permanent varnas (analogous to 
the modern phoneme) and the latter is called dhvani.
The Naiyayikas consider the former as a class (jati) 
of which the latter is an instance. Thus, the speech 
situation can be represented in a rectangle rather than 
the usual triangle.
Diredt relation
A RThe psychical,permanent \ ' Meaning,Thought,
word or the word-class. \ ' mental content,sphota revealed by  ^ /  object-classprfikrta-dhvani N ^» •V"' ?' XA N ^
word-sound,physical C K ---------' - * Thing-meant, referent
phonic,word. external objectvaikrta-dhvani
Direct relation is only between A and B in the diagram. 
Relations between C and D, C and B, and A and D are all 
indirect and imputed.
15
In this diagram the upper portion gives 
De Saussure's analysis, and the portion ABD refers to 
the Ogden - Richards' triangle.
In the sphota doctrine, Bhart^*hari gives a
c  rmore penetrating and minute analysis of the speech 
situation. First, we have the actual sounds of the words 
uttered; this is the vaikyta-dhvani. These sounds 
reveal the permanent prakyta-dhvani which is an 
abstraction from the various vaikyta-dhvanis,or which 
may be considered as the linguistically normal form 
devoid of the personal variations which are linguistically
irrelevant. The third stage is the sphota which is the
■" »
whole utterance considered as an integral whole, as an 
indivisible language-symbol. It is this sphota that 
reveals the meaning which is in the form of an intuition. 
Strictly both the sphota and the meaning are different 
aspects of the same speech-principle.Bhartrhari seems 
to synthesize these various aspects of speech with 
the four-fold nature of the revelation of speecht para, 
pabyanti,madhyama and vaikhari stages corresponding 
respectively to &abda-tattva(The Great Sphota),sphota, 
prakyta-dhvani and vaikyta-dhvani. 1
16
1. See the chapter on sphota.
Divested of all the metaphysical elements, the 
sphota doctrine advocated by Bhart^hhri emphasizes 
the importance of considering the sentence ( which is 
only any complete utterance) as an indivisible,integral 
language-symbol. The division into words and their 
classification as verbs,nouns and so on,as well as the 
subdivisions into roots and suffixes are all means for 
the study of tdtr language without any absolute reality 
in themselves. But they cannot be neglected by the 
grammarian, since they are of great help in language 
study.
Various aspects of the Indian theories of meaning 
are still of vital importance to the students of modern 
linguistics. Bhart^hari1s ribs theory of sphota, the 
Mima&sakafs discussions about akaAkga,yogyata and sannidhi 
as the factors deciding syntactic relation in a sentence, 
Snandavardhana1s theory of poetic suggestion and the 
general discussions about the importance of contextual 
factors and the speaker’s intention may be pointed out 
as of special interest for modem linguistic theory.
-1?-
C H A P T E R  II
A B H I D H I 
THE PRIMARY MEANING , OP :A WORD
-  \<1~
The essential nature of a word lies in its
significative power.1 This significative power or
^akti is defined as the relation that exists between
the word and its meaning,by which the meaning is
2cognized whenever the word is heard. Speculations 
about the nature of this relation of meaning with 
words are found in India, as in ancient Greece; the 
two main schools,Mimamsa and Nyaya, support respectively 
theories of a Natural' and of a * conventionalI 
origin of this relation.
Aocording to the Mlmainsakas the significative 
power is inherent in the words themselves. They were 
not concerned with the ultimate origin of the relation 
between words and meaning*. To them it was impossible 
to conceive of a society without language. We learn 
our language from our parents and elders; they,in their 
turn, learned it from their forefathers; thus, it 
could be traced back to any oonceivable period of
1. Tarkasangraha»6abda : ^aktam padam;Siddhantamuktavail, 
p.283. Formally,a word is also defined as a group of 
letters in a fixed order,ending in nominal or verbal 
inflection!) Nyaya sutra. II.2.60i te vibhaktyantah padam. 
Pagini, 1.4.14: suptihantam padam.
2.SiddhSntamuktavalit &aktis ca padena saha padarthasya 
sambandhah; Laghumanjusa♦p.26:padapadarthayos samban- 
dhantaram eva 6aktih, vacyav&cakabhavaparaparyayah.
3.Mimamsasutra.1.1.5: autpattikas tu sabdasyarthena
sambandhah. See also W.S.Allen.The origin and develop- 
ment of language,TPS,1948.
human society. What they meant by the etemality of the
words and meaning was that it is not possible to
trace the origin of the relationship to any person.1
The grammarians also agree with the Mimamsakas that
the permanent nature of the relation between words and
2meaning is to be understood from popular usage itself.
This natural connection between words and 
Jbfee meaning has also been explained in terms of 
the innate capacity or yogyata of the words. Just as 
the indriyas or the organs of perception have a 
natural power to perceive what comes into their 
purview, so also words have a natural capaoity 
for conveying ideas. Speech is the natural means of 
communication. Thus, any word has the natural 
oapaoity to express anything; this power is restricted
Aby convention. The permanent relation between a proper 
noun and its bearer is to be explainead in this way.
1 .Cf.Allen,loc.cit.This is different from the natural 
theory of the Greek scholars which believed that
"in giving names to objects the primitive man was 
inspired by some innate quality or psychological 
effeot of the thing itself."
2.KatySyana1s Yarttika begins: siddhe ^abdarthasambandhe 
lokatah..;see also Patanjali's bhagya on that. 
Bhartrhari too says (YP.i.23)inityas sabdarthasambandha
3*VP.iii.3.1* indriyanam svavisayesv anadir yogyata yah 
jratha anadir arthai^ sabdeuaam sambandhe yogyata tatha.
4.Slokavarttika,sambandha section,verse 228j sarvakara- 
paricchedya^akte *rthe vacake *pi va sarvakarartha- \ 
vijnanasamarthe niyamah krtah;see Kasika on that. '
See also Prameyakamalamarttanda> III-rlOQ.
Yaska refers to feabdanukrti or onomatopoeia 
as a factor in the naming of birds. He says that a 
few words like *kakaf(crow) could be traced to the 
sound produced by the birds* but Aupamanyava denies 
the existence of onomatopoeia as a linguistic factor.
This theory of natural relation between words
and meaning*is rejeoted by the Naiyayikas and the
Vai^esikas who advocate the conventional origin of
relationship. Gautama says that it is by the conventional
2significance that the meaning of a word is understood.
The Vai6epikas also take the same view; they assert 
that there is no direot natural relation between 
sabda and artha, between words and the objects denoted.
They argue that if there were any natural 
relation between a word and its meaning, as between 
fire and burning, then the word should have already 
coexisted with the objeot signified; but we do not 
peroeive any such relation. A word does not coexist
 t   Z    ..
1.Nirukta»UI.18i kaka iti ^abdanukrtih. tad idam 
bakunisu bahulam.
2.Nyayasfrtra,II.551samayikao chabdSrthasampratyayasya.
3.Vai^egikasQ[tra.VII.2.2Qt samayikao sabdad arthapratyayal 
4.Ibid. VII.2.14 - VII.2.20
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with the object it denotes* The word ’fire* does not 
b u m  the mouth,and the word ‘razor* does not cut it; 
nor does the word ‘honey1 sweeten the mouth.
Another substantial argument brought against 
the natural relationship between words and their 
meanings is that if words had a natural relation 
with the objects,the same words should have meant 
the same thing everywhere. The variation in the 
meanings of words cannot be explained satisfactorily 
on suoh a hypothesis. The use of different words 
for the same object is also against the theory of
2natural connection between words and their meanings.
According to the ancient Naiyayikas and the 
Vaisesikas the connection between words and objects 
is not natural, but it is conventional,being established 
by the will of God.} In the Tarkasangraha also ^akti
1. Sabarabha gya,under sutra 1.1.5: syac oed arthena 
sambandhah ksuramodakoccarane mukhasya pat ana purai^e 
syfftam. See also^lokavarttika,sambandha section, 
verse 8^ Nyayabhasya on sutras II.1.54455.
2. Nyayasutra.II.1.56: jStivi^ege caniyamat. See also 
the bhasyat samayika^ rfabdad arthasampratyayo na 
svabhavikab; rsyaryamleochShSfm yathSkSmam s&bda- 
prayogo *rthaprhtySyanSya pravaVtate.
3. Ny’ayasQ/tra.II.l. 55: samayikac chabdarthasaihpratya- 
yasya.
is defined as the convention made^by God that such 
and such a meaning should be understood from such 
and such a word. 1 According to the later Naiyayikas, 
however, this relation need not always be established
2by the will of God; it can also be by the will of man. 
When the sahketa or the conventional relation is esta­
blished by the will of God, it is permanent and is 
called abhidha or 4akti. When the relation is not
permanent,but established by the will of a man, it is
3called paribhaga. Bhartrhari also refers to these 
two types of relations. He says,"Sanketa is of two 
kinds,ajanika or permanent and adhunika or modem; 
the former is the permanent primary relation, while the 
latter refers to the technical terms with their 
specialized and well-defined meanings,coined by writers
Aof various scientific works."
1 .Tarkasangraha,6abda i asm&t padat ayam artho boddhavya 
itl^varasariketag gbktih.
2.According to the anoient Naiyayikas,^akti exists only 
when it is based on the will of God,and the meaning 
is permanent, and not in the case of proper nouns and 
technical terms. But later Naiyayikas accept 6akti in 
all such cases. See Siddhantamuktavali,^abda sections 
adhunike tu sanketite na ^aktir iti sampradayah.navyas 
tu Trfvareochaiva na £aktih.kin tu iochaiva. teiiadhunika- 
sanketite*pi ITastTti vadanti.
3.ijfabda^aktiprakffdikff,pp. 54f sYidyabhusana.op. cit. ,p.449
4.Yakvapadiya,quoted in kabda^aktiprakgfeika.loc.cit, 
ajSnikarf cffdhunikas safxketo dvividho matah 
nitya ajflnikas tatra yff 6aktiy iti glyate 
kadaoitkas tvadhmnikas ^eTtrakaradibhih krtah.
In both these cases the relation between the 
word and the meaning is direct. When the relation is 
only indirect,being based on the similarity or contiguity 
of the actual intended sense with the original primary 
sense, the relation is called lakganeTor gauni. It has 
no direct power to convey the sense intended; its 
power is derived from the primary sense.
Thus,in India,we find that all the schools of
thought accept a functional definition of meaning.
Vytti or the function of a word is its relation to the
sense. This relation is also considered as a power
residing in the wprd,which enables it to denote the sense.
Even the Buddhists accept the relation between the
4abda and the vikalpa or the mental construct of the
image, and recognize a reciprocal relation between the 
1two. The Naiyayilcas* objection against a permanent 
relation between the word and the object denoted 
is only against an assumed relation between the words 
uttered and the external objects symbolized by them.
The Indian conception of the relation between 
sabda and artha (word and sense) is quite analogous
1. See the section on Apoha. Prof.Siddhesvara Varmafs
distinction of the Hindu view of meaning as a relation 
and the Buddhist view of meaning as a negation (JRAS, 
1925)is due to a confusion between the function and 
the sense.
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to De Saussure1s definition of a linguistic sign
as a relation between the signifiant and the signifie.
He says,wLe signe linguistique unit non une chose et 
un nom, mais un concept et une image aooustique.*
Here it must be noted that both the signifiant and the 
signifi^ are psychical entities and the relation is 
subjective. The word is not the actual sounds uttered 
in actual speech(la parole),but the abstracted 
phonological pattern,or thevengram'of the word in 
la langue,or the class of which the individual 
utterences are instances. Similarly the signifi^ or 
the artha is also different from the external particular
Jr /C*»object*,but- the concept of the object,or vikalpa,the 
mental construct produced by the object,or the 
universal of which the particular things in the external 
world are related through inherence. A fundamental 
identity of opinion is often concealed by divergent 
and overlapping terminologies. Thus the artha or sense 
appears as signifife in De Saussure,thought or reference 
in Ogden-Richards,mental content in Stern,sense in 
Gombocz,idea in Roudet,concept in Weisberger and 
meaning in Gardiner. It is the jati or universal of the
1 .Corny, p. 100
2.Ullmann,op.cit. ,p.6
tfiuirairrgateao,the vikalpa in the form of apoha or negation 
of the Buddhists,the permanent xay vyakti or dravya 
as a mental image etc.^“
2P.C.Chakravarti says that the theory of Signs
or Symbolism as worked out by Ogden and Richards in
The Waning of Meaning "has maintained a peculiar position
that goes directly against the view of Indian grammarians*
It does not recognize any necessary or permanent relation
3between a thing and the symbol which stands for it.”
Here it must be pointed out that there is no fundamental
difference in the views of the Indian philosophers
and that of Ogden and Richards. That there is no direct
relation between the symbol and the external object,or
4the thing-meant in Gardiner’s terminologyj jtfucxxK±Kfca
5is acceptable to all. For as the Indian scholars say, 
the word’fire* does not burn in the mouth,or the word
’razor* cut it;nor does the word ’honey* sweeten the mouth.
: ; " 6
As Wittgenstein says,the relation of a word must be to
something that is permanentt"What the names in language 
signify must be indestructible.”
l.See the section on ’The primary sense of words1 (y * ' 0 "^0
2.Linguistic Speculation of the Hindus,p.342,392.
3«The Meaning of Meaning,p.ll 
4.3piaech and Language,passim.
5.Slokav^rrttika,sambandhSksepa,verse 8.
6.Philosophical Investigations,^*55•
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Multiple Meaning.
"Multiple meaning is one of the chief symptoms 
of a wider feature of speech and language: discrepancy 
between the signifiant and the signif±6 of linguistic 
symbols... All complications of the simple!one name - 
one sense* situation are araacnninai accommodated under 
this heading*.^The Indian scholars were also confronted 
with the problem: how far does multiple meaning affect
2the permanent relation between words and their meanings? 
There are two main categories of multiple meaning:
(i) paryayasabda or several names with one sense, and
(ii)nanarthasabdas or the same word with several senses. 
The binary semantic relationship requires a word to 
have only one sense,and a sense to have only one word
to denote it. But almost every language contains 
elements running counter to this *monosemy' in the 
language system. Sanskrit is full of synonyms and 
homonyms,$nd the various lexicons in Sanskrit are 
acgjrmggat deali»g- with words arranged in synonyms and 
homonyms (paryaya and nanartha). Patanjali has drawn 
attention to this feature in language.
1 .Ullmann, o p. c i t., p.107
2.Vide supra.
3.Mbh.on Ffinini,l.3*li bahavo hi £abda ekartha bhavanti. 
tad yatha indra^,sakrah,puruhiTtah,purandarah.e^ka^ ca 
sabdo bahvyarthah. tad yatha aksah,padah,masS iti.
■ ; The occurrence of plurivalence( one name with
several senses) in a language may give rise to ambiguities
but,as Bhartrhari points out, the meaning of a word is
decided not merely by its form,but also by various other
factors such as the sentence-context and the situational
oontext. 1 In the Vakyapadiya,Bhartrhari gives a long 
2list of the contextual factors that determine* the
meanings of words in,ambiguous cases.
• . - „ . '
' ■ • “j* ***• t > '* ~ «.■ • V iGS
. '--A- •: r An interesting problem about the exact nature
of homonyms is discussed by the Indian grammarians: are" ,■ ?  ^ •, *.■' ;
we to consider them as the same word having different
3senses,or as different words havingxthe same sound?
. ’
-til. India the former view is generally prevalent,as is 
clear from the terra nariarthas'abda applied to homonyms.
But Bhartrhari and his followers,to whom the semantic 
aspect of a word is more important than the phonological 
aspect, take the latter view. According to Bhartrhari 
"it is necessary to recognize that when we talk of 
fthe word x with meaning A ’,’the word x with meaning B ’,
l.VP.ii^3l6: ^abdarthah pravibhjyante na rupad eva 
kevalat. See the section on ’Contextual factors’.
2.See section on’Contextual factors’
3.See Punyaraja's commentary on VP.ii.317
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the identification of the two ' x's as 'one word1 
is a mere practical convenience for lexicography and
exegesis,something which belongs not to the material%
but to one method ofl describing the material, and that 
this method is not necessarily the best approach to a 
satisfactory description of language in operation.
Here it must be noted that the Indian scholars 
were mainly concerned with the synchronistic study of 
language,with dxratui describing the language as it 
exists,and therefore■they failed to distinguish the 
two types of such occurrences from each other: homonymy 
through divergent sense-development and homonymy through 
convergent sound-development (the former may be called 
homonyms and the latter homophones). Such a distinction 
will be possible only by a historical,diaohronistic 
study of the problem. The Indians studied, the problem 
of shifts in application under laksana or metaphor, 
and discussed the problem of nirudhalaksan&s,where the
, .  f-----------------X— » *5acquired sense becomes the normal sense. But they did not
1.J.Brough,op.cit.,p .169
2. Ullmann,op.cit.,pp.125-138
3. See the chapter on i«aksana.
observe that polysemy,which in synchronistic terms means 
that one word can have more than one sense, implies 
from a diachronistic point of view that a word may 
retain its previous sense or senses and at the aame time 
acquire one or several ones. The homophones are,on the 
other hand,different words which in the course of 
histxorical development accidentally oonverge in shape.
It is true that this distinction between homonyms and 
homophones does not exist synchronistically. As Jespersto. 
says,"The psychological acsput effect of these cases of 
polysemy, where*one and the* same word* has many meanings, 
is exactly the same as that of those cases where two or 
three words of different origin* have accidentally 
become* homophones."^ It is to the great credit of the 
Indian writers that they were able to study the nanarthas 
from two points of view* as homonyms and as homophones.
The problem of synonyms is not so great,for
according to the Indian writers^exact synonyms are rare,a<j
there will be shades of difference in the meanings of the
so-called synonyms. Popular new forms of old words were
taken to be their corruptions(apabhramsa). Still they
had to accept some well-known synonyms* even these show
2different aspects of the same thing-meant.
1.Jespers^n,Linguistica,p.405 (Quoted by Ullmann,op^c 
2.See the section on etymology verses Popular usage*.
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How do we learn the meanings of words?
f t y f a a r ? 3?SsT»; -  • / i ^ i * ‘> - ^7-' ’ ’ ••"V * % '’& &
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There are different ways by which we may 
learn the meanings of words. In the Tattvacintamani, 
Gange^opadhyaya refers to eight such methods used 
for learning the relation between words and the 
objects meqnt by them.^
The most important among them all is the
natural method of observing the usage of datum
the words by elders in actual lifeCvrddhavyavahara).
According to the Prabhakara school of MimamsS,this
is the only method of learning a language; it is
only from sentences in the imperative mood that we
can observe some kind of visible activity on the
part of the listener, and therefore, suoh sentences
are of great importance in the natural method of
2learning a language. As Wittgenstein says,"One cannot 
guess how a word functions,one has to look at its 
use and learn from that.^
l.Tattvaointamani»Sabdakhanda< ^
daktigraham vySkaranopamSj^osaptavakyad vyavahara 
ta^ ca vakyasya e^^ fid vivyter vadanti sannidhyatas 
siddhapadasya vyddh&fc.See^idyabhusana.History of 
Indian Logical.450f« Also Siddhantamuktavali.p.266. 
2.See the seotion on Anvitabhidhana theory.
3.Philosophical Investigations. m.499.
Hearing the utterance of a sentence by A to 
B and observing the consequent activity on the part 
of the listener B, an onlooker C gets the idea that 
the activity of B is based on his underieSSding the 
meaning of the sentence. At this time the whole 
action of B is understood as the meaning of the 
whole utterance of A. Prom several such observations 
of various utterances and their meanings, C is able 
to understand the meaning of single words, through 
a process of assimilation and elimination (avapodvapa). 
Kumarilabhatta saysithat in this method there are 
three definite stages:-(a)Pratyakga or perception.
The child hears the utterance of the speaker and 
sees the activity on the part of the listener.
(b) Anumana or inference. The child infers from the 
listener*s action that he has understood the meaning 
of the utterance, ^c) Arthapatti. The child knows 
that the activity of the listener is inexplicable 
except on the assumption of a relation existing 
between the utterance and the meaning.
*” •"  ................... 1 ■ 11 —— —..............   i —.. .i.
1.^lokavarttika. Sambandhaksepa,verses 1$0-143; seelalso
S.Varma,op.oit.,p.5
2.Wittgenstein(op.cit. ,^4^8; says, **lBring me a sugar5, 
bring me milk7,make sense,but not the combination 
*milk me sugar', nut the utterance has effect,though 
it is not its meaning t,stare and gape)**':
hage^a,tne grammarian, considers this as the 
best method of learning the meanings of words.^Jagadlsa, 
the great Naiyayika,also says that the first and 4-her 
foremost method of learning the meanings of words is
2that of observing the use of language in actual life.
It is in this way that children generally pick up 
the use of language, it is a natural and subconscious 
method of learning language.44When a context nas affected 
us in the past,the recurrence of merely a part of the 
context will cause us to react in the way we reacted 
before."
(k) Aptavgkya or the direct statement of a 
trustworthy authority is another way bji which children 
generally understand the meanings of words, m  this 
case the learning is conscious and deliberate, when 
the parents or otner relations directly point out with 
the finger the various persons and objects, and say 
to the child,“This is your father","This is your
1 .Paramalghumahjus&(P«1 ) refers to vrddhavyah&ra as 
rfaktigrshaka^iromaui.
2.^abdag£ak tiprak&^ i ka.p .6 4f ; sanketasya grahaji purvam 
vrddhasya vyavahfiratah•
3»Urban,language and Keality.p.lu2. This is according 
to the nehaviouristic theory,according to which 
meaning is the evooation of a total response by a 
partial stimulus.
-  3*-
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mother","This is your brother eating the banana ,
etc.,the child can understand the relation between 
the words and the persons or objects denoted by them.1 
We age may also know the meanings of certain words 
when an* authority'tells us that such and suoh words 
denote such and such objeots. St. Augustine gives a
clear description of this method of learning a language;
2in his Confessions,he says:
"When they (my elders) named some object,and 
aocordingly/moved towards something, I saw this and 
I grasped that jchocjc the thing was called by the 
sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. 
Their intention was shown by their bodily movements, 
as it were,the natural language of all people: the 
expression of the face,the play of the eyes,the 
movement of other parts of the body,and the tone 
of voice which expresses our state of mind in 
seeking, having, rejecting or avoiding something. 
Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their 
proper places in various sentences, I gradually 
learned to understand whdt objects they signified, 
and after I had trained my mouth to form these 
signs, I used them to express my own desires."
(o) Yyakarana or grammar. We learn the 
meanings of the roots,suffixes and derivatives from 
grammar. In fact, the most important use of grammar is
1. Nygyako gfa, p. 860 1 angullprasaranadipurvakam nirdesena 
^aktigraho bhavati. yatha,bala,taveyam mata,tavayam 
pits', ayam te bhrata kandallphalam abhyavaharatiti 
nirde6ena balasya matradau 6aktigrahah.
Confessions.1.8 (quoted by Wittgenstein.op.oit..p.l). 
Striotly speaking,thiw method described here 
involves both vrddhavyahara and aptavakya.
to help people to learn the language quickly and 
oorreotly. All the normal derivative words and their 
meanings can be understood from grammar on knowing the 
root-meanings and the significance of the suffixes.
(d) Upamaha or identification. A man,who does 
not know what a gavaya (the Gayal or a kind of wild ox) 
is,can identify it through perception aided by the 
description of the animal heard previously. He is told 
that a gavaya is like a cow,and then,wfa«t he actually 
meets with a real gavaya in the forest,he is able to 
identify it at once. This method of knowing is 
considered by the Mlmamsakas and the Naiyayikas as a 
pramana or means of knowledge different from perception 
and inference. It is one of the means of our knowledge 
about the relation between words and their meanings.
The identification of herbs and plants from known 
descriptions oomea under upamaha.
1. Patahjali gives (Mbh.,first Shnika) laghu as an 
important use of grammar. ~
2. This term is generally translated as * analogy1; but 
A»Fouoher,Le Compendium des Topique - Tarkasangraha- 
d *Annambhatta.pp.l48ff. has given sufficient reason 
toj3how that the term is better explained as 
identification. D.H.H.Ingalls also prefers the term
•identification*to the usual * analogy*(Materials for 
the study of Navya Nyaya Logic).
i  y i  -
sentence yavamaya^ carur bhavati is known to be jtefe 
the long-bearded barley from the rest of the passage, 
yatranya ogadhayo mlayante athaite modamana ivottiethantl 
(when the other plants droop down,these stand up as 
if they are happy).1
(g) Vivrti or explanation. We may know the
meaning of any word from a commentary giving the
synonyms of the word,or describing the meaning, 
c 2Patanjali says that the meaning of a word is to be 
determined by the commentator’s explanation, especially 
in oases of doubt.
(h) Siddhapadasannidhya or the syntactic 
connection with words already known, e.g., in the 
sentence "The pika sings beautifully on this mango tree" 
the meaning of the word pika is known to be*a cuckoo1 
from the presence of the other well known words.
1.NySyako^a,p.859;Siddhantamuktavali.p.275.
2.Mbh.,lst ahnikat vyakhyanato vi^e^apratipattir 
na hi sandehSd alak$anam.
3♦Nyayako^a,p.8591 iha sahakaratarau madhuram piko 
rauti.
(e) or lexicon. The meaning of a word
may be understood from a lexicon also. The lexicon 
may even give the metaphorical senses sanctioned by 
usage;but the primary significative power should not 
be assumed in such cases.^
(*) Vftfey&^ega or the rest of the passage in
2the context. Jaimini says that when there is a doubt 
about the meaning of .a y m  word, the rest of the 
passage should be taken into acoount. Thus, in the 
Vedic sentence akta ^arkara upadadhati (The wet pebbles 
are placed nearby),the meaning of the term akta (wet) 
is to be understood from the rest of the passage 
tejo vai ghrtam (clarified butter is the brilliance); 
from this it is known that the pebbles are to be 
soaked in clarified butter. This method may be used 
in getting the correct meaning of a word; thus,the 
meaning of the word yava (generally used by the Xryas 
in the sense of the long-bearaded barley,and by the 
Mlecchas in the sense of the Panic seed) in the
1.Siddhantamuktavali»p.272. Thus,the term nila refers 
primarily to the colour only,the reference to the 
thing having the colour is through lakgana.
2. Mimamsasutra»1.4.291 sandigdhesu vakyasesat. ^
CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
The importance of contextual factors
in determining the exact meaning of an expression■ . "/• > •
is emphasized by writers even from very early times. 
In the Brhaddevata ^ it is said that the established 
rule regarding the meaning of a Vedic passage, 
as well as that of an ordinary sentenoe,is that 
the meaning is to be determined from considerations 
of the purpose to be served (artha) ,the subject 
matter under discussion (prakarana), evidence from 
another place (lihga) . propriety (aucitya).the 
place (desa) and the time (leal a-). Bhartrhari 
agrees with this view and says that the meaning of 
an expression is decided not only by its fora,but 
also by the contextual factors.^ He quotes the
1 .Brhaddevata. 11^118» arthat prakaranal lixigad 
aucityad de^akalatah mantresv arthavabodhas syad 
itare^v iti ca sthitih.
2.Macdonnell’s translation of artha as fthe sense 
(of the word) 1 does not seem to be correct here.
3.Macdonnell’s translation of the term as ’gender1 
is not acceptable here in this context;the exact 
meaning of the term is discussed later.
4.YP.ii.3l6tvakyat prakaranad arthad aucityad 
de^akaiataljL ^abdarthah pravibha jyante na rfrpad 
eva kevalat.
Clearly it is a quotation from the Brhaddevata. 
in spite of Pupyaraja’s statement that the list 
embodies Bhartrhari’s own viewB (see commentary).
same list with a slight modification,substituting 
vakya or syntactic relation for linga. Bhartrhari 
then gives a longer list of such contextual factors
' v * .  J * ’ - - ^  J ^ v v  ^  ,v V gitySZl*' r  . ; . , 5 ^  * ' K , 7 1 * .  !i ’ » . ;*v 'that determine the exact meaning of a word in the 
case of ambiguous and equivocal expressions. This
list is taken up for detailed discussion by the later
v"- ■ .• ' -■ ‘
grammarians like Nagesa and Alahkarikas like Mammata,
*
Vi6vanatha,Hemacandra,Appayadiksita and Jagannatha.^ 
It may be noted here that the list is concerned with 
homophones having different meanings. Whether we take
l.Of these terms vakya,prakarana,ling;a and artha 
are known to the Mlmamsakas also. The process of 
subordinating the details of a sacrifice to the 
main sacrifice is done through six means of proofj 
^ruti or direct statement,lih&a or the implication 
from another word»vakya or syntactic connection, 
prakarana or context,sthana or position,and samakhya 
or the etymological meaning. Of these each preceding 
one is stronger than each succeeding one.
Vakya is the connected utterance of words 
indicating the relation 'of an adjective and a 
substantive;the meaning of the substantive is 
restricted by that of the adjective.
2.VP.ii.317fi
samsargo viprayoga^ ca sahacaryam virodhita 
arthah prakarapam lirigam ^abdasyanyasya sannidhih 
sSmarthyam auoitl de^ah kalo vyaktih svaradayah 
^abdarthasyanavacchede vi^e^asmrtihetavah.
The reading found in all the quotations is samyoga 
for 8amsarga(except in Hemacandra's Kfevyanu^aaana).
The meaning is not affeated by the difference in 
reading. _ _
.Laghumafljusa. p. llOf ;Kavyapraka~3a .ii: Sahityadarpana. ii; 
kavyanusfersana,p.39;Vrtt ivarttika,p.6;RasagahgSdhara,
pp.118 - 126.
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the homophones as the same word having different
meanings or as different words having the same
sound^there is the possibility of doubt as to the
exact meaning intended in a given sentence,because
of the ambiguity5and hence the contextual factors
are necessary to ascertain the prinary meaning of
the word in the context. These contextual factors
2mentioned by Bhartrhari are the following:-
(a)Samsarga or samyoga is a connection 
that is generally known to exist between two things; 
e.g. the term dhenu which normally means a cow or 
♦a mare* is restricted to the cow in the expression 
savatsa dhenuh (dhenu with the calf) and to the 
mare in saki^ora dhenuh (dhenu with the colt). 
Similarly,in the phrase sasankhacakro harib (Hari 
with a conch and a discus),the meaning of the word 
Hari(which normally means Visnu,a monkey etc.) 1b 
restricted to the sense of Visnu alone,since the 
association with the conch and the discus is 
applicable only to him.
1.This problem is expounded fully in the section on 
Abhidha. ^7.
2.Punyaraja,in his commentary,says that the list gives 
earlier views;but the list is quoted everywhere as 
embodying the views of Bhartrhari.
(b) Viprayoga is the disappearance of the 
connection that is known to exist between two things*
dhenu refers to the cow in the phrase avatsa 
dhenuh (dhenu without the calf). Similarly,the word 
hari refers to Visnu in the expression 1vi^ankhacakro 
harib (Hari without the conch and the discus),for the 
possibility association with the conch and the discus 
is found only in him.
(c) Sahacarya is companionship or mutual 
association;e.g.in the expression 'Rama and Laksmana1
♦Rama1 refers to the brother of Laksmana,and not to 
Balarama or Para^urama. Jagannatha distinguishes^this 
from samyoga thus? when the conxection (or the 
separation from that well known connection) restricting 
the denotation of a word is expressed by a distinct 
word (such as1with*or 'without1),it is samyo^a (or 
viprayoga);but when the two m  related things are 
stated together,as in a dvandva compound,it is 
sahacarya.
1 .Rasagahftadhara.p.124•
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(d) Virodhita~ is well known hostility as in 
"Kar^a and Arjuna" where fArjuna' refers to the 
enemy of Karna and not to Arjuna,son of Krtavirya. 
Vlrodhita may also be explained as •opposition* as 
in *ohaya a*id light" ,where ohaya means 'shade' and 
not * lustre*.
All these four factors could be brought 
under association. The meaning of a word is to be 
determined by the collocation of the words it keeps; 
in certain collocations a word may have one meaning 
and in certain other collocations it has a different 
moaning.1
(e) Arthah or the purpose served;e.g., 
sthanum bhaja bhavacchide (Worship sthapu for
removing the shakles of worldly existence). Here
_  / sthanu refers to the god Siva,and not to a pillar,
since the intended object could be obtained only
  / pby worshipping the god. Nagesa explains artha as 
•the meaning of another word* and gives the examples
l.Prof. Firth has developed a theory of meaning 
on the basis of collocation. See his article on 
•The Modes of Meaningfin Essays and Studies,1951•
"Anjalina juhoti" (He offers a handful of oblation) 
and "An.jalina suryam upatisthate (He worships the sun 
with folded hands). Here in the former case the word 
anjali is to be taken in the sense of 'hands placed 
side by side slightly hollowed so as to hold the 
oblation' and in the latter case it refers to the 
hands fully folded as a mark of salutation.
(f) Prakaraqa or context;e.g., devo .janati 
sarvam (My lord knows everything). Here 'deva' 
refers to the king and not to god. Another example 
is *saindhavam anaya' (Bring saindhava). The word 
saindhava means 'salt' as well as 'a horse'. If the 
sentenoe is uttered when a man is taking his meal, 
the word denotes 'salt';but if it is uttered when
he about to go out,the sense is to be taken as 
•a horse' •
(g)Linga is an ambiguous term which has 
been explained by writers in different ways. To the 
Mimamsakas it is the sense-potentiality or the 
implicit factor in the expressing of the sense.
(arthapraka^anasamarthyam). This is the same as
1.Lafthumanjuga ,p.HO.
2.AppayadIkgita (Vrttivarttilca,p.6) defines prakarana 
as vaktr^rotrbuaahisthata’.
3.Nyayako ^ a,p.71®
i-f 3  -
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artha} as explained by Nage^a.^ But the literary 
critioe generally take linga to be evidence from 
another word,such as an attribute(to restrict the 
meaning of the word, e.g., kupito makaradhvajah. 
Here the meaning of the word * makaradhva .ja1 is 
restricted to that of Kama, the god of love, who 
alone oan be connected with the characteristic 
’anger’ (and not to the 1 ocean’ which is also meant 
by the word). Here the association need not be a 
well-known one as in the case of samyoga, the 
attribute used here is only for rejecting the other 
meaning.
(h ) ^abdasyanyasya sannidhifr, the presence 
of another word. It is the use of a word having a 
meaning logioally connected with only one of the 
possible meanings of another* word, e.g., devasya 
purarateh (of the god, the enemy of the Puras).
1. Vide supra.
2. Thus, dividing with a spoon (sruvenavadyati) is 
different from dividing with a knife
(ohurlkayavadyati)
3* Pradipa commentary on Kavyaprakasas lingam
samyogatiriktaeambandhena para^oaksavyavartako 
dharmah.
Here the adjective ’god’ restricts the meaning of 
♦purarati * to the god ^iva ( Otherwise,the word 
could have meant a king who destroyed cities). 
Jagannatha gives** the example ’kareqa rajate riagafr* 
(The elephant shines beoause of his trunk). Here 
both the words kara antf naga are ambiguous(kara 
meaning ’hand’ and ’trunk*,and naga meaning ’an 
elephant’ and ’a snake’),but in this sentence each 
word restricts the meaning of the other.
(i) Samarthyam is the capacity that is 
known from the result. In the example ’madhumattah 
kokilah’ ( The cuckoo is intoxioated by madhu ), 
the word ’madhu’ means spring-time and not honey, 
since only the spring-time has the power to 
intoxicate the cuckoo.
X i )  Auciti is propriety or congruity.
In the example ’patu vo dayitamukham* ( May the 
favourableness of your beloved preserve you ),the 
word ’mukha’ means ’favourableness’ and not ’face’,
1 .  R asagangadhara» p .124
eince only the former sense has propriety in helping
1 2 the lover . According to some other commentators
it is the meaning of the word 1patu* that is
restricted here to the sense of 1 turning agreeably1•
But in either case it seems we have to get the sense
through laksapa, since favourableness1 is not one
of the primary senses of * mukha1 , or *turning
agreeably* that of the root 'pa*. perhaps,what is
meant by taking this sentence as an example of
auciti is that there is no necessity of resorting
to laksana in understanding the meaning of the
expression "May the face of your beloved preserve
you", but the meaning is got from the direct sense
of the words themselves.
(fc) Desa or place, e.g., *bhatiha paramesvarah 
(Here shines Paramesvara). In this case the reference 
to the place (*heref) shows that by *paramesvara* is 
meant *the king* and not the god.
1.Rasagahftadhara,p.124
2. See Jha*s translation of TTavyaprakgsa (chapter ii).
* i+n -
(1) Kala or time, e.g., citrabhanur 
vibhaty asau (Cltrabhanu is now shining) • If it 
is day time,the word 1citrabhanu* in the sentence 
means Tthe sun1,end if it is during night, it 
means ’the light of fire1.
(m ) Vy&kti or the grammatical gender,3" 
e*g*> mitro bhati means ’the sun shines* , but 
mitram bhati means ’the friend shines’.
(n ) Svara or accent. The meaning of a
Vedic passage depends on the proper accent used.
Thus 1 IndrasatrCih’ means the killer of Indra, but
indrasatruh means one whose killer is Indra.^
The Satapathabteahmaxjlo refers to the story about
Vrtra who lost his life,because of the wrong use . 3of accent in the chanting of mantras. Accents 
are employed only in the Vedic language;they are 
not considered as restricting the meaning of;* word
1 .  For the use of the term in this sense> see 
Papini, 1 • 2 • 51 •
2. Cf. PSnirilya^ikga»verse 52* mantro hinas svarato 
varnato va mithyaprsyukto na tam artham aha; sa 
vagvajro yajamanam hinasti yathendra^atrus svara­
to ’paradhat.
jata pathabrahmafia,1.6.3«1< atha yad abravid 
indra6atrur vardhasvcti tasmad u hainam indra 
#va j&ghana.
in Classical Sanskrit. The svara or accent must 
be distinguished clearly from kaku or intonation 
which plays an important role in bringing# out the 
nuances in most of the languages; the former is 
capable of objective analysis,and belongs to the 
primary meaning of words,whereas the latter can 
only suggest the subtle variations of meaning^.
The accent restricts the primary meaning of a word 
in Vedic Sanskrit,but not in Classical Sanskrit.
The intonation cannot restrict the primary meaning 
of a word,but can only suggest new and subtle 
ideaB and emotions. The accent refers mainly to
the word,while the intonation refers to the
2 •"expression as a whole.
'-jj'*  ‘ ~ 3 *V'The list is not exhaustive ; thus abhinaya
or gesture,a p a d e or pointing out directly etc.
are also to be taken as restricting the meaning of
a word in ambiguous cases.
1. See the section on Kaku. U  ^ ° )
2. Sahityadarpaqa,ii
3. This is indicated by the term adi in the list.
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Pour olassesof wordst Yaugika,Rudha.Yogarudha 
and Yaugikarudha.
Words are divided into four classes 
acoording to the different ways in which their 
meaning is determinedt yaugika or etymological, 
rudha or conventional, yogarudha or partly etymo­
logical and partly conventional,and yaugikarudha 
or that which oould be taken either as etymologioal 
or as conventional. Corresponding to these, the 
expressive powers of the words are called yoga. 
rudhit yogarudhi and yaugikarudhi.
(a) Yaugika. When a word retain# that 
signification which belongs to it according to its 
etymology, it is oalled yaugika. Its meaning is 
determined by those of its component parts, as it 
does not signify anything more or less than the 
meanings of its parts, e.g. pacaka (a cook); here 
the meaning of the word is known from the verbal root 
pao ( to cook) and the suffix aka signifying the 
agent of action. The meanings of such words can 
easily be understood from grammar and etymology.
1. Siddhantamuktavali.p.282 fi #aktam padandcacMM. 
tac oaturvidham kvacid yaugikam,kvaoid rudham 
kvacid yogaru<Jham,kvacid yaugikaru<Jham.
In the Brhaddevata~ it is said that ’•a word 
can be explained in five ways, viz, .as derived from 
a root, as derived from the derivative of a root, 
as derived from a compound meaning, as derived from 
a sentence and as of confused derivation." 1
(b) Ru<jha. When a word has a meaning whioh
is not directly connected with its etymology, it is
called rudha. In this case the meaning of the word
is determined by the whole word independently of the
part meanings, e.g.,gauh (a cow) »ghatah(a pot) •
Even rudha words can be derived from verbal roots,1 •
but the meaning will not depend on the etymological 
sense.
1. Brhaddevata.II- 104:
# dhatujam dhatujaj jKtam samastarthajam eva va 
vakya jam vyatiklrnam ca nirvaeyam pafibadhlT pad am 
See Macdonnell*s translation also.
Word derived from a sentence, e.g.,itihasa is 
derived from the sentence*iti ha asa*(lt happened thus). 
For examples of words derived from confusion of 
letters etc.,see Nirukta,II-i. Thus,simha(a lion) is 
derived from hims (to kill) by haplology.
2. Sometimes the word mandapa is given as an example 
of a ruflha word. It normally means a hall,but the 
etymological meaning of 'one who drinks the scum of 
rice* is also possible in this case,and hence the word 
belongs to the yaugikaruftha class. In Dinakariya
it is said that mandapa is a corrupt reading for 
mandala.(See aiddhfetamuktavali,p.283 and Dinakari 
thereon.
(o) Yoga rudha. When the meaning determined 
by the whole of the word (samudayafeakti) agrees with 
that determined by the parts, it is called yogarudha. 
Here the derivative meaning and the conventional 
meaning coincide and refer to the same object. Thus, 
it is partly etymological and partly conventional, 
e.g. ,paiika.ia which means a lotus by convention;the 
etymological sense !what grows in the mud* is also 
applicable to it. Even though both the meanings are 
applicable to the word, it is the conventional 
meaning that comes to the mind immediately on hearing 
the word. The well-known rule accepted by all 
Indian writers is that the conventional meaning is 
more powerful than the etymological meaning, since 
the former ocours to the mind immediately whereas 
the latter has to be known through analysis.^*
Another example generally given for this class of words 
krsnasarpa. which etymologically means *black 
snake1,but which is restricted by convention to the
ppoisonous cobra.
. ' !• V* • ?'V 4" ' YY  ^
1.Yogad rtTdhir baliyasi,^rghravrttitvat.
2 . ^ abdagakt iprakgbikg. 26 s yan^naina svavayavavrtti- 
labhySrthena samam svarthasyahvayakrt tan nama 
yogarSdham,yatha pankaja-krsnasarpa^1dharraadi.
It is interesting to compare the yogarudha
words with the nirudha laksanas^ The former is an 2 1 »--
example of the *law of specialization* in meaning, 
whereas the latter is an example of the *law of
generalization*. The original etymological sense/
is discernible in both cases; but it has slightly 
changed in popular usage; thus,panka.1a(mud-born) is 
not applied to all things that grow in toe mud,but 
is restricted to the lotus. So also the word ku^ala 
(one who cuts grass**) is used not only to* one whoA
is good at cutting grass,but in the sense of an expert. 
According to some scholars nirudha laksana should 
be taken as the primary meaning itself.
(d) Yaugikarudha. It is also referred to as 
rudhayaugika. When the meaning of the word can be 
ascertained either etymologically from the meanings 
of its component parts, or conventionally by the 
power of the whole word, it is oalled yaugikarudha. 
Both the meanings are determined independently of 
each other,and understood separately. The same word
l.Discussed in the chapter on Laksana. ^
gives one meaning when taken in its conventional 
sense and quite another if viewed as a derivative• 
e.g.the word udbhid means a tree,when taken in its 
etymological sense, while conventionally it is also 
used as the name of a sacrifice. Similarly afevagandhS 
cann be used in its etymological sense of ’having 
the smell of horses1,it is also used conventionally 
as the name of a particular plant. It is quite possible 
to consider that it is an instance of two words with 
two different meanings having the same form,one being 
yaugika and the other rudha.
It may be noted that this classification is 
mainly applicable to thw nouns. Jagadisa includes 
words with secondary signification (Lakgakajas another 
group in this classification.1 Words like kusala 
(grass-cutter, expert).pravTna( good at playing on 
the veena instrument,expert) ,dvirepha( having two ’r ’s, 
the bhramara or the bee)fln*M eto^come under this 
grpu p .
1. SabdaftaktiprakaHika.16i
ru<}ham ca lakpakam caiva yogarujham ca yaugikaa 
tao caturdhd" parai rddhayaugikam manyate ’dhikaa.
Etymology versus Popular usage.
Etymology was a popular subject in ancient 
India* Even the Tedic sages were very much interested 
in the derivation of popular words. Thus,sarplh 
(clarified butter) is derived from srp(to spread) 
and means *that which spreads*, and navanita (butter) 
is sow called beoause *it is taken when it is fresh1.1 
The principle of * etymology by contraction* - each 
word being derived from two or more component words-
was also resorted to by thwm. In the gjatapatfra
pBrahmana the word hrdaya ( heart) is derived from 
three different roots,h£,da and i. ^aka^ayana^ 
derived the word satya (truth) from the two roots
_  Aas and i. Yaska objects to this kind of derivation.
"In j.ndia the concept of verbal rather than
nominal roots is strongly embedded in grammatical
5thought."^ The etymologists as well as the grammarian
1.Durga’s commentary on Nirukta.1.14: yad asarpat
tat sarpir iti mantro,yan navam eva nTtam abhavad 
iti mantrap.
2.fetapatha Brahmana>14.8.4.1* tad Kk etad tryak^aram 
hrdayam iti. hr ity ekam aksaram abhiharaty asmai.
da ity ekam aksaram dadaty asmai. yam ity ekam aksaram 
eti svargam lokam ya evam veda iti.
3. Nirukta.1.13 4. Ibid.
5* W,S.Allen.The Origin and Development of Language, 
TPS,1948.
Sakatayana held that all nouns are derived from 
verbs^ On the other hand, Gargya;who was aunt an 
etymologist, and tfte- grammarians considered this 
view to be too sweeping and admitted the possibility
of some original nouns which cannot be traced to
2 -a verb. Yaska supports Gargya and says that if all 
nouns are derived from verbs which denote action,
every one will have as many names as the actions
3with which one is conoemed. But generally he 
subscribes to the verbal derivation of nouns.
PataXjali also refers to this controversy^ Pariini 
seems to have considered the unadi words as 
avyutpanna pratipadikas (under!vable stems). Nouns 
which can be regularly derived from verbal roots 
by the addition of suffixes form the subject matter 
of the krda&ta section; others which do not admit of 
such regular analysis are taken under the unadi class.
1.Nirukta»1.12t nSmany akhyata jahlti saka^ayano 
nairuktasamaja^ ca; Mbh.,ii,p.l38s nama oa dhatujam 
Sha nirukte vy5karag.e Sakatasya ca tokam.
2.flirukta,1.12t na sarva^Tti gargyo vaiyakarananam 
oaike•
3»rbids yavadbhir bhavais samprayujyeta tavadbhya 
namadheyapratilambhas syat.
4.Mbh..ii.p.138
5»Mbh..iii.p.241i pratipadikavijnanac ca pa^ines siddham; 
unadayo 1 vyutpannani prStfipadikani.
It is accepted by all schhols of thought in 
India that the meaning current in popular usage 
is more authoritative than the etymological meaning# 
Panini says that the authority of the samjna or the 
usage of words must always supersede the authority 
of the meaning dependent on derivationKatyayana 
says that the application of a word to an object 
rests mainly on the popular usage.2 Pataiijali 
maintains that the usage of sistas or the^people who 
actually speak the language is the final authority
■xon the application of words. Both KStyayana and 
PataHjali frequentjTappeal to current usage as the
4final authority on the gender and meaning of words.
The relation between words and their meanings is
5also established by the popular usage.
The fifiraamsakas have also laid down the principle 
that the meaning established by usage (ruflhi)is more 
powerful than the etymological interpretation^ samakhya)
1 .Panini .1.2.53i tad asigyam saih jMpram&natvat.
2.Vgrttika on Panini,1.2.68s dardanam hetufy. He kkn> 
says that the application of a word to an object can 
also rest on the root-meaning underlying it.
3.Mbh. orjfPajgiini,6.3• 109j si$ta5 ^abdesu pramfinanu
4.Mbh. on 1.1.21,1.1.65 jlokavijnanat siddham.
5.Mbh.first ahnikat siddhe sabdSrthasambandhe lokatah .
6. This is discussed in the chapter on Lakgana.
* $  if
In interpreting ancient texts like the Vedas, 
what should be done in the case of words that are not 
in use among the people of the land? Are we to depend 
on etymological interpretation* jftJT should we take 
into consideration the meaning of such words in other 
languages? This problem has been discussed Kumarila 
bhatta in the Tantravarttika. He says that the well- 
established usage is more authoritative than that 
meaning which is newly assumed.^In the case of loan 
words we have to accept the meaning*assigned to their 
III the foreign language itself, as that is also based 
on long usage. He criticizes the method,adopted by ~ 
some scholars,of trying to derive such foreign words 
from Sanskrit roots;^in the oase of the Dravidian 
words ending in consonants,some Aryans consider them 
as Sanskrit words by adding the neoessary vowel affixes: 
cor (rice),atar(road),pap(snake).mal(woman) and vair 
(stomach) are considered are taken to be the equivalents 
respectively of the Sanskrit words corab(thief).atarafr 
(difficult to cross),papah(evil),mala(garland).and 
vairi£(enemy)* etad try to explain them with reference to
1.Tantra va r t1ika.p.227: kalpanikySt prasiddegf oa 
ya k}.ptS sa ballyasl.
2. Ibid.,p.225f.
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the meanings attached to the Sanskrit words. He
attacks such ridiculous attempts at arbitrary
derivation of foreign words from Sanskrit roots.
Kumarilabhatta says that the usage of the foreigners
is as authoritative as that of the Aryans in all
worldly affairs. In cases like patrorua( a silk
garment) and varavaha( an armour) where the articles
are brought from the foreign country,how can we know
1
the meaning ,if the MJecchas do not point them out?
When the same word-form is used by the Aryans and 
the Mlecchas(foreigners) in different meanings, 
both are equally authoritative.Thus, yava,vetasa and 
varaha are used in the sense of barley-♦em,cane
and boar respectively by the Aryans,and long pepper,
2black berry and crow by the Mlecchas. Majority of
usage is no criterion for determining the primary
meaning of a word;for in the case of well-known
homonyms like aksa, all the meanings are accepted
as primary. The word pilu means a kind of tree in
Sanskrit,but it means an elephant ±k to the Mlecchas.
ofWhile interpreting ancient texts,the^use^the word in 
other vcontexts in the text has to be taken into account.
1 .Tantravart t ika,p .228.
2.This is following Sabara. Kumarilabhatta says that 
the second set of meanings a»e no longer known.
In the case of the oorrupt forms(apabhramsas),
however, the Mimamsakas do not consider them to be
independent wordB acceptable as synonyms of the
original words. The apabhramsas originate due to the
discrepancy of the speaker^but owing to long usage
people may mistake them as correct words. The
significance of suoh words ac is derived indirectly
through fcfc their association with the correct forms.
It is only in the case of universally accepted
synonyms like hastq and kara (for hand) that we need
assume both as correct words; in other cases it is
better to take one word as the oorrect one and the
others as the corrupt forms of it. The invariable
connection of words with meanings shows that an object
should not have many words to express it; it is not
2quite reasonable to have many synonymous words. 
Kumarilabhatta says that the corrupt forms of words 
become capable of expressing the meaning only by 
manifesting the potentiality of the original word, 
through their similarity with it.
1.VP.1.149;Punyaraja thereon*sabdaprakytir apabhramsa 
iti sahgra^karokteh.
2. MjmamsSsutra .1.3.26*^ anySya^ caneka^abdatvam
3.TantravSrttika on sutra 1.3«28.
«•  (o O  "
TK& PRIMARY- MEANING OF A WORD,
The exact nature of the primary meaning of 
a word has been discussed almost by every school of
Indian philosophy and there are different theories
1about the primary signification of a word.
According to the Naiyayikas of the old school 
a word means the vyakti or the particular,the akrti
or the generic shape or form and the jati or the
2,universal. It denotes the particular,connotes the 
universal and also stands for the shape distinguishing 
the particular from dissimilar things. All these 
three factors are present in the sense of a word; 
in a given contextf one factor is predominent and the 
others are subordinate. If in actual usage only one 
of the factors seems evident,it is not because the 
other two factors are absent,but because they are 
not useful in the context.
l.On this problem see:- D.M.Datta.Six Ways of Knowing;
PP•259-72;Huparikar.The Problem of Sanskrit Teaching, 
pp.410-427;P. C .Chakravarti.Linguistic.Speculation of 
of the Hindus.p. 185-205:Ganganatha JhatParvamlmainsa 
in its Souroes.pp.145-48;Hiriyanna.Vyadi and Vajapy&- 
yana>IHQ,Xr\r,pp26lff ;Tantravarttika. Translation, pp. 36 5fl 
Vakyapadiya.iii.Jatisamudde^a and Vyaktisamudde^a; 
NyayamaHjari.o p .177ff.
2.Nyayasutra.2.2.65: vyaktyakrtijatayas tu padarthah.
See also V&tsyayana*s BhSgya on that.
Among modem Naiyayikas some hold that the 
primary meaning of a word is a partioularam as
1characterized by both the universal and the form. 
This is a development of the old view. According to 
some others the primary meaning is the particular 
as characterized by the universal only;the generic 
shape is part of the universal and need not be 
included separately.
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According ot the Sahkhyas and some of the 
modem Naiyayikas the primary meaning of a word is 
the percept of the particular;the meaning of a word 
is cognized only through its connection with a
particular act,and each sentence would refer to
f fsome particular act. As Vatsy&yana says,an attribute 
can be predicated of an object alone,not of a universal.
1. i^abda^aktipraka^ika .under verse 19*
2.Siddhantamuktavali.under verse 81ijatiman ^abdarthaji. 
^aktir jjAtyakptivi^igtavyaktau vi^ramyati. See 
Dinakari on that,holding jativi^i^avyakti as the 
me aning.Jayantabhai^a(Nyayaaiddhantamahjari,pp.177f) 
also takes jativiiiptavyakti as the meaning of 
a word.
3.Nyayasutra.2.2.57 and the Bhagya thereon; Vivarana- 
prameyasahgraha.p .181;Nyayako6a»p.855tvyaktaV eva 
daktih,na tu gotvadi jatav a pit i navya ahuh; Nyfcaya si- 
ddh Ant aman .1 a r 1 . p . 17 8
4.NySyabhSsya on Nyayasutra 2.2.57.
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It is only the particulars that become the objects of
sense perception and of practical activity (arthakriyg-
karitva). Moreover,there are unique things like the
sun and the moon and proper names which cannot have 
Ia universal.
ZThe Jaina philosophers hold that a word like 
•oow’ does not mean a particular cow;the word applies 
to all animals having the general shape of a cow. So 
the primary meaning of a word is the akrti or the
shape. This explains the case of the proper names
3also. This view is oriticized on the ground that there 
are cases where,in spite of the similarity of shape, 
there is no identity of meaning,as in the case of a 
clay cow. Moreover substances like gold remain the 
same in spite of any change in the shape it may assume.
According to the Mimamsakas the primary 
meaning of a word is the universal concept which is
1. According to the Nyaya theory of samuh&laksana 
pratyasatti,the cognition of plurality is simply 
by extension of the particular,and not by an 
abstraction of the particulars;after seeing a 
single instance of a thing,we come to know the 
plurality of it through the form of the knowledge 
it assumes.(See P.T.Raju.Idealistic Thought of 
India,p.421?
2.  YivaranaprameyasaAgraha«p . 1 8 1sNyayasutra. 2 . 2 . 60. 
3* gy&yabhgsya on 2.2.61. “
the essential quality common to the particular 
instances of the class. It is admitted that while 
cognition of the meaning brought about by the word 
pertains to the universal,all practical activity 
that follows the word pertains to the particular.
But the primary relation of the word must be to the 
universal,for it would be impossible to understand 
the meaning of a word,say,1 cow* if it has to be 
understood with respect to all the particular cows. 
Moreover,there will be confusion if the primary 
meaning of the word is taken to be the particular, 
for if the meaning of the word 'cow* is known with 
respwct to a white cow,it will be difficult to 
understand that the word has reference to a black 
cow also. KumSrilabhatta argues that when he hear 
a word like * cow1,before we can have the idea of 
any particular cow,it is the universal common attribute
1.The early Mimatnsakas,Jaimini,Sahara,Kumarilabhatta, 
Prabhakara and Murari,as well as the Vedantins like
f  y \__Sankara,use the term akrti in the sense of .iati or the 
universal. Kumarilabha^ta says(£lokavarttika.ikrii 
section,verse 3):jatim evAk^tim prfihuh. Later 
writers use the term jSti itself.
2.The universal is the essential quality common to 
two or more instances of the classjto the Naiyayikas 
it is real and eternal(nityatve saty anekasamavetalant- 
tvam jatitvam),but to the Mimamsakas it is only the 
common essential characteristics existing in a
group of particulars(dravyagu#akarmavyttis samSnya- 
dharmah).To the former it is objectively real,but 
to the latter it is only an abstraction.
rof rcowness* that we oomprehend. If the word meant 
the particulars, there would not be any uniform
concept, since the particulars are found to have
Ivarious qualities.
Besides, the problem is what is the primary 
meaning of a word. When it is held that primarily 
a word means the universal, it is also admitted that 
the particular is implied when the word is used 
in a sentenoe. Aocording to the Bhatta school of 
Mimams'g, the particular meaning is known through 
laksana or the secondary significative power of the 
word, based on the incompatibility of the isolated 
primary meanings with the intention of the speaker 
to give a unified sense. According to Prabhakara and 
murarimisra, the particular is known from the m 
universal because of the invariable connection 
between the two, and since the same cognition 
oomprehends both the universal and the particular.
1.Tantravart1ika on sutra 1.3*33:
anantyavyabhicarabhyam saktyanekatvadosatafr 
na vyaktav ak^tau tu syat sarvam etat samahjasam 
anvayavyatirekabhyhm ekarupapratltitafc 
Skrteh prathamam jnane tasya evabhidheyata 
vyaktyakytyor abhedac ca vyavaharopayogitS
1 iiiga sahichy a d i samb and ha s samanadhi karany ad hih 
sarvopapannS oa yatah tasmat tatraiva kalpayet.
See also the translation,pp.363ff*
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According to the Advaita Vedantins,though 
there is no absolute reality for the distinction 
between vyakti (particular) and jati (universal), 
which are simply the concepts of the mind,from the 
point of view of phenomenal reality (vyavaharikasattA) 
the Miraamsa view,that the primary relation of the 
word is with the universal and not with the particular, 
is acceptable. The particular is also understood 
from the word,because the same cognition cognizes 
both the attribute and the substantive,the universal 
and the particular. Or we may take the view that 
the word primarily signifies the universal and 
secondarily (through lakgana) the particular.^
According to the Mimafasakas xt and the 
Vedantins,even proper noung are connotative;the 
knowledge of the identity of the same person from 
birth to death through all the ohanging stages is
1 .YedSntaparibhasa^IV: katham tarhi gavadipadad 
vyakter bhanam iti ced,jater vyaktisamanasamvit- 
samvedyatvad iti brumah; athava vyakter lakgapaya 
•vagamah.
The universal fcownessf is the upadhi or 
substratum for all the particular cows,but it 
cannot exist without its Asraya or the thing which 
inheres in it5an attribute cannot exist without 
a substance;hence the particular object.is implied by the u n i v e r s a l . This is ?rabha£ara<s view;
The Bhatta Miraanlsa view,that the particular is got 
from the universal through lakgana,is generally 
attributed to MapdanamiAra.iNyayakorfa,p.857 ).
explained on the basis of the ooramon attribute.
XModem logicians in the west like Bradley and Bosan- 
3quet agree that a proper name has a universal meaning 
as its connotation. As Wittgenstein says,a name
wsignifies only what is an element of reality,what
cannot be destroyed,what remains the same in all 
STchanges.*
Among the grammarians Vyafli held that "the 
meaning of a word is the particular which is the 
substantive, and kha not the universal which is the 
attribute. It is dravya.which stands for any 
particular of the class. VajapySyana,on the other
7hand,held the Ifflmaisaka view that it is the jati, 
the universal essential attribute,that is connoted
1. Sarvadar^anasangraha»section on Paninlyadarsana.
2. LOjgic,p.59
3. Essentials of Logic.p p .91ff. ^
4. Philosophical Investigations,p.59• C
5. Both the Mimamsakas and the Vedantins believe that 
the significative power of the word resides in the
.particular and in the universal,though in different 
degrees;in the particular its existence is only 
latent(svarupasatT) .whereas in the universal, it is 
express or_known_ (jhata satl). See Vedantaparibhasa.IVt 
"yadvl gavadipadariam vyaktav ^aktis svarupasat1! ,na 
tu jnata;jatau tu j!iat§f satl hetuh*
6 iKStyayanafs YSrttika on Pacini, 1^.2.64* dravy&bhidhanam 
Vy£dih;Helar5;ja on VP.iii• 3»2iYya$imate tu sarva^abda- 
riSm dravyam arthaft,tasyaiva saks(htkriyasamanvayopapa$
7* Helhraja.loc.cit. s V&japySyanacaryamatena s’Srvatriki 
jatipadCrthavyavasthapapadyate;Hiriyannatloo.cit#
1 £ by a word* Patanjali says that^ according to Paninit
the meaning of a word is both the universal and the
particular,since the sutra 1*2*58 is based on the
Yiew that the word means the universal,while the sutra
1*2.64 is on the assumption that a word means a
2,particular* Helaraja also says that according to 
the school of Paplni'a word means both the universal 
and the particular.
Bhartrhari discusses elaborately the various
3problems involved in thesec two views* Those who hold 
that the word meaning is the universal have to explain 
how in a sentence the universal can have any connection 
with the action which is the main constituent of the 
sentence. According to some the conorete particular 
is known through its invariable association(sahacarya) 
with the universal,even though it is not actually 
demoted by the word;thus the universal is only an 
upalaksana or the means for understanding the power
l.MBH*i*p*6: kim punar ak^tih pad5rthah,ahosvid
dravyam? ubhayam ity Aha. katham jnAyate? ubhayahha 
hy acaryepa sutrapi pa^hitAni.
2>Helara.1atloc *cit * \ pA^inidarsane jStidravye 
sabderi&bhidh^yate•
3«VP«iii.Jatisamudde^a and Dravyasamuddesa.
4*VP.iii. 3*6; ke^Aflcit s&hacaryepa jAti6 rfaktyupa- 
lakqanam*
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of denotation{according to some others the particular
is known on the basis of the intention of the speaker,
J
through lakgana.Bhalftrhari says that every word,first
of all,means the class of that word;thus*cow1 means
the universal of the words having the form ‘cowrit
is the universal of the 1 form-meant1. Later it is
superimposed on the universal of the 1thing-meant*.
Thus^ the word first gives the idea of its form and
then fctefca that of its referent. The upholders of this
view believe that even in the case of proper msacx
nouns it is the jgti that is meant by the word;they
3also accept a universal within another.
Bhartrhari says that in all phenomenal 
entities there are two rattttaa elements;jati refers 
to the real element and vyakti to the unreal. The 
particulars suffer changes whereas jSti remains 
constant. The jati is the essence of things* It is
the sattS or existence that is in things that is 
denoted by jati;all activity exhibited in the world
1.Helaraja on V P . i i i . 3*: anyepam punas tatparyena._
2.VP.iii.3*6• svd jatih prathamam ^abdais sarvair eva- 
bhidhiyate tato 1rthajatirupegu tadadhyaro^akalpanfif.
3*Thus,there is no non-connotative word to them. See 
Heisraja,loc.cit.: vaiyakarapariam ... jatigv api 
jatir aviruddh&;tath£ canvayirupeuabhidhiyamano guno 
jatir eva,evam kriyapj abhedenabhidhiyamana jatih.*
4*VP.iii*3«32:satyam yat tatra s'® jatir asatyST 
vyaktayas smrtffh.
~ Cd ^
can be considered as its manifestation*
According to those who hold that the meaning 
of a word is dravya or substance,it is not necessarily 
any external concrete object that is to be meant,but 
the mental image produced in us of the object( The 
meaning is mental ratier than physical. It is not 
even necessary that the mental picture should have 
a corresponding physical object in the wotld. This 
view is almost in keeping with that of the Yijnanavada 
school of Buddhism.
The grammarians**. who held dravya or substance 
to be the ultimate meaning of words also explained it 
as a reality which is the essence,the soul and the 
real nature of the thin-. Thus whether the meaning 
of the word is the universal or the substance,it is 
something real and permanent^ The meaning of the word 
must be something permanent and real.
1.VP.iii.3*13: anupravrttirupam yam prakhyatam 
ak^tim vidul kecid vySVrttirupAm tu dravyatvena 
pracak^ate.^HelAraja says,: vyavrttAkarabuddhi- 
sannive^itvad akaro ' tra dar^ane dravyam iti 
prasahgad uktam.
2. PataHjali(MBH.on siltray.i.119)defines dravya as 
that which does not lose its essence when different 
qualities come to inhere in itiyasya gunantaresv 
api pradurbhavatsp tattvam na vihanyate|tad dravyam.
PataHjali says that the import of words ^  
is to be understood with regard to either jati 
(universal),guna( quality), kriya (action) or 
yadycoha^abdas or proper nouns.^ The "Slahkarikas 
generally follow this view of the grammarians.
All common nouns are indiwative of the jati; thus, 
the oowness(gotva) in cow is the very essence whioh 
resides in all cows and whioh distinguishes cows 
from other animals. Guna or quality is the attribute 
which distinguishes one thing from others of the 
same class; thus, the quality of whiteness serves 
to distinguish a white cow from a black one. Guna 
always an accomplished fact( siddha) ♦ Kri.ya or 
action is something to be aoooTnplished(saddhya)» and 
is a process consisting of a series of successive 
actions. Yaska also refers to the verb(akhyata) 
as denoting an action occupying successive periods
' ^  ^  V ?••• 3fe"‘ •*of time. In the case of the proper nouns,the words 
refer directly to the things named.
1.Mbh.i,p.lli catustayi ^abd&nam pravyttih;jatisabdah 
kXlyaatabiac guna^abdah kriy*5dabda yadrccha^abdaa
caturthah*
2. Sahityadarpana. ii > sanketo grhyate jatau gu^adravye*' 
v kriyasu ca* KavyaprakST^a,iis tatra mukhya^ catur-
* bhedo^ jatyerdibhedataft.
3♦ Nirukta, 1.1 < purvaparibhutam bhavam akhyatenaca^ta*
4* MImamsakas take only jati as the import, but
they accept a jati for guna,kriya andp proper nouns
The Buddhist Dootrine of APOHA
Whereas the Mimamsakas and the Naiyayikas 
believe that words have direct reference to objective 
realities, the Buddhist philosophers maintain that 
the essence of meaning is negative in character and
that words have no direct reference to objective
\realities. According to the Buddhists words deal 
directly with conceptual images which are purely 
subjective constructions of the mind Ivikalpas), and 
therefore, there can be no real connection between 
words and the external objects. The meaning of a word 
is a conceptual image (vikalpa-fwhose essenoe is the 
negation of all its counter-correlates (Anyapoha); 
the word 'cow' does not actually mean the animal with 
dewlap,horns eto.,il means only the exclusion of all 
objects that arevnot the cow.
The .uudahists do not accept the view of the 
Mimamsakas and the Naiyayikas about the existence of 
a positive entity called the universal (samanya or jati)
1. DignSga: vikalpayonayas sabda vikalpa sabdayonayah 
(quoted in Stoherbatslay ,Buddhist Logic.II.p.405n^
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To them only the particular at a time-point (svalaksana)
is ultimately real. The so-called objective world is
made up of a succession of such momentary particulars
like the still pictures of a cinema,1 Strictly speaking,
these momentary particulars produce mutually different
resuits,but since they produce the same sensation, they
all appear as identical. Dharmakirti saysfckack that
the sensation of sameness is produced by a repeated
series of the same perception,and that the sameness of
the particulars is the oonsequence of the fact that they
2produce the same sensation. The mutual differences of 
these particulars is not grasped,and hence,man imputes 
sameness to them,by the common exclusion of all the 
others. The efficiency ofAthe particulars is the basis 
of differentiation: all things which produce certain 
results are different from those that do not produce 
them.
1.bergson (Creative Evolution.London. 1928.p.322) 
compares our cognitive apparatus with a cinematograph 
which reconstitutes a movement out of momemtary 
stabilized snapshots.
2.Dharmakirti,quoted by Vacaspatimisra in HVTT: 
ekapratyavamar^asya hetutvad dhlr abhedinl 
ekadhlhetubhavena vyaktlham apy aoninnata.
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±o the Buddhists pratyaksa or real perception 
is the unerring knowledge of the unique particular 
that is given directly by the senses; the name and the 
concept through which we generally interpret the 
particular not to be included in perception,since 
it is the mind that supplies them. Indeterminate 
perception is the only pratyaksa according to them.
The Vaiyakara^as,on the other hand, consider that 
there is no knowledge without language and concepts; 
knowledge must always be determinate. The Naiyayikastilr
distinguish between indeterminate perception (nirvikalpa
pratyaksa) and determinate perception( savikalpa paxaajDtiar
pratyaksa);but they say thatithe indeterminate stage
is not actually experienced,but is to be inferred.
The Mimamsakas,however,accept both the stages of
perception as valid means of knowledge; but to them
indeterminate perception is only that a unattended by
verbal images,as in the case of children or the dumb.
The Vedantins also believe that it is possible to have
different stages of perception before the fully
ldeveloped perceptual judgement.
l.See D.M.Datta.The Six Ways of Knowing.pp.31-94.
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Acoording to the Buddhists the conceptual image 
of a thing has no direct correspondence with the real 
external things which are mutually different; the apparent 
identity of the image is produced by the identical 
efficiency of the things. Just as different medicinal 
plants have the same febrifuge influence,even though 
they do not have the same form, so also the different 
things like the black and the white cow become the 
cause of the same xapajcKOt repeated uniform image, 
without the presence in them of any real universal.^
These conceptual images which are actually unreal can, 
however, bring about purposeful action in dailp life. 
Every one experiences his own images,but the imaginative 
operations of different individuals agree with one 
another. It is like the visual experience of two 
persons suffering from the same eye-disease,both seeing 
the moon double. Like the Vedantins?the Buddhists also 
believed^that there are two kinds of truths,the practical 
or empirical truth and the supreme truth.
1.Por a^detailed discussion of the problem see 
Prauwellner1 s article in W Z K M . v o l * . - h  i
2. para and apara vidya In Mundakopanisad.1.1.4 
samvrtisatya and paramarthasatya.See Nfigftrjuna’s
MfidhyamikakSrik£. XXIV. 8: dv^ satye samupfisritya 
buddhanam dharmade^anS lokaegiivrtisatyam ca satyam ca 
paramarthatah•
A word cannot signify a unique particular, 
since the particulars are momentary entities and do 
not continue up to the time that conventional relation 
is apprehended. Even if verbal relation is supposed 
to exist in one particular at an instant, it cannot 
serve any other particulars, and the word •cow* would 
mean only one cow at a particular time,and not others. 
Moreover, it is impossible for one to know the conven­
tional relation of the word with all the particulars, 
past,present and future. Thusythere can be no compre­
hension of a verbal connection with regard to particulars 
either individually or collectively.1 As for the 
universal, it is only an intellectual fiction without 
any reality.
A word cannot denote any positive real thing, 
because only the momentary particular thing-in-itself 
(svalakdana) is ultimately real. The meaning of a word 
is primarily and naturally a conceptual construction
(vikabpa) and not an objective fact. The relation between
2the two is one of cause and effect ;the word produces
1 .Tattvasahgrahapanjika.p.2781 na hy adrstesv atltahagata- 
bhedabhinnesu samayas sambhavaty atiprasahgat.
2.Prameyakamalamarttanda.p.441i tatpratibimbakam ca sabdena 
janyamanatvat k£ryam eveti MryakaranabhSva eVa vacya- 
vacakabhavah.
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the purely subjective conoept,which is negative in 
nature,consisting as it does in the exclusion of 
other concepts to make it distinct. Hence ^ he meaning 
of a word has to be considered as the negation of 
the concepts counter-correlates,as the exclusion of 
everything other than the concept.
When Dignaga first promulgated this theory
of Apoha establishing the negative essence of meaning
in the fifth chapter of his Pramanasamuccaya,he seems
to have explained it in terms of pure negation
without any positive reference. Many works on the
1subject are available in Tibetan translation; but it 
is mainly from its representation by the opponents of 
Buddhism like Kuma£ilabhatta,Udyotakara and Bhamaha 
that we get some clear ideas about the original form 
of the theory of Jtpluuc Apoha. They all oriticize the Vfrmr; 
theory on the assumption that it is a purely negative 
approach. In the Tattvasahgraha?^antiraksita suggests 
that when Dignaga denied the positive import of words, 
it was on the ground that from the logioal point of 
view, words did not have any reference to a positive 
reality.
1. Stoherbat skit . Buddhist Logic . II. p. 404 *
2.Verse 1097I asambhavo vidher uktas samanyader asambha- 
vat sahd&nam ca vikalpiuiam vastuto1 visayatvatah.
v. 7 7
Some of the main arguments adduced by the 
Buddhists for assuming that the meaning of a word 
is essentially negative in nature are the following!-
(a) Similarity between things absolutely 
dissimilar can be established only by the common 
exclusion of their counter-correlates, different 
animals such as the cow,the horse,the burfalo and the. 
elephant oan be classed together as similar, sjiiiy oy 
taking tnem as lnon-lionsf\  xf the word 'cow is 
to oe used to me*n different k m a s  ox cows,the red,the 
black and the brown, it oan be only by the negation 
of the non-cow. There oan be no positive similarity 
between such different objects as the red and the 
black. The word 1 cow*,therefore, does not denote 
a positive object cow, but means only the negation 
of the non-cow.
vb) Anything that can De alternately affirmed 
and denied is necessarily of the nature or exclusion
1* JMVTT ,p. 486* atyantavilaksahAnam saiak^apiyam
anyavyavyttikytarn eva. yatha gavfidvamahi^amatanganam 
atyantavilakaapanSm api simhavyavrtya salakaapyam.
See also .parthas'&rathimldra1 s commenxa-ry on the 
alokavartxiica,p. 56b •
of its counter-oorrelate^. In the case of every word 
we find an element common to both existence and 
nonexistence; for a word like ‘cow* can be connected 
either with 'is* or with fis not*. If the meaning 
of the word were exclusively positive, it could not 
be connected with ‘is not*,as that would be a contra­
diction. x,either could it be connected with ‘is1,since 
that would be superfluous. Hence,the cognition of 
the common element must be attributed to some cause 
which is negative in nature; it must lie in the 
exclusion of all other things.
(c) The meaning of a word is directly experii 
enced as something distinct,something whose essence 
consists in the negation of its counter-correlates.
If the objects of determinate perception were not 
cognized directly as an exclusion of their counter­
correlates, a man ordered to tie up a cow might proceed 
to tie up a horse,as he would not recognize the .difference
1. NYTT,p.486i yad bhavabhavasamanyam tad anyavyavrtti- 
rupam eva.
2. NVTT,p •487i anubhuyata eva vikalpavi^ayo vyavyttirupah. 
tathfi hi tadapratibhasane gam badhaneti deVito f£vam 
badhnlyat•
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Dignaga seems to have carried out this
negative approach to meaning even in the case of
expressions like fblue lotus'; here the term 'blue'
is used to exclude all lotuses that are not blue,
and the term 'lotus' to exclude all blue things
that are not lotuses^ Thus the expression signifies
the negation of the relation »non-blue non-lotus'.
This view is quite similar to the theory of Vyadi
that the meaning of a sentence is not samsarga or
the mutual association of the word meanings,but the
2mutual exclusion (bheda) of these. Ratnakirti says 
that in a sentenoe that in_^a sentence every word 
denotes a negation. Thus,in the sentenoe "This road 
leads to Srughna", th* word 'this' excludes all roads 
other than the one indicated, 'road' excludes footpaths 
eto. 'leads to' shows that it is not a blind path, 
and'Srughna' excludes all the other plaoes.
In recent times De Saussure has advanced a 
similar theory in his Courrde Linguistique Generale.
1. Prameyakamalamarttanda.p.436: dignagena visepa^ia- 
vi^e eyabhavasamarthan&rtham "nilotpalhdi^abda 
arthentaraniv^ttivisi^tan arthan Shufr" ity uktam.
See also Tattvasahgraha.p.301.
2. This is disoussed in detail in the section on 
'The Relation of words in a sentence». (_ \> - to <0
3* Apohasiddhi.p.16.
-He says that in language there are only differences 
without positive terms (Dans la langue il ny a que des 
differences ...sans termes positifs) Though we 
say that meanings correspond to concepts, we have to 
understand that these concepts are not positive in 
their content, hut only differential. The function 
of a word is contextual elimination. Thus,the meaning 
of a word in a sentenoe will be modified,if a 
neighbouring term undergoes modification.
After establishing the negative essence
of meaning in the case of words, De Saussure says
that the sign and the thing signified are negative
only when taken separately, but their combination
is a positive fact. This idea is also similar to
the Buddhistic theory according to which the import
2of a sentence is positive,even though the meanings of
ahjL. 3
the individual words,taken separately,im- negative.
!• Couis. .pp. 167*175: See also 3.Yarma.Indian 
Semantics. Journal of the Dept, of Letters,
Calcutta University,1926,p.24; Firth.Technique 
of Semantios.p.63
2. Tattvasahgraha.verse 923ivakyarthah pratibhalak^apo'. 
Also Kamalatflla's commentary on verse922: v&kyarthah 
pratibhakhyo 'yarn.
3. Prof. Firth suggestsCloo.cit.) that"it is 3US^ 
possible that he had learned something of Indian 
philosophy. 11
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This Apoha theory of negative approach
towards meaning has been vehemently criticized by
f y *  —  —scholars like Ud^takara,Kumarilabhatta,Bhamaha and
1Udayana. The arguments adduced in favour of the theory 
are set aside as weak and unconvincing. Their reply 
to the Buddhistfa arguments are the followingi-
(a) The sameness of reference in the cognition 
of different objects like the black cow and the red 
cow is to be explained by the assumption of a positive 
entity,the universal. Unless we assume such a universal, 
it is not possible to explain expressions like 
"The black cow", for if ’cow' negates all non-cows, 
it will include all cows,black and white,and the term 
’black cow* would be a contradiction. With the 
conception of a positive universal^ cowness embraoing 
all the cows,black and white,there will be no 
difficulty in such oases.
1 .uayotakara»U.yayavarttika.pp. 320-3315 Kumaril&bhatta, 
^lokavarttlka.Apoha section;Bhamaha.Bhamahalankara; 
Udayana,Atmatattvaviveka.ohapter-1;Jayantabha^ta, 
Nyayamanj ari,pp.302-317;Prabhsoandra,Prameyakamala- 
marttanda.pp.437ff.
2. ^lokavarttika.p.567
(b) If we assume the existence of a positive 
universal, there is no logical contradiction involved
in connecting ’is* or *iB not* with a word. "A universal 
is an eternal entity, but residing in an infinite 
number of particulars scattered in time and space, 
it can be alternately affirmed or denied; affirmation 
means the universal*s connection with the particular 
in the present time,while negation means its connection 
with the individual in the past or future.**'*’
(c) It is contrary to experience to suggest 
that the word denotes only the negation of the 
counter-oorrelate,and not any positive entity. When
we hear a word, it is the positive idea that comes
2to our mind.
Kumarilabhatta says that the negation of a thing 
positively unknown is impossible; so the meaning of 
the term *non-cow* can be understood only if we know
Wlu-
1.Stcherbatsky.Buddhist Logic .p.404. See also NVTT,p.487i 
ya hi svarupato nityapi de ^ aKalavikirnanakatntavyaktya- 
^rayataya bhavabhavasSdhSrai^I bhavaty astinastisamban- 
dhayogyS.vartamanavyaktisambandhita hi jater astita, 
atltanagatavyaktisambandhita ca nastita iti.
2. Tat tvasaiigraha. verse 9111 _
vidhirapavasayena mati^ Aabdi pravartate
_  2 -
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what •cow* means. If the meaning of ’cow’ depends 
on that of ’non-cow1 and the meaning of ’non-cow* 
depends aqp on that of 'cow1, there will be a vicious 
circle. And if the meaning of the term ’cow* is already 
known, it is unnecessary to search for the meaning 
of ’non-cow*.
Bhamaha criticizes the Aphha theory on the
ground that a word can express only one meaning at one
time. If the meaning of the word ’cow’ is the negation
of the non-cow, then it will be necessary to search
for another word which gives the positive idea of the
animal. The same word cannot give simultaneously two
2
meanings,one positive and the other negative.
Kumarilabhatta says^that even negative 
expressions like ’non-brahmin' signify a positive entity.
1.&lokavarttika,Apoha section,verses 83-84*
siddhaef cagor apohyeta gonisedhatmakas ca sa£ 
tatra gaur eva vaktavyo naha yaty pratisidhyate 
sa ced agonivrtyatma bhaved anyonyasanidrayah 
siddha^ ced gaur apohartham vrthapohaprakalpanam
2. BhamahSlahkara.vi.verses 17-18*
yadi gaur ity ayam £abdas samartho 'nyanivartane 
janako gavi gobuddher m^gyatam aparo dhvanifc 
nanu jiianaphalas sabda na caikasya phaladvayam 
apavadavidhijnanarn phalam ekasya vah katham?
3. Slokavarttika.Apoha section,verse 35.
Negation can be of two kinds: absolute negation 
(prasajya pratigedha) and specifio negation (paryudSsa)♦ 
Absolute negation would mean the negation of all 
reality and existence; if that were the meaning of 
speeoh, then speech would be impossible, since all 
words would mean the same uniform absolute non-existence. 
If the negation is merely specific negation, it means 
that the Buddhists are indirectly accepting a positive 
entity as the meaning of words; for specific negation 
is a positive entity; the word *cow* will then mean 
something general and positive,which negates the 
non-cow. It is the same as the universal ’cowness* of 
the Mimamsakas.1
Again, if negation were the import of words, 
expressions like "blue lotus" bearing the relation of 
attribute and substance will be impossible. The co-exist­
ence of blue and lotus will be impossible,if the words 
*blue’and ’lotus* do not denote positive entities.
7  — -  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
1. Slokavarttika.Apoha section,verses 2 and 10*
bh&vShtarfitmako 'bhava yena sarvo vyavasthitah 
tatra^vadinivrttyatma bhavah ka iti kathyatam 
tasmat sarvesu yal rupam pratyekam parinisthitam 
gobuddhis tannimitfh syhd gotvad anyac ca n&sti tad.
2. Prameyakamalami5rttanda.p.437: vi^e^anatvam apohasya 
ayuktam. See also ^1okavSrttika,p.59of.
3. lyayavSrttika.P* 334*yasya canyapoha^^abdarthah 
tenSnilShutpalavyudSsau katham samanadhikaranau iti 
vaktavyam.
An attribute must always be a real,positive,entity•
Even if the theory of Apoha could explain 
some of the words referring to substantives, this 
theory will fail to explain the meaning of words like 
'and1 or 'thus*. Udyotakara says that in the case of 
the word 'all* the negative explanation of the meaning 
fails completely,since nothing could possibly be 
excluded from 'all1.1
With such criticisms from the realistic Hindu 
philosophers, the later Buddhistic scholars found it 
necessary to modify their conception of Apoha. Thus, 
in the Tattvasangraha of S&ntiraksita we find a slightly 
different approaoh to the problem. He admits that mere
negation is not what is apprehended from a word. In fact,
Xthere is no affirmation without negation; the affirmation 
of something is always concomitant with the exclusion
1.Nyayavartt ika, p. 3 52 * na hy asarvam nama kinoid asti, 
yak yat sarvapadena nivartyate.
Udyotakara gives many subtle arguments against the 
Apoha theory. He asks,'’How can we understand the 
meaning of ’two', if it excludes ’one*, since'two'is 
made up of adding ’one' to another 'one'?1’ (dvyadi- 
^abdansm samucoayavisayatvad ekadipratisedhe...)
2.Tat tvasahgraha.verse 1020* nanvayo vyatirekavan.
See also Kamala6ila thereon* na hi vij§£± tlyayyavrtta- 
sya kasyacit sambhavo ’sti; tena ekasya ^abdasya 
phaladvayam aviruddham eva.
*pk\r
of everything else. Santirakeita says that Kumarila- 
bhatta and Udyotakara did not understand the real 
significance of the Apoha theory.
■ V  - * < ' < » ; ** , "■> •"‘‘S i ,
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There is nothing incongruous in a single word 
bringing about two notions,one positive and the other 
negative. The two notions are not brought about
• ;  *  • j t j
simultaneously; the positive meaning is known direotly,
and the negation or the exclusion of everything else
is known through implication. From a negative
statement like "The fat boy does not eat by day" we
understand the positive idea about his eating during
night; similarly both the meanings are known from 
1 'the word. Sfintiraksita is laying stress on the fact
that the words of our speech,although directly meaning
a concept which is only a subjective construct without
any objective reality,indirectly refer to,the particular
real thing also. This particular thing is also called
2a negation,since it is something unique in itself.
1.Tattvasahgraha,verse 1020: divabhojanavakyader 
ivasyapi phaladvayam.
For Jinendrabuddhi18 arguments in favour of the 
Apoha doctrine,see Stoherbatsky.Buddhist Logio.1.pp.46lff.
2.The meaning of the word is the image whioh seems 
identified with the object.
A slightly different interpretation of the
Apoha theory is found in the Apohasiddhi of Ratnakirti.
He says that a word has both a positive and a negative
signification^ He rejeots ^antirakftita*s view that 
sa word conveyed a positive meaning first,and a negative
2meaning later by logical implication. He also rejects 
the view that negation is the direct meaning and that 
the positive notion comes later? According to 
Ratnakirti, the essence of meaning consists in 
affirmation qualified by the negation of all other
Athings; This simultaneous cognition of the positive 
and negative elements of meaning is a matter of 
experience. Just as in the term 1indivara* (blue lotus) 
the element of'blue'and the element of 'lotus * are 
cognized simultaneously, so also in every word the 
two elements of the wocxtit meaning are grasped
5siraultane ously.
1.For a detailed exposition of Ratnakirti*s views on 
Apoha,see Satkari Mookerjee.Buddhist doctrine of Flux 
pp.l30ff.;S. Yarma,Analysis of Meaning in Indian 
Semantics, pp. 2 5ff •
2.Apohasiddhi.p.3;nahi vidhim pratipadya kascid artha- 
pattitafr pa^cad apoham avagacchati.
3. Ibid. apoham vs pratipadyanyapo<Jham.
4. Ibid,p.17ianygpohavi^isto vijStivyavyttyartho viihih 
sa eva capoha^abdavScyaef sabd&nsm arthafc.
5* Ibid.p.4> yathS nllotpale nive^itad indTvara^abdan 
nllotpalapratltau tatkala eva nnimasphura^am,tathS' 
go£abdBd api.
This interpretation of the Apoha theory is
—  1generally attributed to Ratnakirti, but it seems td 
have been put forward first by the Buddhist writer 
Jnanasri. Udayana says^in his Atmatattvaviveka that 
in order to explain the difficulty of mutual dependence 
of the arguments in favour of the Apoha theory 
resulting in a vioious circle,- the concept of ’cow1 
depending on that of ’non-cow’ and the concept of 
’non-cow’ depending on that of ’cow’ -Jnanasri put 
forward the view that both the positive and the 
negative concepts associated with the meaning of a 
word are felt simultaneously*
The great importance of this Apoha theory 
"lies in the faot that it radically eliminates every
c
attempt to maintain the reality of uni ver sals, whet her
as real entities^ external and ubiquitous,residing in
all attaining particulars, or as meanings having
3whatsoever objective reality*B
l*3»Varma,op*cit*,p.25s 8*Mookerjee,op*cit.,pp*132f.
2♦Atmatattvaviveka* pp*118f t "tatah*pratitav itaretara- 
srayatvam uktam saiikete sancarya yat parihrtam 
jnana^riya ..."
3 * Stcherbat sky *Buddhist Logic JI* p * 404 *
An indirect influence of the Apoha theory 
may be found in the negative definitions adopted by 
the later Naiyayikas for logical precision. Thus," •. , . *,* "i • • * j ' • rY\JtA*
vyapti or conoomitance is noSt- defined^as a necessary 
connection of the cause with effeot, but as the 
connection of the cause with the counter-correlate 
of the absolute non-existence of result.1
pProf.Siddhesvara Varma says that "while the 
Hindu and Jain writers on philosophy and semantics 
define meaning in terms of a relation,Buddhist 
philosophy defines meaning as negation." It must be 
stated here that the Buddhist also considered the 
significative power of words as being baded on the 
reciprocal relation of the word and the mental image
*5produced. This mental image or vikalpa connoted by 
the word is,according to the Buddhists, not grounded
ifin an objective reality. As Mookerjee says,"There is 
no difference(in opinion) whatsoever about the fact 
that the connotation of a word is a concept,subjective
1. Hetuswwaiadhikaranatyantabiiavaprat iyogisadhya- 
samanadhikarapy am ’
2.1oc.oit.»p.2Q
3*Dignaga,jvikalpayonaya^ ^abda vikalpa sabdayonayafc.
(Quoted by Stcherbatsky,11,405n)
4*o p .cit.,p.l37
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in faot though objective in reference*. The difference 
of opinion among the various schools of thought is 
mainly about the nature of this conceptual image. 
According to the Buddhists, the external reality is 
not presented in the conceptual knowledge} but a 
Mia. volitional urge towards the real things can be 
created by the conceptual images beoause of the
. v’
similairity of the mental make^of the human beings.
Both the speaker and the listener have similar
illusions; what they see and hear are really their
own mental concepts,but both think that they are
referring to the objective reality. Hence language
is a convenient means of communivation. Santiraksita
says that linguistic discourse is in faot similar
to the conversation between two people,both suffering
from the same ophthalmic disease and both seeing the
moon double, about the nature of the moon.”* Pillsbury
says,*We come then to the conclusion that meaning is
practically everything. We always see the meaning as
we look,think in meaning as we think,act in terms of
meaning when we act. Apparently we are never conscious
2of anything but meaning". According to the Buddhists
1. Tat tvasahgraha. verse 1211: timiropahatakso hi yatha 
praha '~4&4idvayam svasamaya tatha sarva kabdT vyavah^tir 
mat a.
2. W.B.Pillsbury, Meaning and Image .Psychological Review, 
xif 19o8,p.l56.
this conceptual image has no real stuff in it,and is 
negative in content. They accept reality only to the 
simple,non-conceptual cognition which is absolutely 
free from all verbal association; this kind of 
indeterminate knowledge may be experienced,but cannot 
be direotly communicated by words,since it is beyond 
the reach of words or concepts.
Bhartrhari holds a very similar view about
ir>a.p per m3
the whole discourse betognfcotte in terms of our 
conceptual images and the words which symbolize them. 
But & he denies emphatically the possibility of an 
indeterminate knowledge beyond the reach of words.
He says^that all knowledge is interpenetrated with 
words and that it is impossible to have a cognition 
which is free from word association. The critios 
like Jayantabhatta who find fault^with Bhartrharifs 
philosophy take(word' literally in the sense of the 
spoken word; but to Bhartj*hari ^abda or the word is 
much more than this. To him it is ultimately 
identical with the conceptual image idfcskft itself.
X * VP.i.124: na so * sti pratyayo loke ya^ ^abdanugamad 
rte anuviddham iva jnfinam sarvam 6abdena bhasate.
2. Ny ay amah .1 ar i (Vi z. Sakt. Se r i e s). p. 99
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THE ‘ THEORY OP LINGUISTIC SYMBOLS
The Doctrine of Sphota
The doctrine of sphota is one of the most 
important contributions of India to the central 
problem of semantics in general linguistics. It 
maintains that the word or the sentence is to be 
considered not as a pattern made up of different 
sound units arranged in a particular order, but mainly 
as a single meaningful symbol^* whose parts are not 
relevant to it qua symbol. The word or the sentence 
thus considered as a single meaningful symbol is 
called the sphota. The artioulated sounds used in 
linguistic discourse are merely the means by which 
the symbol is revealed; it is this symbol whioh is 
the meaning-bearer. It may also be called the word 
or the sentence considered from the sematic aspect.
It is indivisible and has no time-order; the articulated 
sounds with the time-order are resorted to only as 
a means of revealing this symbol.
1."Symbol* is an ambiguous term used by different 
scholars in different senses.(See W.MVrban,Language 
and Reality,pp.407,411-14). Here the term is used 
in the sense of a linguistic sign and not in the senses 
in which it is employed by tJrban(loc.cit.) and Sir A.G. 
Gardiner (The Theory of Speech and Language,p.101 n.) 
For a detailed study on symbolism see E.Cassirer, 
Philosophie der symbolischen Formen(3 vols.,Berlin, 
1983-29).
This sphota theory wa8 fully developed and 
systematized by the great grammarian-philosopher 
Bhartrhari in his Vakyapadiya; but some of the ideas 
underlying this theory can be found even in earlier J 
grammatical and philosophical literature. There is 
no evidence ,however, to show that Papinl knew anything 
similar to the sphota theory, in spite of the fact 
that Haradatta^and Nage^abhatta^refer to the tradition 
ascribing this theory to sage Sphotayana,mentioned 
as an authority by Panini himself.^
According to Bhartrhari,speech and thought
4are only two aspects of the same speech-principle.
A sentenoe is to be considered as •a single undivided 
5utteranoe1 and itB meaning is *an instantaneous flash
'2 6of insight *(pratibha). Thought has no structure; so also 
an utteranoe. The central idea underlying Bhartrhari^ 
linguistic theory is the view tfearifc J m that the sentenoe
l.Padamanjari under Pacini,VI.1.123s sphotayanas sphota- 
pratipadanaparo vaiyakarapacaryah.
2.Sphotavada.p.lQ2i vaiyakarapanlige6as sphotayanar^er 
mat am pari^kptyoktavfiAistatra prlyatiam jagadl^vara^i.
3•Panini,V I •1•12 3 s avail sphotayanasya
4*VP.ii.31sskasyaivatmano bhedau sabdarthau appthak sthi- 
tau. The interdependence of speech and mind(thought) 
is given in the A itareyo pani gad > van me manasi prati- 
sthit5,mano me vaci pratisthitam.See also Raghuvainsa,1.1i 
vagarthav lava samprktau'.’ ; *
5«VP.ii.2i eko *navayava6 sabdah.
6.VP.ii.ll9,145.
||B|the fundamental linguistic fact, and that words are V 
unreal abstractions from the sentence. The sentence- 
meaning is also to be grasped as a unity. The division s 
s.-and -%-ord-meanings are only useful means In '$M 
■She sfud^ of language,and have no reality in themselves*
According to Yaska,Audumbarayaqa held the view
that only the sentenoe is really found in the minds of
1 2 the speaJeer and the listener. Bhartrhari says that
Vartakga also held the?same view. This school of thought
started by Audumbarayapa may be considered as the
3forerunner*of the 3pho ta dootrine of Bhartrhari.
4.Dr.Betty Heimann Suggests that the view of the
gjfd?nina|^anaf tha-f- a - sentence must contain a verb *■ 
(»r that the most imperii*}; element in a senteno. is 
the verb denoting action) foreshadows the sphota doctrine, 
She says,-This concept of a predeveloped Immanent general 
potentiality centred in the verb itself gives room for I
the acceptance of other faetors of complex potentialities
csuch as is the sphota. i s  in the;,:Mahnbhasya of
Patanjail that the first mention of the'theory ocours.
^S^^^A-Iiittdriyanityam vacanam audumbarayai^ati.
2•VP•ii.347
3«See J .BroughpAudumbarEya.uaf rt Theory of Language.BSQAS. 
♦♦Betty Heimann.Sphota and Artha, XIV,part 1.
*A Volume of studies presented to Prof.P.V.?Tane.pp.221ff 
5.Ibid,p.222. c ^
SeMbh.i.p.181.
Pataniali *b view oft the ephota1 tat an;) all distinguishes between two aspects
of words,the Sphota and the Dhvani;the former is the
permanent element in the word and may be considered
a& the essential word,whereas the latter is the
actualised and ephemeral element and im an attribute
&of the former. The Sphota may be a single letter 
(varna) or a fixed pattern of letters and is the norm; 
it remains constant and istnot affected by the pecu­
liarities of the individual speakers. Even when 
pronounced by different speakers with different tempos, 
its linguistic value is the same. The absolute vowel- 
length and the individual peculiarities of the parti­
cular instances are of the Dhvanis and depend on 
the individuality of the speaker and the effort with 
which the words are uttered. The Sphota is permanent 
and unchanging and is manifested by the ephemeral 
Dhvanis uttered by the speaker and heard by the
listener. These are that respectively the Prakrtadhvani
3and the Vaikrtadhvani of the later grammarians. This
1. Mbh,i.p.181:
Dhvanis sphota^ ca dabdariam dhvanis tu khalu 
laksyate ;alpo mahgrh? ca dabdan&m ubhayam tat 
svabhBvatah.
2. Sphotas dabdah#dhvani^ ^abdagunah.(ibid)
See also: Dvau grabdStmSnau.nityah ktfryad' ca.(ibid)
3• ;K.A.Subrahmania Iyer,The Doctrine
2X S p h o t a ,v,pp. 121-122. j .Brough,Theories of 
General Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians,
TPS, 1951, PP* 32-37
-3 t '
distinction is supposed to have been made by the 
great grammarian Vyadi who is earlier than 
Katyayana. The well-known verse in the Vakyapadiya 
defining the two types of Dhvanis is considered 
by some commentators to be a quotation from 
Vyadi*s famous work,the Sangraha. According to 
this verse the 1 primary sound* or Prakrtadhvani 
is defined as the cause of the perception of the 
letters and the *modified sound* or the Vaikpta- 
dhvani isjeonsidered as the cause for the differ­
ences in speed of utterance(vrtti).
This distinction between the virtual and 
permanent element in language and the ephemeral 
elements at the various instances of its actua­
lization is known even to Katyayana,though he 
does not apply the terms Sphota and Dhvani to them.~”Y
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1. Vyadi is the author of the Sangraha whioh is 
devoted to the philosophy of grammar and which 
is known only from quotations.
2. VP.i.77:
Varnasya grahane hetub prakrto dhvanir 
igyate. ^ Vrttibhede nimittatvam vaikrtah prati- 
padyate.
In the discussion of. Panini Sutra "Taparas tat-
1 *kalasya" he says that the rowels are fixed and 
that the styles of diction (vrtti) depend upon 
the speech habits of the speaker* It is while 
explaining this portion that Patanjali gives the 
term Sphota to the word considered as a time- 
series pattern of letters and the xfc term Dhvani 
to the actualized sound. This is illustrated 
with the analogy of a drum-beat. "When a drum 
is struok,one drum-beat may travel twenty feet, 
another thirty,another forty;but the Sphota is 
precisely such and such a size,the increase in 
length is caused by the sound.
Thus it is clear that for Patanjali a 
word as a Sphota is a fixed pattern which can be 
analysed as a succession of sound-units;it has a
l.Papini,1.i.70.
2* Avasthita varaS.vaktu^ oiraoiravacanad vrttayo 
vi61syante.Mbh.i.p.181.Cf.also p.355«
?• Bherlm ahatya ka^cid vim^ati padani gacchati, 
kadcit trimsat ka^oio catvarim^at.Sphota^ oa 
t5vSn eva bhavati.dhvanikrt& vrd&hih. Mbh.i.p.181
normal and fixed size,and is entirely different
from the Sphota of the later grammarians which
has no size or parts. Patahjali also speaks of
the Sphota of a single letter(varna). In discuss­
ant ~ f Iing Panini Sutra "Krpo ro lah"(In the root krp-,
2, . r is replaced by 1 ) he says that "in bothpases
(r and 1) it is only the Sphota that is taught
in the Sutra."X In other words,an r-sound is
3
replaced by an 1-sound.
It is true that later commentators like 
Nagoji Bhatta try to jt read the fully developed 
Sphota theory into these statements of Patanjali, 
but a oareful study of these passages shows that
nuPatanjali's conception of Sphota was entirely
mm
different from that of the later grammarians.
To him the Sphota is not a single indivisible 
symbol considered as the meaning-bearer,but only 
a time-series pattern of unchanging sound-unit s.
1.Pacini,VIII.ii.18
2. Ubhayatas sphotamatram nirdisyate,ra-sruter 
la-i^rutir bhavatXtjl. Mbh.i.p.181.
3. J.Brough.op.oit.p.37.
Patanjali seems to have been influenced 
very much by the theory of the Mimamsakas about the 
permanent nature of the letters or varnas. They 
distinguished between the virtual and permanent 
sound-units and the sounds produced and heard at 
the actual instances of their utteranoe. The latter 
are only the manifestations of the former* The 
rapi^fmedium and slow styles of diction*are only
for the manifesting agents and do not touch the
1  i *nature of the letters. Sankara says that when we
hear the speech of some one known to us,we reoo- 
gnize not only what he says,but also who he is; 
but the latter information is oonveyed only by 
the voice and not by the words and cannot there­
fore,be considered as part of the meaning of the 
speeoh* Even though the absolute speed of utter­
ance and other peculiarities of speeoh are of 
the sound and not of the words,the difference 
between short and long vowels has to be taken as 
linguistically significant. Kumarila Bhatta refers
1. druta,madhyama and vilambita.
5* Commentary on the Brahmasutra 1.3.28.
to the view that the long vowels should not be
considered as modifications of the short ones,
\but should be treated as different letters.
The Mimamsa doctrine about the permanence 
of the letters is analogous to the modem theory 
of phonemes,even though the full significance of 
the modem linguistic theory was not known to the
ancient Indians. The distinction between the
Hu,"phonematic pattern" of the word.termed^Sphota
by Patafcjali,and the actual sounds or Dhvanis
produced at the instances of their utterance may
be compared to De Saussure*s duality of langue 
%
and P&role. The latter is the individual speech- 
activity and is ephemeral and contingent. The langue, 
on the contrary,is the social product of the faculty 
of speeoh and is relatively constant. The smallest
acoustic units of la parole are the sounds,whereas
/1.Slokavarttika.Sphotavffda <
VamShtaratyam evffhuh kecid dTrghaplutgdigu.
2.P.De Saussure.Cours de linguistique gen^rale.
See also UllmanniThe Principle of Semantics,p.27f.
3. On the modern theory of phonemes see W.F.Twa- 
ddell,0n defining the phoneme;Firth,Technique 
of Semantics.pp.34ff;D.Jones.The Phoneme tits 
nature and use.
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th e  en gra in s^ in  l a  la n g u e ( t h e  r e s i d u a l  t r a c e s  l e f t  
i n  th e  m inds o f  members o f  th e  s p e e c h  com m unity) 
a r e  th e  phonem es. The phoneme i n  a la n g u a g e  
rem a in s th e  same ev e n  when u t t e r e d  by d i f f e r e n t  
p e o p le  a t  d i f f e r e n t  sp e e d s  and  i n t o n a t i o n s .  The 
phonem es o r  th e  p h on em atic  p a t t e r n  w ith  th e  norm al 
t im e  s e q u e l  i s  a n a lo g o u s  t o  th e  S p h ota  o f  P a t a n j a l i  
and th e  so u n d s o f  l a  p a r o le  t o  h i s  D h v a n is .
Even th ou gh  P a t a f i j a l i ’ s  c o n c e p t io n  o f  ^  
S p h ota  i s  d i f f e r e n t  from  t h a t  d e v e lo p e d  by B h a r tr ­
h a r i  in  th e  V a k y a p a d iy a , some o f  th e  fu n d a m en ta l 
p rob lem s i n  la n g u a g e  p e r c e p t io n  t h a t  le d  t o  th e  
a ssu m p tio n  o f  t h a t  d o c t r in e  w ere n o t  unknown t o  
h im . He w as f u l l y  c o n s c io u s  o f  th e  im p o rta n ce  o f  
th e  se m a n tic  a s p e c t  o f  la n g u a g e . When th e  Mimamsa 
s c h o l a r ' d e f i n e s  a word a s  th e  a g g r e g a te  o f  th e  
l e t t e r s  in t o  w h ich  i t  co u ld  be a n a ly s e d ,P a t a H j a l i  
d e f i n e s  i t  a s  t h a t  w h ich  when u t t e r e d  b r in g s  a b o u t  
th e  n o t io n  o f  t h e v th in g-m eant* . I n  th e  b e g in n in g  o f
1 ■ I ■ —  ■  ■■■ I ■ .  I I ■ ■■■ ■  —  I . .  ..I I—  — .M l I . I .11 I | . | .  .  ■ .
1. ^abarabhasya,vol.i,p.8: Gaur ityatra kas 
§abdab? gakaraukaravisarjanlyS iti bhagavan 
TJpavar sah. CfY^ahkara1 s BhST^ya on BrahmasDtra 
l.iii.28* Varna eva sabda iti bhagavan Upavar-
the Mahabhasya he raises the question,what is the
I
word foowf? The final answer he gives is this* "It
is that by means of whioh,when uttered,there arises
an understanding of creatures with dewlap,tail,
hump,hooves and horns"# The commentators have made
it clear that here the term "uttered"(uccarita) is
UBed in the sense of "revealed" or "brought to
light"(abhivyakta). Thus Pataftjali lays special
emphasis on the fact that a word is a word only
when it haB a meaning. This is something against
the orthodox jflLmamsa view^hat an aggregate of
letters,when manifested,is a linguistic utterance,
even when there is no meaning, or when the meaning
is not understood .Kiimarila Bhatta^C says that even
the individual letters should be considered as
a*linguistic piece1(£abda) though they do not
3 ‘convey any meaning,and that in the oase of words
—     —  —   ■ ■      . . .       .
1# Mbh.i.p.lt Gaur ity atra ka^ e'abdafr? • •. Yeno- 
coaritena sgsnalSLhgulakakudakhuravisSninam 
sampratyayo bhavati sa ^abdahT"
Cf.Mandana»Sphotasiddhi.verse 3i Arthavaseya- 
prasavanimittam ^abda isyate.
2 # Slokavarttika.Sphotavada. verse 5:
JEasm|c chro,tr^payjftqfajfoag. M l  axthftffl gftfflftyfin 
an va, sarvatha tasya fiabda.tyaffl lotaaiddhaa na
hTyatn.
3. Na va' pratyayakatvnt syad ekavamegv asabdata.
1(ibid,verse 7)
I
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also the idea of the sabda occurs to the hearer
I
even before the meaning is understood.
The problem of the perception of a tempo­
ral series is also discussed by Patahjali and 
Katyayana. When a word is uttered,the different 
sounds come one after another in the exact order 
in which they are uttered. There is not a single 
moment when all the sounds are perceived together.
Then how is it possible that the word is grasped
rtU. _ .
as a whole? In the discussion of Panini Sutra
A
' “  ^Paras sannikarsas samhita, Katyayana raises the
objection that it is impossible for the letters,
that are destroyed as soon as they are produced,
3to be together and to have a sequence. Taking the 
example of the word gauh.Patanjali says that the 
word cannot exist a s  a whole,since the letters 
come one after another. "When the speech is in g, 
it cannot be in au and h;when it i s  in au,it can­
not be in g and hjand when it is in h,it cannot
l.Wa ca prag arthavijnanac chrotragrafaye na 
?abdadhih. (jLbid. .verse 8).
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3 .Mbh. i . p . 3 5 6 1 "Paurvaparyam  a k a la v y a p e ta m  sa m h ita  
o e t  purv5parabh5vg&  a sam h itam . w "E k a ik a v a ra a -  
v a r t i t y g d  v a c a  u c o a r ita p r a d d h v a m sitv f ic  ca  * 
gfaWshfimT"""
be in  g  and a u . Each l e t t e r  r e q u ir e s  a s p e o i a l  
e f f o r t  t o  p rod u ce i t , and i t  d is a p p e a r s  a s  th e  
e f f o r t  i s  changed  t o  produce th e  n e x t  l e t t e r . n 
The s o l u t i o n  t o  th e  prob lem  i s  n o t  g iv e n  w ith  th e
h e lp * o f  th e  S p h ota  t h e o r y .  P a t a n j a l i  s a y s  t h a t
*
e v e n  th o u g h  th e  l e t t e r s  ca n n o t c o e x i s t  a t  th e  
t im e  o f  u t t e r a n c e , t h e y  can  do so  i n  th e  mind o f  
th e  sp e a k e r  a s  w e l l  a s  th e  l i s t e n e r s , a n d  t h a t  th e  
o r d e r  o f  seq u en ce  o f  th e  l e t t e r s  i s  a l s o  t o  be
3
g ra sp e d  i n  th e  mind on th e  b a s i s  o f  th e  m ean in g .
... ;  i  -A> •' . v  ’* V * ’S / V '  • '  , '.V - - > : V  • v * -
Thus i t  seem s t h a t  a c c o r d in g  t o  P a ta n j fc l i  th e  u n i t y  
o f  th e  word i s  p a r t ly  due t o  th e  u n i t y  o f  m eaning; 
th e  s im u lta n e o u s  g r a s p in g  o f  th e  word i s  somehow  
e f f e c t e d  i n  th e  m in d ,e v e n  th o u g h  th e  l e t t e r s  t h a t  
make i t  up a r e  pronounced  s e p a r a t e ly ; t h e  k now ledge  
o f  th e  se q u en ce  o f  th e  o r d e r  o f  th e  l e t t e r s  i s
1.Gaur iti yavad gakare vag vartate naukare na 
visarjanlye.ygvad aukare na gakSTre na visarjariiye 
yavad visarjaniye na gakare naukSreTTibid.p.356)
2.Yenaiva yatnenaiko varna uocaryate viochinne 
varaa upasamhytya tain anyam upSdgya dvitlyah 
prayu.iyate tatha foritlyas tatha caturthah.
~Zy Yibid.p.355)3.Buddhau kytva sarvae ceqtah karta dhlras 
tanvannttih. gabdan arthSn vgoygn drstvg buddhau 
kuryat paurvSparyam.fibid.p.356V
1
also there* Patanjali does not discuss the problem 
as to how this is done*
The question as to whether or not the 
individual letters in a word have meaning is also
Idiscussed by Patanjali,though he does not give any 
final answer,since according to him the answer 
depends on the point of view taken. On the one 
hand it may be said that letters are meaningful, 
since meaning can be understood from verbal roots, 
stems,suffixes and particles which consist of a 
single letter and also since the substitution of 
a different letter can produce a difference to 
the meaning,while the absence of a letter may 
make it impossible to understand the meaning of 
a word. On the other hand it may also be said that 
letters are meaningless in themselves,since a 
meaning is not understood by the hearer from each 
letter separately. Here we find that Patanjali
1. Mbh.i.p.220. Arthavanto varna dh&tu-pratipadika- 
pratyayanipStangm ekavaman^m arthadarsanSd,
varuavyatyaye c^rthghtaragamanad,varpgnupala- 
bdhau cSnarthagateh. AnarthakSs tu prativarnam 
arth&iupalabdheh.
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was vaguely conscious of the role of letters in 
building up the higher units which are full symbols 
with a meaning of their ownjbut it was left to 
Bhartrhari to develop the theory of symbols in 
his Sphota doctrine.Patanjali did not consider the 
word as an indivisible and time-less symbol,apart 
from the letters that are revealed when the word is 
uttered. Of course,unlike the Mimamsakas,he knew 
the importanwe of the meaning-bearing aspeot of 
words;but he could not explain it fully. According 
to him the intelligent man could,somehow,grasp all 
the letters of the word together in the mind,along 
with the knowledge of their order of sequence, ^he 
Unity of the word is based mainly on the unity of 
the meaning.
Very little is known about the linguistic
discussions in India during the period after
Patanjali and before Bhartrhari. From the many
•
l .K u m a r ila  B h a tt*  h a s a l s o  s t a t e d  t h a t  i t  i s  a c c e p te d  
by a l l  th e  d i f f e r e n t  s c h o o ls  o f  th o u g h t  t h a t  a lo n g  
w ith  th e  k n ow led ge o f  s e q u e n c e ,th e  l e t t e r s  c o n s t i ­
t u t i n g  th e  word m ust be com prehended i n  th e  mind 
a s  a w h o les
Sarvesu oaivam arthegu manasam sarvavadinam 
Istam samuccayajiianani kramajrlgnegu satsv api 
* V t Slokav5rtika, Sphotavada »
v e r s e  1 1 3 ) .
-tov-
references to the various theories in many a
linguistic problem mentioned in the Vakyapadiya
it is certain that the period was one of active
speculation. The Sphota theory of Bhartrhari
is the culmination of many suoh attempts in the
solution of the linguistic problems that were
worrying scholars in the various philosophical
sohools. Sahara's Bhasya on the Mimamsa Sutras,
Vatsyayana's Bhasya on the Nyaya Sutras,Vyasa*s
IBhasya on the Yoga Sutras and the disoussions 
«
of the early Buddhist philosophers must have
greatly influenced Bhartrhari in moulding his 
views about the real nature of language.
The Nyaya philosophers held that Sabda
is linguistio utterance and is only a collection 
of sounds which are produced by the movements of 
the vocal organs of the speaker. The sounds 
vanish as soon as they are produced and are,
1. There is difference of opinion about the 
identity of the author of the Yoga Sutras 
with the grammarian Pataffjali. Though the 
Yoga school has accepted the Sphota theory,
,there is no direct reference to it in the 
Yoga Sutras.
2. Nyaya SutrasiII.ii.13 -II.ii.38.
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therefore,ephemeral. The Naiyayikas do not 
accept permanent letters as the Mimamsakas do; 
instead,they explain the recognition of the 
letters,when uttered by different persons at 
different times,as due to the faot that they are 
particular instances of the same Universal;the 
idea of identity is only due tot their similarity. 
According to them the meaning of a word is presen­
ted to the mind of the listener by the last sound 
aided by the memory impressions of the preceding 
sounds. Since the isolated sounds of a word 
cannot individually present its meaning,they 
must do so jointly. Since they come one after 
another into the mind,they are not perceived 
together as a whole. Each sound perceived leaves 
its impression behind,and the apprehension of the 
last sound,aided by the accumulated impressions 
of the preceding sounds,presents the meaning of 
the word.
This view is linguistically quite unsatis­
factory. Even if we admit that the sense data are
received as a series of atomic perceptions,we 
have again to assume that we remember,through 
the impressions,not only the various sounds,but 
also their order. If the sounds are also remem­
bered in the same order in which they are uttered, 
how could they be simultaneously grasped? And how 
could these sounds be a meaning-bearing word? The 
sounds by themselves have no capaoity to attaoh 
themselves directly to a meaning;so it is necessary 
to postulate a single entity as the meaning-bearer. 
To explain how am meaning is understood from a 
word or a sentence,it is necessary to assume that 
the word or the sentence is 8 single meaning- 
bearing unit. This is what the Snhota doctrine 
really does.^
The Mimarasakas who defined a word as the 
aggregate of the letters which make it up were 
also foroed to accept a theory similar to that of
■7^ 3/the Naiyayikas. Sahara says that the meaning is
1.Cf.J .Brough,0£iCit.p •38•
2. Ifarvapurvavarnaj anitasamskarasahit o*ntyo 
varnah pratygyakah. ^abara BhSgya
conveyed by the last letter aided by the impre­
ssions produoed in the mind by the preceding 
letters. The main difference between the views 
held by the Naiyayikas and the Mimamsakas is that 
the former considered the letters to be ephemeral 
whereas the latter believed that the letters 
are permanent. The impressions or SaAakaras are 
the traces left on the mind by experience and can 
produce the recollection,when needed,of what has 
been experienced. They are analogous to the 
"engrams" in modem psychology. The SamskSras 
of the individual letters in a word can produce 
only the reoollection of the letters heard;they ta 
have no power to convey the meaning. So the
Mimamsakas have to assume a special power for
Ithese SamskSras to convey the meaning also. Again, 
the order in which the letters are uttered is 
only for the act of utterance and not for the 
letters themselves,which,according to the MlmaA- 
sakas,are permanent. But unless we assume the
1. KUmarila Bhatta says that there is no harm in 
assuming su<^ h an additional function to the 
Samskffrasi Slokavartika»Sphotavada.verse 1031 
YadyVapi smrtihetutvam saAskgrasya Vyavasthitam 
ArthBktaresu samarthyam na tasya pratisidhyate.
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order of sequence to these impressions,the 
process of understanding o3r meaning cannot he 
explained.
The Yoga Sutra speaks about the confusion
among ordinary people of the spoken word,the
wthing-meantn and the concept formed in the mind,
and explainns it as due to the erroneous mutual
superimposition of these * Sabdarthapratyayanam
itaretaradhyasafr sankarah. While explaining this
I ’passage,Vyasa discusses the problem connected with 
the auditory perception of speech* His explana­
tion is almost on the lines of the Sphota theory, 
though Vyasa does not use the term Sphota at all* 
He says that when a series of letters is uttered 
in the conventional order,the mind of the hearer 
grasps it as an indivisible unit haying no time 
sequence* This unity,termed a word,is,in every 
case,brought to light by a single effort of the 
mind. It is the knowledge of the last letter
1. Bhasya on Yoga Sutra III.17t
Tad etegam arthasahketavaochinrihrihm upasamhrta- 
dhvanikramangm ya eko buddhinirbhasas tad padam
( CtfvJU)
that operates on the mind and makes It grasp the 
whole word as a single unit. It is indivisible, 
having no time sequence,and not made up of 
separate letters. The minds of the members of 
the speech community are permeated by the use of 
speeoh to which no beginning can be assigned; 
hence the word is understood by people as some­
thing real in itself. Thus arises the common 
understanding of the word. Really this is due to 
an erroneous superimposition of the word,the 
object and the concept,and is based on memory.
«Ce,Even among ^ ancient Indian grammarians 
who accepted the Sphota as the essential element 
in speech there was difference of opinion about 
the real nature of the Sphota. In the Vakyapadiya 
Bhartrhari himself mentions many of these earlier
ekabuddhivi sayam ekaprayatnaksiptam abhagam 
akramam avarnam bauddham antyavarnapraiadapc- 
tyayavyap&ropasthapitam paratra pratipipada- 
yisayg vanaair ej^hidjifyamftnair uccgryamSLyairf 
^ruyamanaiei oavsrotybhir anadivagvyavah&ra- 
vasananuviddhayg lokabuddhyS siddhavat saifa- 
pratipatyg pratiyate. • ^
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theories. According to one school of thought the 
Sphota consisted of the original articulatedi
sounds produced by the oontaot of the different 
Yooal organs with the various places of articu­
lation. These sounds disappear as soon as they 
are produced,but they are the cause of producing 
other sounds which spread in all directions like 
the reflections of the original sounds. These 
subsequent sounds produced by the Sphota are
Xr
called the Dhvanis. These move like water-waves,
becoming weaker and weaker.as tajc they go farther
*
and farther from the Sphota.The absolute length
and other individual peculiarities are only for
the Dhvanis.though they seem to be for the Sphota
itself. This is similar to the view heltf by
fPatanjali himself. In fact the commentator of the
- I I I , -
\
1. VP.i.verse 103: Yas samyogavibhagabhyam 
karanair upajanyate * Sa sphota^ febdajg^ sabda 
dhvanafro fnyair udfihrtah.
2. Vlclsantanavac ca srotram da^adigavasthitanam 
upagacchanti. Commentary on VP.i.verse X 103.
3. Cf. K.A.Subrahmania Iyer.Who are the Anitya- 
sphotavadins?.POC.19 3 5.p p .2 S8ff.
4. Patanjali is generally considered to have held 
the viewl that the Sphat§ is permanent;but the 
Mahabha^ya passage could be explained as 
supporting this theory also.
vBgyapadTya.while explaining this view,gives the 
illustration of the drum and the stick found in 
the MaHabhagya itself.
Another theory,slightly different from 
the previous one,is that both the Dhvanis and the 
Sphota are produoed simultaneously. According to 
the previous theory the Sphota is produced first; 
but according to this theory there is no interval 
between the production of the Sphota and the 
Dhvanis. The Sphota is the central sound and may 
be compared to A a flame;the Dhvanis are like the 
light spreading in all directions. Sometimes we 
hear the Dhvanis without recognizing the Sphota, 
just as we perceive the light even without seeing 
the flame. These two theories hold that the Sphota 
is produoed by human effort and is ephemeral.
Aocording to the third view mentioned in 
the Ylkyapadlya regarding the nature of the Sphota 
and the Dhvanis.the former is the class and the 
latter are its members. He says that aocording to
1.Commentary on YP.i.104^ Yatha bheridandabtxghata- 
iasya karyaparampara duram anupatati.
2. VP.i.105* Durat prabheva dlpasya dhvanimatran 
tu lakyyate.
some the Sphota is the class revealed by the 
various individual instances and the Dhvanis are 
the members of this class. Many scholars have 
taken this theory as that of Bhartrhari himself. 
Bven Bhattoji Dikqita quotes this verse in 
support of thd view that Bhartrhari aocepted 
the Class-Sphota theory. Here it is important to 
note that for Bhartrhari the Sphota is the word 
or the sentence taken as a single meaningful unit; 
if he aooepts the ooncept of the class,it will be 
a class whose members thammttaMca are themselves 
Spho^as. The identification of Sphota with the 
class of Dhvanis without any reference to the 
meaning-bearing aspect is entirely against ttut 
Bhartrhari*s conception of Sphota.
1. VP.i.94:
Anekavyaktyabhivyangya '.jatis sphota iti smrta ;jj 
Kai&oid vyaktaya evasyS dhvanitvena prakalpit&. 
Cf. J .Brough.op.cit., p•4 4f.
2. &abdakaustubha.p.9• Bhat^oji Dik^ita took the 
first line of the verse as a complete statement; 
but,as Nagoji Bhatta has shown(Sphotavada.p.99). 
the word kaiscit is to be taken with the first 
line.
3« Similarly Patanjali's statement(Mbh.i.p.26) 
"ubhayatas sphotam&tram nirdisyate .ra-^ruter 
la-srutir bhavatlti* is also taken to be in 
support of this theory of Class-Spho^a.
4* J.Brough.loo.oit.
This third view about the Sphota.mentioned 
by Bhartrhari,is analogous to the view expressed 
by Bertrand Russell. He says:- "The spoken word 
•dog" is not a single entity* it is a class of 
similar movements of the tongue, throat and larynx* 
Just as jumping is one class of bodily movements, 
and walking another, so the uttered word "dog" is 
a third class of bodily movements. The word "dog" 
is a universal,just as dog is a universal. We say, 
loosely,that we oan utter the same word "dog" on 
two oooaslons,but in fact we utter two examples of 
the same species. There is thus no difference of 
logioal status between dog and the word "dog": 
each is general,and exists only in instances.
The word "dog" is a certain class of verbal utter­
ances, just as dog is a certain class of quadrupeds. 
Exactly similar remarks apply to the heard word 
and to the written word."
Referring to the Sphota theory of the 
Indian grammarians Prof. P.T.Raju says:-" This 
sohool believes in a sort of universal called 
Sphota for every word also like fcow’, *house * and
1.An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth,p.24.
2.The Universayin the Western and the Indian 
Philosophy.Rddhakrishna Volume.p.394*
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•roan*. For though these words are uttered by different 
persond at different times with different intonation, 
pitoh etc., they are recognized to be the same, and 
though the syllables of the word are uttered in 
succession, they are comprehended together; $nd both 
facts can be explained by postulating a unitary 
word-universal called sphota.* This is only the third 
view about the nature of the sphota referred to by 
Bhartrhari, and should not be taken to be the final 
view accepted by Bhartrhari and the later grammarians.
Bhartrhari^ discussion about the nature of the sphota
Bhartrhari begins the disoussion on the sphota 
theory with the observation that words or sentences 
can be considered under two aspects, as sound-patterns 
or as meaning-bearing symbols. He says that in meaningful 
language linguists recognize two entities,both of whioh 
may be called words* one is the underlying cause of the 
artioulated sounds, while the other is attached to 
the meaning*^
Dvav upadana^abdesu ^abdau ^abdavido viduh 
Eko nimittam ^abdanam aparo *rthe prayujyate.
1. VP.i.44.
The former is the sound-pattem which is the external 
facet of the language symbol, while the latter is the 
semantic facet which expresses the meaning. Janus-like, 
words have two faces: the external face looks at the 
sounds(dhvani).while the internal face looks at the 
meaning(artha)• The underlying cause of the articulated 
sounds(^abdanSm nimittam) is the sound-pattem which 
underlies instances of the utterance of the word; this 
abstract sound-pattem with the time-sequenoe still 
attached to it is called prakrta-dhvani and is the 
external aspect of the language. The internal aspect, 
which is directly attached to the meaning is the sphota 
which is the partless,integral linguistic symbol.
l.The meaning of the verse is rather difficult to 
understand.(Note that the definition of dhvani by 
Anandavardhana in Dhvanyaloka > i.13 is also given in 
an equally clumsy way,though there too the idea is 
of great linguistic importance.)
By the term upadana^abda is meant the speech-unit 
in language as is normally understood.No distinction is 
made between dhvani and sphota in this.It is only the 
linguist who can recognize these two aspects in it.
One aspect is the underlying cause of the articulated 
sounds produced: this is the prakrta-dhvani which is 
the cause of sounds vaikyta-dhvani. Bhartyhari himself 
defines prakrtadhvani as the cause of perception of the 
letters(var*iasya grahape hetub prakyto dhvanir i^yate, 
VP.i.77). The internal aspect is the linguistic sign 
which is called sphota; it is this which oonveys the 
meaning. Some explain the former as the sphota and the 
latter as the dhvani(G.N.Bhattacharyya,A Study in the 
dialectics of Sphota.p.l3;Ravisankar Sukla's commentary 
on the vers$;but the explanation given above seems to 
be the correct one.
This fundamental dichotomy between form and 
content in language is mentioned by Panini himself in 
the sutra^ : svam rupam sabdasyasabdasam.jna, "A word
(in a grammatical rule) which is not a technical term
- ^ 2 denotes its own form". On this sutra Katyayana says,
^abdapiirvako hy arthe sampratyayas. tasmad arthanivrttih.
"The understanding of the thing-meant is preceded by
that of the word; hence in a grammatical context, the
question of the thing-meant does not arise11. A word
can signify its own form, asX well as the thing *eant
by it. One is the name and the other is the thing-named.
Bhartrhari says^that every word,first of all,expresses
its own class, thereafter it is fiotionally superimposed
on the form of the class of things. In grammatical
discussions where the thing-meant is irrelevant, it is
only the form that is signified by a word (which is not
a technical term). Thus, in a r u l e Agni(fire) has the
suffix eya", it is only to the form of the word that
the suffix is added,and not to the fire or even to worts
synonymous to it.
1 •Papdni,I .i .68
2.B/Tbh.i,p.l76
3.VP.iii.i.6i sva jatib prathamam sabdais sarvair evabhi- 
dhiyate tato »rtha jatirupe^u tadadhyaropakalpanS-.
For a discussion of the problem see Brough,op.cit.
4.Panini,IV.ii.33* agner dhak
Bhartrhari says,** Just as a technical term
like vrddhi.while linked to its own form, is also < .
attached to what is named by it,viz., the speech-entities 
symbolized by adaic (i.e.,a.ai,&au) , so likewise 
this word agni (in the sutra),while linked to the word 
agni(in everyday use,i.e.,the meaning*fire 1 ) is also 
attached to the sound agni. which in this context has 
the word agrxi as the thing-expreseed. The word which 
is uttered in ordinary usage must certainly not be 
the one which partakes of the operation (of adding 
the suffix). But in conveying this other sense, its 
power (to convey the normal sense) is not impeded.* 
Bhartrhari emphasizes again and again the fact that 
a word has a double power;it can convey an idea of the 
form of an expression as well as its content. The 
problem of how a word can mean not only the thing 
symbolized by it,but also its own identity, is explained 
by him with various illustrations, language is similar 
to light and consciousness in so far as it can reveal 
itself ,wU±KxkK±KgxKamxgc±axxxacfaE and also reveal other 
things. Just as consciousness can be conscious of itself,
1.VP.i.59-61. See the translation by J.Brough,op.oit.,p.
V.. >;%• : , • / 1 .V " :twhile being conscious of other things, and just as
a light can reveal itself while revealing other 
2objects, so also every word has the power of referring 
to itself as well as to the external things symbolized 
by it.
3The Buddhists also accept this two-fold power 
of words to express their own identity as well as the 
things symbolized by them; but this character is 
cognized only when they become the subjeot of 
conventional relation, and not at the time of perception#
It is only in the determinate knowledge that follows 
a perception that the relation between word and 
meaning is understood. At the time of perception of 
of the sounds of the words, it is only the sound that 
is known; the expressive power does not belong to the 
sound at that time.
The grammarians too accept that words will have 
to be taken a s vautonymous1 until the relation between 
the word and the meaning is known. Thus, Patanjali says 
that when we do not hear a word properly, we ask, "What
1.VP.i.50* Atmarupam yatha jnane jneyarupam ca dpsyate 
Artharupam tatha 6abde svarupam capraka^ate.
2.VP.i.55t Grahyatvam grahakatvam ca dve s'akti tejaso yatha 
Tathaiva sarva^abdanam ete p^thad iva sthite.
3.Satkari Mookerjee,Buddhist Doctrine of fflux,pp.296ff.
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aid you say?*, thereby indicating that we have not 
understood the form of the word.
Bhartrhari1s analysis envisages three aspects J
2of the language situation*(i) thw vaikrta-dhvani,the 
individual instance of the utterance in purely phonetic 
terms. It is the actual sounds spoken by the speaker 
and heard by the listener. It includes all the various 
differences in intonation,tempo,pitch eto.,depending on 
the individuals.(2) The pfakyta-dhvani, the phonological 
structure,the sound-pattem of the norm; or from another 
point of view,the name of the class of which the various 
instances are members. This is indioated by the vaikyta- 
dhvani. All the non-linguistic personal variations are 
eliminated at this fc± stage. Both the speaker and the 
listener are conscious of the normal phonological pattern 
alone.The time-sequence is still present in this. It may> ■ * • ' ' ' ’ / • • „ v • ;m. '■ • V< • r ■* ;* V ! .  . ~V. “ I
be considered as the acoustic image of the normal word, 
or the word in the mind,keeping the time-order with it. 
(3)The sphota.the integral linguistic symbol,which is 
the unit of meaning,but which cannot be pronounced or 
written. This is manifested by the prakyta-dhvani. In fact 
it is the prakyta-dhvani considered as an integral, 
meaning-bearing ,linguistic sign.
1.Mbh.i.p.17 6; VP.i.57:J.Brough.op.cit.,p.31
2.J.Brough,op.cit.,p.40
-  J $  A -
The sphota as explained by Bhartrhari is
something analogous to the linguistic sign,which in
1the terminology of De Saussure has two facets: the
signifiant and the signifid1that which means and that
which is meant. In Indian philosophy these two are
called,respectively, feabda and artha. W.M.Urban has 
2
shown beyond any shadow of doubt the existence of a
bipolar relation between the signifiant and the signifie.
Innlndia this relation is taken to be permanent and
natural by the Mimamsakas and the grammarians,and to be
conventional by the Naiyayikas. The glossematic school
o^iinguistics under Prof. Hjelmslev also accepts this
parallelism between the plane of content and that of
3expression in language. He says,"The sign is a two-sided
entity,with a Janus-like perspective in two directions,
and with effect in two respects: "outwards" toward the
expression-substance and "inwards" toward the content-
substance." "The sign is,then - paradoxical as~it may
seem - a sign for content-substance and a sign for an
expression-substanoe." Explaining this view, Andre 
4
Martinet says," According to the glossematicians language
1. Court, pp. 98f •
2.Language and Reality.pp.66,113
3.Prolegomena to a Theory of Heaning,p.36 
4.Structural Linguistics.'Anthropology Today',edited by
A.L.Kroeber,Chicago,1953,p.582
v - ■ ..has recourse to two different types of substances for its 
two planes. On the plane of expression tfcfe substance may 
be phonic and therefore perceptible to the auditory organ; 
(but it is also commonly graphic aniff therefore usually 
perceptible and any other perceptible object could be n 
used, although may not be quite so conveniently, for 
the same purpose). On the plane of content the substance
I ’ 1 ** ‘ y» . »*^4*1^ * * * ,  • ir 1 ’■ *^¥|* “T ; C*  ^ ;  t i  - *i- ■ . * • ■C? * •’<‘,^ i‘"f <1 ' 1 '  •*' ** ** • ’ .,* • ^is of a mental,semantic nature."
,¥'4ft'; V; . v * t*'*. £■ *$•' W^1'''*' ‘
' ' . . : ' -
The modem linguist^ consider the symbol or
the linguistic sign as a functional term,based on the
relation between the signif iant and the signifi^tthe sabda
and artha. But to Bhartrhari this sphota is an independent
entity which is revealed by the signifiant or the'-
• •'* * -;• - • *•< • . . ;  •
prakrta-dhvani. And it is this sphota or the linguistic 
sign(le signe of De Saussure) which conveys the sense# "
-/SLvSr-
The distinction between the actual sounds of
speech uttered during each occurance of the speech
(vailcrtadhvani) and the engrams left by them behind
by them in la langue or the phonematic pattern or the
acoustic images(images acoustiques)(prakrtadhvani)is
1accepted by the modem linguists also.
?.4
Vi
1 . Courr, pp. 97-103.141-169
2  4 -
Bhartrhari is here emphasizing the fundamental
truth that,strictly speaking, words are psychical
entities (^abdo buddhisthah)1whioh reveal themselve^C
2through them articulate sounds. As Gardiner says,•v'V ^ f-V' ‘ 'vw -JF.• r “«£?• r.T-V v.V ’‘tts’-'-. /!*-C.g.v 4- vx.'f X^' V-
"it is only inaccurately, thnugh by a sort of 
necessary inaccuracy, that the name of ’words* is 
given to the articulate sounds which pass between 
speaker and listener". "As words exist in the possession 
of every individual ( of a linguistic community), they 
are psychical entities, comprising on the one hand 
area of meaning, and on the other hand the image 
of a particular sound susceptible of being physically
1 I*', ■ ■ £ - Z * Vi'?X '■ 4 ’ ^ Ai‘WT
■ “; • 3reproduced whenever A x  wanted."*^ Even earlier thinkers 
in India had recognized the fact that the word is 
something more than the audible sounds uttered by 
the speaker and heard by the listener; Vyasa, in the 
Yogasutrabhagya states clearly that the word is to be
grasped in the mind, though it is brought together by
A - - »the sounds. Even the Mimamsakas who considered the word
as an aggregate of the permanent letters(varnas) in a
fixed order recognize* that it is much more than the
artioulate sounds.
1.VP.i.46 t &abdo *pi buddhisthah ^rutlnam karai^am
prthak.
2. Gardiner, Speeoh and Languagep p.69
3. Ibid.p.70
4. Yoga But rabhasya, under sutra 111.17 s padam punar 
hadanusamharabuddhinirgr&hyam •
*|De Saussure also emphasized the fact that both 
the aspects of the sign, the signifiant and the signifife» 
are mentalt the former is the acoustic sign or the 
psychical entity which belongs to la langue, and the 
latter is the idea (ide&). The Indian grammarians too 
maintain the subjectivity of both the word and the
* 2
meaning (£abda and artha). Nagasabhatta says in the 
laghumanjusa that in reality the meaning is only 
subjective and the word is also subjective.
The concept of sphota is something more than 
what is generally implied by the term linguistic sign.
The relation between the word and the meaning is an 
essential for sphota concept as for the sign. There is 
no sphota without meaning;il is the meaning-bearing 
nature of an expression that makes it(when considered 
as a whole apart from its parts which are irrelevant) 
a sphota. In fact the sphota is the signifiant taken as 
a timeless and indivisible symbol denoting a meaning.
The time-order of the signifiant is merely a means 
for revealing the timeless and partless sphota.
-  / 2  7 -
1.Coujy, pp.98f
2.Laghumaft.iusa~,p.45; 3 Jarma,Analysis of Meaning in 
Indian Semantios,p.l4» See also Kaiyata on pmnini,V.2*94
- J $ -
The term sphota is derived from the root sphut
which means *to burst*, and it is defined in two ways.
In its linguistic sense it is normally defines as 11 that
from which the meaning bursts forth,i.e.shines forth,in
1
other words the word-as-expressing-a-meaning(vacaka)"
"The sphota is simply the linguistic sign in its aspect
2of me aning-bearer(Bedeutungstrager). * Secondly it is 
defined as an entity which is manifested by the letters.1
Even though the sphota is an integral symbol 
which is indivisible and timeless, it can be revealed 
only by means of the sound in a time-series pattern.
The fact that the sound is produced serially is no 
argument for considering the sphota to have a time 
sequence. The individual sounds of the letters*that we 
hear in the course of revealing the sphota.seem to be 
present in the sphota itself only because of ikn our 
incapacity ii hearing the symbol apart from the sounds.
1.Nage^abhatta.SphotaVgda.p.5i sphu^ati praka^ate *rtho
* emad iti sphoto v&caka iti jcata* yavat; Madhava, 
Sarvadar^anasangraha(ed.Abhyankar),p.300 j sphu^yate 
vyajyate var^air iti sphoto varn&bhivyangyah,sphutati 
sphutibhavaty acxih asmad artha iti sphoto *rthapra- 
tyayakah.
2.J.Brough.op.cit.,pp.33f.
How the Sphota is comprehended
The sphota. the word located in, the mind an<J 
taken as an integral symbol, is rewealed by the sounds 
produced in a fixed order. The sounds are only the 
manifesting agencies and have no function other than 
that of revealing the word-symbol. Each sound helps 
in manifesting this sphota. the first one vaguely, 
the next one more clearly and so on, until the last 
one, aided by the impressions of the preceding 
perceptions, reveals it clearly and distinctly. It is 
one and the same sphota that is revealed by each one 
of these letters. Bhartrhari says^that "with the last 
sound, the word is grasped in the mind (of the hearer) 
where the seed has been sown by the sounds, and which 
has been brought to ripeness by the telling over 
in order (avrtti) of the Bounds*. This sphota is 
one and indivisible; the sounds uttered to reveal 
this sphota or the essential word cannot be considered 
as parts of the word, but only as diacritical marks 
to reveal the identity of the whole word. The process
1. VP.i.85* nadair ahitabijayam antyena dhvanina saha
avrttiparipakayam buddhau sabdo 'vadharyate.
2. J.Brough.Linguistics in Sanskrit Grammarians.
TPS,1951,p.39
of revelation of the word by the sounds is from 
the indeterminate stage to the determinate; it begins 
from complete ignorance, passes through partial 
knowledge and ends in complete knowledge.
The prooess of comprehension of the sphota 
is illustrated by the grammarians by means of various 
analogies. It is like a jeweller examining a precious 
stone by looking at it steadily for some time to 
enable him to determine its real value. He has a 
series of perceptions; the firBt one gives him a 
general knowledge of the gem; each subsequent perception 
helps in revealing the real nature of the gem, until 
the last perception, aided by the impressions of the 
previous ones,helps him to grasp the real value of 
the gem completely and clearly* Bhartrhari has given 
another analogy; it is that of a student trying to 
learn a verse by heart by reading it repeatedly. It is 
the last reading,aided by the impressions left behind
1. Sphotasiddhi.p.l31i yatha ratnaparlksipah parikeama- 
nasya prathamasamad&igamanupakhyatam anupakhyeyarupa- 
pratyayopahitasatoskararupahitavi^e^ayarn buddhau 
kramena oarame cetasi oakasti ratnatattvam.
2.VP.i.84* yathanuvakas sloko va sodhatvam adhigacohati 
avyttya na tu sa granthafc pratyavytti nirupyate.
The analogy of the jeweller is given by 
VScaspatimirfra in the Tattvabindu also(p.20 f)
- lA3i -
by the previous readings that helps the student to 
know the verse fully*
Even though each letter causes a vague cognition 
of the indivisible sphota, the letter also figures in 
the oognition* It is the cognition of the whole that 
is significant and therefore important. The whole
taken as an integral symbol is something different from
tu.
the parts that constitute it,and^»ay be considered
oas irrelevant and illusory. It is not the existence
of the cognition of the parts that is denied, for we
do undoubtedly cognize the individual letters; it is
their significance that is in question?* The sphota is
the objeot of cognition; but it is in the form of the
letters that this cognition takes place. This is an
instance of a series of Errors leading finally to
the truth. Even invalid oognitions can sometimes lead
one to a valid knowledge; a false hypothesis oan be of
help in getting at the truth. Bhartrhari explains it
2by means of some illustrations. Sometimes a tree may 
appear as an elephant when seen from a long distanoe,
1. S.S.Suryanarayana SaBtri,Vacaspati1s criticism of 
the sphota theory,Jouraal of Oriental Research,
Madras,1932,pp.311-314
2. VP.i.90-91 and the commentary thereon. See also 
K.A.Subrahmania Iyer,The Doctrine of Sphota,JGRI, 
vol.V,part l,pp.l21ff.
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or a rope ■£» mistaken for a snake in a place without 
sufficient light; but close and careful observation 
will ultimately reveal tbe real identity. In the final 
cognition the object and th# form become one. This 
correct cognition can take place without any change 
in the circumstances. Standing in the same place 
and looking steadily at the object we get the correct 
cognition of the tree or the rope. So also in language 
the real objeot of utterance is the sphota. though 
the form is that of the letters themselves.^
Even though each letter in the word or sentence 
has the capacity of revealing the same indivisible 
sphota. every one of them is necessary, since the complete 
and distinct manifestation of the word is effected only 
with the perception of the last letter. Hence the 
subsequent letters in the word are not at all super­
fluous. According to the M±msmkn Mimamsakas, when a 
word is uttered, the individual ± K ± t x n sounds reveal 
only the permanent letters or the sound-units (which 
are analogous to the phonemes of modem linguists), 
and nothing more than these. But according to the 
grammarians it is the whole indivisible word that is 
revealed by the sounds, or by the letters indicated
by the sounds. The function of the letters in revealing 
l.See also Tattvabindu,p.21,for a similar analogyT"
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the integral sphota is based on their ’value1 in 
differentiating one word from another. Thus, while 
uttering the word 1gauh1, the function of the letter 
g is to distinguish the word from all other words 
that do not begin with £. This essential nature of 
the function of letters in the building up of a word 
is notioed by Vyasa in his Yogasutrabha^ya. He says* 
wThe power of speech has its function in the utteranoe 
of the various sounds and the ear has for itd objeot 
only the series of sounds. It is the mind of the 
listener that grasps the sounds as a. significant unit 
at the end of the final sound. As the individual 
sounds cannot co-exist, they do not naturally aid 
one another. One by one they come into being, and 
vanish without touching the word; so none of them 
can be considered to have attained the form of a unit-
1* Yogabhapya on sutra 111-17*
tatra vag varpe^v «nc evarthavatl. ^rotram ca 
d h vani pa r ipSmama t r a v i 9 ay am. padam punar nadanusam- 
harabuddhinirgrahyam iti. varpa ekasamayasarabhavi- 
tvat paraniranugrahatmanas te padam asaihspr^yanupa- 
sthapyavirbhutas tirobhutas oeti pratyekam apada- 
svarupa ucyante.
- /3Zf -
word. On the other hand,each one of these letters may
be said to have the essence of the word and the
potential capacity to express almost everything, in
so far as, by association with other letters, in
various combinations, it can form different words.
Though a universe of meanings can thus be attached
to a single letter, this potential capacity is limited
by the convention of meaning on account of the order
of sequence in which the letters are uttered. Thus,
the potential capacity of the letters £,au and h
is restricted to the £mxm object having dewlap,horn
etc., when they follow one another in the particular
sequence, gauh." Of course,Vyasa was not fully oonsoious
of the Sphota doctrine as developed by Bhartrhari and
Bffandanamisra; that is why he is trying to explain the
function of the letters in conveying the meaning of the 
a,word. But ^ similar argument will explain how the 
individual letters reveal the word-symbol or sphota.
1. Ibid; varpiifr punar ekaikah padatma sarvabhidhana- 
tfaktipracitas sahakarivarpantarapratiyogitvffd 
vaigvarupyam ivdpannafc. purvas cottare$a,uttara8 ca 
purvej^a vise^e ‘vasthapita it£ evam bahavo var$a£ 
kramanurodhino •rthasahketenavaochinna iyam ta ete 
sarvabhidhana^akti parivrtta gakaraukaravisarjariiyas 
sansnadimantam artham dyotayatiti.
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This is what we find in the Sphotatattvanirupapa
of Sesakrsna1 ,where a reasonable explanation,on the
< ♦ •
basis of Vyasafs remarks,is given about the function 
of the individual letters in revealing the integral w 
word. He says that when a man utters the sound ka 
with the intention of saying kamalam (a lotus), we 
know that he is trying to utter a word beginning with ka. 
Thus , the whole word is vaguely suggested by the first 
syllable itself, for it gives a clue to the identity 
of the word. When he utters the next syllable ma, we 
get another clue and the word can more clearly be 
guessed, since it narrows the field. All the words 
that do not begin with kama are now excluded. Still 
the word is not w^ite clear, for we do not know whether 
he is going to say kamalam or kamanam. When the last 
sound lam is also uttered, the word is known fully 
and clearly. Thus, the function of^JLetters in a word is 
to build up the higher unit; they have no meaning of 
their own;their value consists in differentiating one 
word from another.
1.Sphotatattvanirupana.p.101 tatha hi kamalam ity ukte 
kakaramakar5hubhavepi kim kamallyas spfootah kamanTyo 
veti sandeho napagacohati tavad yavan na’ oaramo lo no 
vanubhuyate. tasmSd Isattvam sandigdhatvam ni^oitatvam 
eva sphbtataratvam.C •' ■ i. ‘h*:-" . l >. V""-, . . '• -V ‘ ' . • - V ‘
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This conception of the function of the letters 
in the manifestation of the sphota is analogous to the 
Apk Apoha theory of the Buddhists} for the value of 
each letter in the word is its being different from 
all the other possible letters. It may also be compared 
to the view of some modern linguists that the signi­
ficance of the phonemes - the smallest significant 
units in a language- lies in their differentiation- 
value, Bhartrhari*s statement,that the individual 
letters in a word or sentenoe have no direct connection 
with the meaning,but are merely concerned with the
manifestation of the linguistic sign or the sphota
V swhich is the real meaning-bearer,an*e quite in keeping 
with the claim of modem linguists that the basic 
assumptions that underlie phonemios can be stated 
without any mention of mind and meaning, and that 
the structural analysis of a language need not 
necessarily involve considerations of meaning.
1, The Apoha dootrine is discussed in a separate section
2, On the modem theory of phonemes, see D.Jones,
The Phoneme,its nature and use,Cambridge,1950;
W,F.Twaddell,0n defining the phoneme,Baltimore,1935; 
E,Sapir,The sound patterns of language(Collected 
writingBV;A,Cohen,The phonemes of English,The Hague, 
1932;B,Bloofe,A set of Postulates for phonemic analysis 
•Language 1,vol.24,1948,
3* See Blocfr,loo,cit,; Zellig Harris,Methods in 
Structural Linguistics,1951
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The sphota is not an imperceptible entity*’ 
assumed by the grammarian to explain how a temporal 
series of sound-pattern can express a unitary sense; 
it is something which is actually perceived in 
speech situations. The very fact,that a word or sentenoe 
is cognized gradually from the vague indeterminate 
stage to the clear determinate stage,shows that it is 
through perception that this cognition takes place; 
for, as Mandanamisra points out,2it is only in 
perceptive cognition that a gradual process from the 
indistinot to the distinct,through increasing degrees 
of clarity, is possible; in the case of other mean* 
of cognition we have either a clear knowledge,or no 
knowledge at all.
In fact one of the arguments adduced by the 
s- grammarians in favour of the sphota theory is the
experience that people have in actual speech situations 
about the word or the sentenoe as a single entity,
1. D,M,Datta (Six ways of knowing,p,252) says,"In 
reality,corresponding to every word perceived,there 
is an unperoeived,partless symbol which directly 
presents the meaning*.But the sphota is the perceived 
word itself,taken as a partless symbol.
2. Sphotasiddhi,verse 23* pratyak^ajflSnaniyata vyakta- 
vyaktSvabhasita manantarefu grahanam athava naiva 
hi grahah.(There is no vagueness in non-perceptual 
knowledge)
Nagesabhatta says'that the justification for the 
existence of the sphota and for its unity is the 
realization "This is one word,one sentence". In the 
Sarvadar^anasangraha also it is stated that the 
acceptance of the Bphota is based on direct perception 
itself, since it is a common experience that a word 
like ’oow’ is a unique entity,apart from the different
letters we seem to hear in it. The same idea is
3 4stressed in the Sphotasiddhi  ^and the Tattvabindu
*- 5also. Jayantabhatta also mentions the grammarians*
view that the sphota is cognized through direct
gauditory perception. In the discussion of the sphota
/ 7doctrine, SaAkara presents the grammarian as saying,
I 3  y -
1.Mahabhagyapradipodyotatvol.i,p.111 idam ekam padam 
ekam vakyam iti pratyayas sphotasatve tadekatve 
ca pramanam.
2 ♦ Sarvadarsanasangraha»p. 2991 pratyaksam evatra pramanam 
gaur ity ekam padam iti nanavarnatiriktaikapadavagates 
sarvajanlnatvat.
3.Sphotasiddhi»p.1711 sphotatma tu pratyaksaredaniyah
4*Ta11vabindu»p.231sarvajaninam api padam iti vakyam 
iti caikavi^ayanubhavam.
5«Nyayamahjari(Viz.S.S.).p.371i srautre pratyaye 
prat ibha samahab.
6•G .N •Bha11acharyya(A Study in the Dialectics of sphota, 
pp.44,68)criticizes Jayantabhatta for misinterpreting 
the grammarian*s view. He says,"We do not subscribe 
to Jayanta*s views when he says that sphota is 
perceived by the auditory organ";his argument that 
the sphota is known through mental perception(manasa 
pratyakga) is based on a passage in the Tattvabindu 
(Ch.S.S,p .3)5 but the reading he has taken is a wrong 
one;from the later edition in the Annamali University 
Series(p.l6 f)and its commentary by Parame^vara,it 
is clear that the term manasapratyakga in the 
passage refers to prayatnabheda and hot to sphota.
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"I do not postulate a new entity called sphota; I 
know it through percept ion*'!’ Even the critics of the 
sphota doctrine do not deny the common experience 
of the word or the sentence as a unique entity; they 
only try to explain it in a different way.
Thus, it is argued by Vgcaspatimis'ra in the 
2
Tattvabindu that the unitariness that is commonly 
experienced regarding the word or the sentenoe is based 
on some limitation (UPADHI) like that of the experiences 
of anvarmy*or a'forestland that it need not be real.
Two such extraneous adjuncts which produoe the notion 
of unitariness are given: being the content of a
single cognition, and being the cause of the oognition 
of one idea. The critics of the sphota doctrine base 
their arguments mainly on these two points.
/ ,Sankara criticizes the sphota doctrine on the i"
ground that the apprehension of a temporal or spacial 
series can be explained as due to the synthetic activity
1.Brahmasutrabhasya on 1.3»28* na kalpayamy aham sphotam 
pratyaksam eva tv enam avagacchami.
2.Tat tvablndu.pp.50ff.
3.ekavijnanavi^ayata and ekabhidheyapratyayahetuta.
4.£aiikara calls it samastapratyavamar^ini buddhi or 
the intellect having the power of holding together 
the separate memories into one whole. This is the pame 
as the ekavijnanavigayata mentioned by Yacaspatimisra.
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of the mind. He holds that "though a series cannot be 
apprehended as a whole through perception, we have, 
affctr all the members of a aeries have been perceived 
one by one, a memory of all the members combined 
together. We have in experience in all cases of 
temporal and spaoial series the knowledge of wholes 
which preserve the integral relation obtaining among 
their component members. We have to acoept it on 
the basis of such an experience." 1 Sankara says,
"The one comprehensive cognition which follows upon 
the apprehension of the successive letters of a word
has for its objeot the entire aggregate of the letters
2constituting the word,and not anything else." He
illustrates this point with various analogies. "The
ideas which we have of a row,for instance, or a wood
or an army or of the numbers ten,hundred,thousand and
so onjshow that also such things as comprise several
unities can become the objects of one and the same
3cognitional act."" The particular order of sequence 
determines the nature of the word; just as ants
1.D.M»Datta,op.oit. ,p.253s see also Brahmagutrabhasya, 
on sutra 1.3.28.
2.Thibautfs translation of the Brahmasutrabhasya.p.208. 
3.Ibid,p.209.
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produce the idea of a row only when they march one 
after the other, so the letters also constitute the 
idea of a certain word only if they follow one another 
in a certain order.
The sphota theory itself presupposes something 
like this as the means of revealing the sphota. viz., 
a comprehensive oognition of the letters in their 
propwr order. They tee have to acoept that the intellect 
has the power to interpret a series of sense-data as
j i__ _a finished gestalt♦ Sankara and the Mimamsakas do not
explain how simultaneity and succession are compatible
in the same act of the mind; the Naiyayikas who consider
that the synthesis of the letters is based on memory
(samuhalambanasmrti) are also at a loss to explain this
problem. Their difficulty was mainly due to the fact
that to them the present was : an instant. The modem
psychologists have shown that even the present has
a duration of its own and extends both tax backward
i
into the past and forward into the future. Thus, there 
is a simultaneous perception of All the letters of
1. S.C.Chatterjee, The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge,p.363# 
James.Principles of Psychology>vol.i7p p .608"510.
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a word, though these are successively heard by us.
So also in visual perception, things are cognized as 
wholes. The sphota theory is quite in keeping with thw 
modern Gestalt psychology which believes in the 
primaoy of Gestalten. The earlier methods proceeded 
from the elements to the whole,from the sounds to the 
words,from words to sentences and finally to the 
meaning of discourse sb a whole;but the present 
tendency among psychologists is the exact opposit, 
nemely,from meaning as Gestalt to the sentence and 
words as elements.1 The sphota is the sentence or 
word considered as a linguistic sign, and perceived 
a® a Gestalt ab initio.
The second argument brought by the Mimamsakas
against the sphota theory is that the unity of the
word or sentenoe is based on the unity of the meaning,
and that therefore, no new sphota need be assumed
to explain that.(ekabhidheyapratyayahetuta). The
2
grammarians reply that this objection involves the fallacy 
of interdependence,since the conception of the word
1.Urban,W.M,Language and Reality.p.65.
2. Tqttvabindu,p.51
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as a unitary entity depends on its conveying a single
1
idea and the meaning depends on the word. The Mimamsakas 
argue that there is no interdependence since since the 
conception of the word is based on that of the meaning,
pbut not vice versa. We learn the meaning of words and
sentences from their use in actual speech contexts; and
so much of the sound-pattem in a fixed order which is
found applied to a particular sense is taken to be
3a word having that meaning. Kumarilabhatta says that 
the meaning of a word is determined by usage and as such 
those letters uttered in a particular order of sequence 
by one individual,whioh has expressed their sense to us 
when wt have first learned the word from our elders 
will express the same sense at all future times. Hence, 
it is argued that there is no necessity for postulating 
the sphota. The grammarian*s point of view is that even 
though the meaning is learned from their funotion in 
actual usage, we do experience the word or the sentence 
as a unitary entity,as a whole, and not as an aggregate 
of the various letters comprising it.
1 .Tattvaafegraha .p.51 s paraspara^rayaurasaktir durvaraT.
na khalu aviditapadarupavadhir artham avaiti.
2.Ibid,p.53s na h hi padayadharapadhlhas sambandhabodhaty
kirn tu tadadhfnam padajnanam.
3«Slokavarttika,sphota section,verse 69s yavanto yadysa
ye ca yadarthapratipadane varnah prajftatasamarthyas
te tathaivavabodhakafc.4. And there is no reason to consider this experience
as false,being based on upadhis.
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Classification of the sphota
The later grammarians like Bhattoji d-ksita"1* 
and Nage^a Bhatta enumerate eight different varieties 
of the sphota. The fundamental argument in all these 
cases is meaningfulness (vacakatva). Thus, we may 
consider either the letter or the word or the sentence 
as the meaning-bearing unit, and we get respectively 
the varna-sphota,the padasphota or the vakyasphota.
Here we again oome across the philosophical controversy 
as to whether sabda is permanent or transient (nitya or 
karya).
If we take the Naiyayika view that sabda is transient 
being produced each time of its utterance,we have to 
assume the concept of the class to explain language 
behaviour. The letter,the word or the sentenoe has to 
be considered as a class denoting the class of objects 
meant. Both Bhattojidiksita and Kondabhatta say that 
according to Bopadeva,the denoter(vacaka) should be of
3the nature of a universal,just like the denoted(vacya).
1.Sabdakaustubha» pp.7ff?
2.Sphotavada,passim.;Laghumahjusa»sphota section. 
3«(x.N.Bhattacharyya,op.cit. ,p.!07
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Every word or sentence uttered in actual speech is an
instance of the class of such words or sentenoes. This
is similar to the mode of view put forward by Kaplan
and Copilowish who define a sign (inoluding a linguistic
sign) as a class of sign vehicles all having one and the
same law of interpretation** Bertrand Russell also 
2
says,"The word*dog* is a universal, just as dog is a 
universal. We say,loosely,that we can utter the same 
word **dog** on two occasions,but in fact we utter two 
examples of the same speoies. Ther is thus no difference 
of status between dog and the word **dog**i each is 
general and exists only in instances.*1 By synthesizing 
the sphota theory with this Naiyayiks view, we get the 
three kinds of sphotas;varnajatisphota.padajatisphota 
and the vakya.1 atisphota.
If,on the other hand,we take the Mimamsaka 
view that sabda is permanent,the word or sentence will 
have to be considered as a permanent pattern of the 
letters in a fixed order. Each instance of its occurance 
is only a case of revealing or manifesting the permanent
1.Mind.Oct.1939;discussed by Russell.Inquiry into Meaning 
and Truth.p.184 and by J.Brough.op.cit..p.45
2.op.oit ♦ ,p. 24
sound-pattem. The semantic unit is taken to be one and 
the same in all oases of its occuranoe. If the sphota 
theory is Synthesized with the Mlmamsaka view,we get 
the three set of sphotast varnavyaktisphota,padavyakti- 
sphota and vakyavyaktisphota.
V\y-’ ’ *vT ’* \ ’>•?” •*.- ^ X j p v * ' ’• ,** ' • 5yi*., M fiJ‘*> 9R* ' j T - V ^ *  • * •% *Jc‘ • <* ■ — :rjfe*Qffg* ,£.? V’;*;^5s2’: **'rj !;>y i V iiI*-* ^•-* ^ - . %,v.'-'t'** *'ft
Again, the padasphota and the vakyasphota, taken 
as semantic units built of smaller such units which
V ~  ;* V  z w -  ' . .%■’
are themselves meaningful, are different from padasphota 
and vakyasphota considered as indivisible symbols 
denoting the meaning of the whole without any reference 
to the parts. The former are the sakhanda-sphotas and 
the latter are akhanda-sphotas. This division does not 
apply to the varnasphota,as it cannot be further divided. 
Thus,the eight subdivisions of sphota are:- W :-
1. vanjasphota
2. padasphota
3. vSkyasphota
4. akhapdaPadasjahota
5. akhan<javakyasphota
6. varpajatisphota
7. padaj&tisphota
8. vSkyajatisphota.
Bhartrhari seems to have held the akhan&avakyasphota,
. y y  ■ !!■ ■■■■■■■ — A  I ^
the indivisible sentence sphota of the vyakti type 
as the real sphota.
-  14-  ^ _
1.J.Brough,op.oit.,p.45
According to the later grammarians,varnasphota 
is justified on the grounds that a meaning is understood
, ■ ■ ■ - - * V Vi,* ”. .. .from roots and suffixes having one letter only. Patanjali 
himself has stated that from one point of view the ±bl 
individual letters may he considered to have meaning,
since roots,suffixes and particles of a single letter 
are meaningful.1
■:-V
Sometimes it is impossible to discriminate 
how much of the word refer to the thing-meant,and 
how much the case relationship, (e.g.ramena by Rama).• t
The Naiyayikas explain this difficulty by saying that 
that it is the sthanin or the original permanent suffix 
that should be considered as the meaning-bearer. But 
the grammarians assert that it is not the sthanin, but 
the substitute or ade^a that carries the meaning.They 
rightly point out the fact that the sthanin is an 
artificial entity invented by the grammarians to explain 
the formation of the various words in a simple way, 
and that they have no reality of their own,since they 
could be different in different systems of grammar.
The people who speak the language are concerned only 
with the adesa»and the meaning is understood from that.
1 .  M B H . i . 2 2 0 .
2.G .N .Bhattaoharyya,op.cit,pp.91ff; Vaiyakaranabhusanasare, 
pp.418ff.
Hence the meaning has to be ascribed to the word as a 
whole,and therefore the padasphota has to be assumed.
Similar consideration of the sandhi-forms such
as dadhidam (dadhi idam = this is curds) make it
1
necessary to postulate the vakyasphoarta. All these various 
considerations are based on the conception of the 
sentence being made 'up of smaller meaning-bearing units, 
the words,the roots and the suffixes.
Strictly speaking the linguist oan accept only
the undivided sentence as the unit of meaning. As
2Bhartrhari says,in actual speech situations,there are
■■ • - A
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no letters in the word,and no words in the sentence.
"The analysis into letters and the distribution of 
meanings between stem and suffix,or between the words
mm t  ^m  the sentence - these proceedings,as Nagesa says, 
are the occupation of grammarians.
- I u S' -
!'• Kopdabhatta gives the example k m a  1 Hareva1 for 
Hare ava (Hari,protect!). VaiyakaranabhfLsanasara,66> 
"HarevetySdi drstvST tu vSkyasphotam vini£cinu."
The special power found in compound words to convey 
^unified sense is also explained by vakyasphota.
(See the section on compound words in the chapter on 
i»akgana)
2.VP.i.73i pade na varpa vidyante varpe^v avayava na ca 
v&kyat padanSm atyantam praviveko na kadcana.
3.Laghuman.jusa, p. 51 tat tad arthavibhSgam kadtramatrggiga
4.J.Brough.op.cit.,pp.43f•
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The great importance of the sphota doctrine 
for the theory of language-symbolism is not fully 
appreciated by modern linguists mainly because of 
the fact that it has been subjected to a great deal 
of unnecessary mystification. Bhartyhari himself 
developed a monistio doctrine of philosophy taking 
the transcendental Speech-essence as the first 
principle of the universe • This metaphysical 
doctrine of the evolution of the empirical world of 
names and things from the transcendental Speech-essence, 
erected on the basis of the sphota theory, was 
confused by later writers with the main linguistic 
theory itself, as a result of whioh it was.generally 
assumed that the sphota i-s^  something mystioal. Even 
many of the modern writers on the subject have not 
distinguished the purely linguistic theory from the 
metaphysical superstructure erected on its basis.
Keith describes the sphota as a "mysterious
entity, a sort of hypostatization of feta sound, of
whioh action sounds are manifestations." Similarly,
2Dr. S.K.De considers the sphota as a somewhat mystioal
li A History of Sanskrit Literature»p.387
2* Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics»ii»p.180
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c one option" and explains it as the "sound of a ldi word 
as a whole"," the sounds or something corresponding 
to them ••. blended indistinguishably into a uniform
whole." O.Strauss^takes the sphota as the transcend-
2ental word. A.Foucher takes it as "La mysterieuse
3et fulgurante relation qui eclate entre le son et le x 
sens, entre le mot et lfidee." This mystical element 
brought in the discussion of the sphota is responsible 
for the neglect of the theory by modem linguists.
Another reason for the oonfusion about the 
real nature of the sphota is the mistranslation of 
the Sanskrit word *sabda1 as sound*. Even in India 
the term sabda was interpreted differently by different 
schools of philosophy. Many of the heated discussions 
about the essential nature of the sabda. found in the 
various philosophical works are mainly due to the 
equivocal nature of the term itself. To the Naiyayika 
sabda is the ujdcKK physical sound,articulate(v a m a ) 
or inarticulate(dhvani) and is a product of the 
conjunction or disjunction of two bodies; it can also
1. Altindisohe Spekulatione fiber die Sprache und ihre 
Probleme.ZDMG,1927.
A C * .2. Le Compendium des To pique- Trakasangraha- d * Annam- 
bhatta, Introduction,p.xix.
3* The sphota is not a relation,but the word itskelf. 
See Brough.Linguistics in Sanskrit Grammarians.
TPS,1951,p.42
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be produced from another sound, like one wave from 
another. They consider sabda to be ephemeral,since the 
sound is destroyed as soon as it is produced. The 
recognition of the articulate sound is based on the 
knowledge of the class. To the MTmamsakas on the 
other hand sabda is the unit of speech, eternal and 
ubiquitous, which is only revealed or manifested by 
the spoken articulate sounds; it is not produced, 
it is only revealed. The Mimamsakas* conception of the 
varna is something analagous to the modem linguist’s 
conception of the phoneme. The ready recognition we 
have of the letters as the same cannot be due to 
similarity or even due to their being instances of 
the same class.1 To Bhart^hari and the Vaiyakaranaa 
it is not the letter(varna) that is to be taken as 
the unit of language,but the expression with the 
meaning attached to it should be taken as a single 
indivisible unit of speech; this unit o£ speech is 
the sabda. The sounds produced at the time of utterance 
as well as the permanent letters(varp.as) revealed by 
the utterance,are only the means of revealing the sabda.
!• Stcherbatsky(Buddhist Logic,1»p.23) refers to this 
view of the Mim&nisakas as an ’absurd idea*. He seems 
to overlook the fact that the unit of speech is 
necessarily something permanent and ubiquitous,and 
is not identical with the sounds used to reveal it.
-  i s  a, -
This essential waJk sabda is the sphota. according to 
hart^hari y
To translate sabda as sound in the discussions
of the grammarians a theory of the sphota is highly
misleading. Thus, for example, M5dhavafs definition
of the sphota in the Sarvadarsanasangraha,(varnatirikto
varnabhivyahgyo 1rthapratyayako nityas sabdas sphota
iti tadvido vadanti) will be quite dear, if translated
as "The abiding speeoh-unit which is the conveyor of
meaning,distinct from the letters and revealed by them,
is called the sphota by the grammarians". But it is
quite confusing in Cowell^ translation,"And..(say the
wise in these matters).•• this sphota is an eternal
sound distinct from the letters and revealed by them, 
the
whioh cause s/cognition of the meaning." Monier 
Williams defines the sphota as "sound(considered as 
etema).,acKitix±n|ncxKKpl±h±s indivisible and oreative)?" 
"the eternal and imperceptible element of sounds and 
words and the real vehicle of t t a u  the idea which
1. Sarvadarsanasangraha,translated by E.B.Cowell and 
A.E.Gough,p.211. See also J.Brough,op.cit..p.41
2. Sanskrit-English Dictionary,p.1270
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burets or flashes on the mind when a sound is uttered"* 
It must be noted that the sphota is not a hypostati- 
zation of sound; the Indian grammarians use the term 
in the sense of the essential word or expression 
and attaoh more importance to its meaning-bemring 
aspect than to its phonetic aspect.
George Thibaut says that the sphota is a 
"grammatical fiction in so far as it is apprehended 
by us as a whole. " Bhartrhari's reply to this 
oritioism would be that only the sphota is real; 
the separate sounds uttered by the speaker and 
heard by the listener ( or the various letters of the 
alphabet written by the writer and seen by the reader) 
are only the means by which the linguistic symbol 
is revealed,and are irrelevant if taken by themselves. 
The criticism that the sphota is an impereeptible 
entity is rejected by the grammarian; in fact, one of 
the main arguments in favour of the sphota theory itself 
is the direct perception of the unity of the word or 
the sentence.
l.Vedantasutras.with Sankara's bhSpya, English 
Translation, SBE,XXXIV,p.204 n.
Many modem scholars have tried to identify
the sphota with the 'idea* ifcr 'notion* expressed by
the combination of the tofctgg letters. Thus, Garbe
writes1 , "It will be seen that a true thought is here
presented,though obscurely expressed. This obscurity,
however, will not appear strange to any one who
considers that here for the first time a difficult
problem is touched, which since has occupied many
minds; for that supersensible word is,of course, no
other than the idea whioh is expressed by the
2combination of the letters." F.V.Pathak, in the 
Heyapakga of Toga, gives the same view that "one o m 4,v; 
go to the length of identifying the sphota with the 
meaning of the word", and says that "the sphota theory, 
at its worst, is only a hypostatization of a 
psychological prooess of perception." Deussen is also 
inclined to identify the sphota with 'notion'.
This view does not seem to give full credit 
to the symbolic nature of the sphota. for the discussions 
of the grammarians on the sphota theory make it clear 
that the sphota is not the idea or the meaning, but
1. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.article on Yoga.
2. Heyapaksa of Yoga.p.84
3* See George Thibaut, Vedantasutras,SBE,xxxiv,p.204 n. 
Thibaut criticizes this view strongly.
it is that indivisible symbol which brings to light 
the idea of the thing-meant. The sphota is generally 
referred to as the vacaka or the abhidhayaka,indicating 
that it is that which expresses the meaning.
S.Radhakrishnan says1that "the sphota is the
indivisible idea with its dual form of sabda.word
and artha,meaning." It is true that Bhartrhari is
a pure monist who believed that, when looked from the
philosophical point of view, both the word and the
mefjning are only the different aspects of one and the
same indivisible essence of thought? but from the
empirical point of view they have to be distinguished
and the* sphota in its linguistic sense has to be
taken as the indivisible symbol expressing the
meaning. The word or sentence is realty a psychic
entity which is an indivisible unit,the symbol which
carries the meaning,but which can be revealed or
%physically reproduced whenever wanted.
1.The Principal Upanisads.l953.p.674
2. VP.ii.31t ekasyaivhtmano bhedau £abdarthav aprthak 
sthitau.
3. Gardiner,op.cit..p.69 f.
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Bhartrhari1s Philosophy of language
On the basis of the sphota theory Bhartrhari 
ereoted a metaphysical superstructure, in which the 
transcendental Speech-»essence(&abdatattva) is considered 
as the first principle of the universe. The whole 
world of things,whose individuality oonsistvonly in 
names and forms, h a w  th^kr source in this LOGOS.
IH^ e- flhilosophers have accepted four different stages 
for this Speech-essence(Yak) in its manifestation! 
para,pa^yanti»madhama and vaikhari. At the para stage 
Speech is identical with Brahman,and may be taken as the 
source of the whole universe. The pasyanti stage may 
be identified with instinct or pratibha or the 
instantaneous flash of insight. It is thought in its 
undifferentiated form, and it is the meaning off language. 
According to Bhartrhari the sphota indicates this
’ • . r • * -v
pasyanti stage of speech. Of oourse, it is very difficult 
to distinguish between tought and speech at this stage. 
There is no language difference here. Every language 
reveals the same sphota whichfin a flash, conveys the idea.
1.YP.i.ljanadinidhanam brahma sabdatattvam yad ak$aram 
vivartate 1rthabhavena prakriya jagato yatbak
2,Vrsabhadevafs commentary on VP.i.14* pratibHam iti. 
yemam samasta^abdarthakaranabhata buddhih,yam paByantl- 
tyahuh,yata^ dabdSh prapavrttim anupata&ti,tam ann 
paraiti pranugacchati,
V,
The language difference is only the difference in the
means of revealing the same sphota. The next stage of
►
speech is the madhyama; this corresponds to the vedcrta
dhvani in Bhartrhari?s system of analysis (and to?l3phota
1
according to the analysis of Patanjali ).This is the 
sentence with its phonological structure,the sound-
jkpattern of the norm. It is psychical in/nature and can
be comprehended by the intellect. Some have called it
the unstruck sound,since it is the acoustic image taken
as the signifiant. The last stage in the manifestation
of speech is the vaikhari or the actual utterance
spoken by the speaker and heard by the listener; this
2
corresponds to the vatk vaikrta-dhvani of Bhartrhari.
Thus/by synthesizing the sphota doctrine with the
ancient philosophical ideas,Bhartrhari gave his theory
3an added significance. The para stage of speech may 
be called the Great Sphota in which case it can be 
identified with Brahman.
1. Mahabhasyapradipodyota,p.11: dhvanipadenatra vaikhari,
_ fcphotapadenabhivyaktakatvadiko madhyamavastha antara-
£abda ucyate. ...
2.Paramalateghuman.jusa»p. 4\ "madhyamanado ' rthava'caka- 
3pho$atmaka6abdavyaI^;jakahw , rtP§ra vanmulacakrastha 
pa^yanti nabhisamsthita hpdistha madhyama jfieya vaikhari 
kanthadesaga. vaikharya hi kyto nadah parai£ravanagoca#ah 
madhyamaya kpto nadas sphotavyanjaka ucyate. •
(The reference to the mulacakra,naval,chest and throat 
should not be taken literally,but is symbolic in 
nature).
3. It has also resulted in the neglect of the linguistio 
principles underlying the sphota theory,as a 
mataphysical hypothesis.
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'<:■ CH A P T E R -  IV
CONDITIONS OP KNOWING THE MEANING OP A SENTENCE* 
IkSNk sI, YOGYATl, SANNIDHI AND tIt p a r y a j nIna
The Mire  definition of a sentence as a collection
J
of words is found as early as in the Brladdevata;but 
it is in the Mimamsasutras of Jaimini that we first 
come across the real definition of a sentence: a 
sentence is a group of words serving a single purpose, 
if on analysis the separate words are found to have 
akanksa or mutual expectancy.(arthaikatvad ekam vakyam 
feakankgam ced vibhage syat). This principle was 
enunciated by the Mimamsakas in dealing with the prose 
passages of the Yajurveda,where it was sometimes found 
difficult to ascertain how far a certain sentenoe 
extends. This principle of syntactic unit says that 
so long as a single purpose is served by a number of 
words,which on being separated are found to be deficient 
and incapable of effecting the said purppse,they form 
a syntaotic unit - one complete Yajus mantrat* ^abara
ralso explains this sutra as referring to the Vedic 
mantras only,and the term arthaikatva is interpreted 
in the sense of serving a single purpose.
1.Brhaddevata,ii,117t padasahghatajam vakyam,
2.Mim&msg sttt ra s,2.1.47
3.The term gkdnksS is not used as a technical jar word 
here as in late^MlmamsS and Nyaya works.
4.Ganganatha JhatPurvamlniamsa in its Sources,p. 189.
5•^ abarabhagya,vol,1,p.443:Translation.p.313f•
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lt was felt that this principle was capable 
of a much more extended application,and in the Vakya-
padiya we find Bhartrhari referring to this as one of
Ithe well-known definitions of a sentence. KomSrilabhatta^
* A' '• 'who follows Sahara in the interpretation of the passage^
was also conscious that it could be applied to ordinary
sentences as well. He says,"It must be concluded that
those words on hearing which we are cognizant of a
single idea must be regarded as one sentence - either
—ordinary or of a mantra and brahmapa«*This explanation
is by taking arthaikatva in the sutra in the sense
of a single idea. Among the followers of Kumarila bhatta^
ParthasSrathimi^ra favours the Bhasya view and takes
artha in the sense of purpose,whereas Some^varabhatta
in the Nyayasudha takes the word in the sense of
ifmeaning to admit a wider scope of the principle.
1.VP.ii.4: sakank^avayavam bhede parhnSkahkea^abdakam 
karmapradhffnam guijavad ekartham vakya ipyate.
2.Tantravarttika.translation.p.586f.; Ganganatha Jha, 
op.cit.,p.l90.
3*Ganganatha Jha.op.oit..p.!90f.
4.Ibid.p.191;NySyasudha,p.3Qlff.
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PrabHSkara says1 that artha in the sutra stands for
prayojana or purpose,and that the words of a sentenoe
must be related to the purpose which is the most
isimportant factor in a sentence $lqter he says that 
artha in the sdtra^for meaning as well as for purpose. 
both being interrelated;the Bhasya emphasizes the 
unity pf purpose,as that is more important. Prabhakara 
lays stress on the purposive nature of sentences.
The next sutra of Jaimini lays down the princi­
ple of vakyabheda or Syntactic split* which says that 
"when the sentences are independent* of one another 
(each sentence having no requirement or expectation of 
words outside itself to complete its meaning),they 
should be treated as distinct sentences." Thus 
akanksa or sjmtactic expectancy among the words is 
accepted as an essential condition for a sentence.
This MimSmsa type of definition laying stress 
on the necessity of akahkga or mutual expectancy
l.l£hati,Ms.p.51( See PurvamlmafasS‘ in its Sources,p.190) 
2.Ibid,Ms.p.52A ( See Purvarnlm&msa in its Sources,p.191)
5.M^aSmsBsHtras, 2.1.47: samesu vdkyabhedah.
-  U l i -
among words in a sentence in order to have syntactic 
relation to bring about a unity of idea or of purpose,
sentence is described as that which is nirakarikga, 
that is to say,something which has no requirement or 
expectation of words outside itself to complete its 
meaning. The condition about the unity of purpose or 
of idea is not mentioned there. A similar definition
2s
is found in the Satyasadha^rautasutra also. It has been
suggested recently that the ^rautasutra definitions
- - 3are based on the Mimainsa definition.
It is generally believed that the condition about
akartega or the mutual expectancy among words in a 
sentence was first promulgated by the ®flmamsalcas;but 
the necessity for interdependence of words when theyknrvt/
have to give a unified sense as in a compound^ or a 
sentence was recognized even earlier by the grammarians.
1.Katyayanasrautasutra,1.3.2;J.Brough.Some Indian 
Theories of Meaning.SPT..1953.p.l62.~
appears in the TCatyayana^rauta sutra also. There a
-  H  V
Panini himself says that words can form a compound u/W
only if they have samarthya;this term has been
differently interpreted by oommentators;according to
some it is vyapeksa or mutual connection pertaining to 
2/the meaning,in whioh sense it is similar to the condi­
tion of ak&nk^a given by the Mimamsakas {according to
some others samarthya is to be explained as ekarthibhava
3or unification of meaning;that is "to say,the different
words with different meanings are made to signify a
unififed sense. This latter view may be compared to the
condition of arthaikatva given by Jaimini ( when
explained as unity of sense). Panini is discussing
compound words,whereas Jaimini is dealing with the
4*
sentence,but the conditions seem to be similar. Patanjali 
explains these two views as mutually exclusive,and 
accepts the ekarthibhava point of view as the correct 
one{according to this the members of a compound word
1.Pacini, 11.i.i* samarthah padavidhity.
2.MBh.i,p.365iparasparavyapek$5m samarthyam eke. ka 
puna^ ^abdayor vyapeksa? na brftmag' ^abdayor iti. 
kim tarhi? arthayoh.
3.Varttika under Pacini,11.i.i* prthagarth&nam 
ekarthibhavas samarthavacanam. See also the Bhagya on it,
4*Strictly speaking.samarthya is the capacity of the 
words for mutual association.vyapeksS is their inter­
dependence , and akarikgfi is the need one had for the 
other for completing the sense.
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give up their individual meanings and acquire a special 
signification;hut according to the other view,the 
individual members retain their own meanings,but they 
are mutually related. According to Haradatta^both 
vyapekga~ and ekarthibhava are necessary in a compound 
since in the absence of mutual connection of meanings, 
words are not allowed to form a compound.But others 
like Kaiyata give these two as the conditions for 
a sentence and a compound respectively.
The knowledge of the syntactic unity of a 
sentence is mainly on the basis of the akahksa or the 
mutual expectancy of the words. To this primary condi­
tion were later added two more.yogyata or consistency 
of sense^ and asatti or sannidhi which stands for the 
contiguity of the words. These three conditions for 
the understanding.of the correlation of the words in 
a sentence were first promulgated by the Mimamsakas,
l.See P . C .Chakravartf.Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar,p.293
2.Mahabhasyapradipa. under^Pa^ini ll.i.i. iha vyapekgayam 
samaso na bhavati,ekarthibhave vakyam neti.
3. KUmarilabha 11 &. T ant ravar t.t ika .vo 1.1. p. 455:
akarikga sannidhanam ca yogyata ceti ca trayam 
sambandhakarapatvena klptam nanantara^rutih.
(Mutual expectancy,proximity and congruity constitute 
the grounds of relationship;mere immediate sequence 
is not a ground of relationship).
-IfcS’-
and later taken up by all the other systems of thought 
with slight changesyand^the normal statement of the 
conditions fpr ^abdabodha or the understanding of the
meaning of a sentence is that it must possess akankga,
l
yogyata' and asatti. To these some have later added 
a fourth condition,viz. the knowledge of tatparya.the 
intention of the speaker or the purport of the sentence. 
Of these the greatest linguistic impojrtanoe has to be 
given to akaiikea.
p
Akahksa consists in a word not being able to 
convey a complete sense in the absence of another word; 
literally it is the desire on the part of the listeners 
to know the other word to complete the sense. A word 
is said to have akahksa for another if it cannot, 
without the latter, produce knowledge of its inter­
connection in a speech. In every language oertain words 
necessarily require certain other words to complete the
1.Faddegon refers (The Vaisegika System.pp.6lff.) to 
the use of the terms akahksa.yogyata and sannidhi 
by Kumarilabha^ta in the ijlokavarttika.and says* 
that the terms are not used there in the exaot sense 
in which they are used by later writers. He seems to 
have missed the reference to the terms in the Tantra- 
varttika.The term akaiikga is used even by Pacini, 
though not in a technical sense.(VIII•ii.96 & 104 )•
2.Derived from the root kahks to desire.
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sense. Thus a nown in. the nominative case requires a 
verb to convey a complete meaning;a verb like 'bring1 
has expectancy for a word denoting some object. A string 
of words such as "cow,horse,man,elephant" (gaur a^vafr 
puruso hast!) does not convey a complete sense,sines 
there.is no connection between them owing to lack of 
akahksa*^
—  i , " f  ■ "  |7 r '
The Mimamsakas weresr not quite clear in distin­
guishing between syntactic expectanoy and psychological 
expectancy,and Bhartrhari actually criticises their 
definition of a sentence on the grounds that its 
akahkga would imply that a passage of several grammatical 
"sentenoes" would have to be considered as one sentence. 
Salikanatha,the follower of Brabhakara, says that 
akahkea.being the curiosity on the part of the listeners 
has been explained by some on the basis of invariable
1.Tarkasangraha.p.30 : padasya padahtaravy&tirekaprayukta- 
nvayananubhavakatvam akanksa;Vedantaparibhaga.IV: tatra 
padarthanan parasparajijnasavigayatvayogyatvam akahksa, 
kriya^ravape karakasya,karakas'ravaue kriyayah,karana- 
sravane itikartavyatayS^ ca jijhasavisayatvat.
2.VP.ii.3* See J .Brough.op.cittP.l63.
association;thus an action implies an agent,a place,
an instrument and so on,an,d similarly,an agent or an
instrument naturally implies an action to complete its
sense. This view is oriticized on t>ie /.round that there
is no -end to the curiosities aroused in the minds of
1the listeners through such associations. Only those 
that are essential for the accomplishment of the 
intended purpose need be taken as the requirements;the 
omission by the speaker the particular nature of
the instrument,place etc. for the action recommended 
shows that he is indifferent about it. Thueg"Britfg the 
oow” is a complete sentence,even though the instrument 
is not mentioned; "with a stick** is added ,if that is 
intended,otherwise it is implied that the listener is 
to bring the cow by some means or other. Thus the 
scope of akankga* depends on the intention of the speaker. 
Even though the sentence ’Bring the cow* is complete 
and has no •akariksa outside itself,if we add the phrase 
"with a stick”,that new phrase is in need of the verb 
Tor syntactic completeness,and hence "Bring the cow with
1.Yakyarthamatrkavall,p.1 t ka punar iyam akariksa? 
pra 11pattur ji jnasa• Kinnibandhana punar asau? avina- 
bhavanibandhaneti kecit. kriya hi karakavinabhavtnlti 
tarn pratTtya karakam jijriasate.evam karakam api buddhva 
kriyam iti. Tad ayuktam iti mariyante. jijriSsa tatha 
tadlyajanakatatkriyatatkHrakantaraclijijnasapyapadyate•
- H T  -
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ft stick” becomes a single sentence. In the case of 
elliptical sentences like "-the door",that word itself 
requires some verb for syntactic completeness.
According to the Yedantins>however,there is
akankseT between words,not only when one actually
implies the other,but also when it may possibly imply 
1it. Thus there are two kinds of akahksa: utthit&kahkga~ 
or actual and natural expectanoy of one word for the 
other to make a complete sense,and utthapyakahksa or 
potential expectancy whioh could be roused if necessary. 
For example in the sentence "Bring the cow",one may ask 
the question "What kind of cow?",and hence the word 'cow* 
may possibly imply adjectives like ’white* or *old*; 
there is no limit to the possibilities of such 
potential expectancy. According to this view the 
akahksa that exists between words in a sentenoe must 
be mutual and not one-sided5in some oases the expectancy 
in one direction may be direct and natural,while in 
the other direction it is only potential;thus in the 
sentence "Bring the white cow" the word *cow* has only
l.Nyayako‘Aa»p.ll3:S.C.Chaterjee.The Nyaya Theory of 
Knowledge,p.367;Vedantaparibhaga,IY.
a potential expectanoy towards the adjective ’white*, 
whereas the adjective has a direct and natural expectancy 
for the substantive *cow*.
The Mimamsakas explain akanksa not only on the 
basis of the syntactic incompleteness of the sentence,
but also on the basis of the psychological incompleteness
I
of the idea. They are concerned with the interpretation
of the Vedio injunctions;but the two schools of Mimamsa,
the Prabhakara and the Bhatta,differ in their view as
to what an injunction really means. According to the
Prabhakara school,every Yedic injunction is to be
considered as a command (niyoga);the person who is
enjoined to do something has to do it,not because it
will bring about some beneficial result,but simply
Irbecause it is the command.The law is to be obeyed 
because it is the law,not because of the fear of 
punishment or the expectation of reward. The action may 
bring about some fruit,but the action has no expectancy 
for it. A command is not a tempting offer. Hence according
1.Vakyarthamatrkavali.p.7:"anvitesyabhidhanartham 
uktSTrthaghatanSyajv’Si pratiyogini j.ij&5sa ya s"h]cahk$eti 
gTyate**; "abhidh&naperyavasSham abhidheysparyavasanam 
ca jijMsodayanibandhanam."
2.C.Kunhan Raja.In Defence of Mlmams5,Adyar Library 
Bulletin,1952,p.17Qf;Introduction to Bfrhat£(Madras 
University 3e ri e s, 3). P. 2 4«NySyaratnam51a .chapter 111.
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Hfco the Prabhakara school the three essential psycholo­
gical akankgas are for vigaya or the act enjoined,for 
niyo.jya or the person who is enjoined to do it and for 
karana or the means of doing it. Thus in the passage 
vijrvajita yajeta (The Vi^vajit sacrifice is to be 
performed) there is no mention of the niyojya or the 
functionary;therefore to complete the meaning we take
4,1 • i V'  ^ -r* \. -V «v‘ W  '.y*** : • r *■ . V * v  : * u.t ‘ V * ,'  ;• »-
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the word svargakama (one who is desires heaven) as 
understood.^
But according to the 3hatta school the content 
of an injunction is the realization that the action - 
enjoined is productive of some peneficial result.
Ktimarila takes the utilitarian view of morality;he says * 
that not even a fool will act without expecting some 
reward. The Skahkga of the Vedic injurytton- ii tttirtaxK 
for the itikartavyata or the act enjoined,the sadhana or 
karana or the means and for the phala or the friJlit of 
the action. There is no special 'akahksa for the person 
who is to do it;anyone interested in the fruit will do it.
1.The well-known line in the Bhagavadgita denouncing 
the expectation of the xra&rtit results while doing 
one’s duties(karmapy evadhikSras :%£..mSi phale^u kada- 
cana)seems to imply this view of PrabhSkara. KXunarila 
bhatta rejects this theory of action without the 
expectation of any result.
2. i^lokavarttika: prayojanam anuddi^ya na mando’pi
pravarttate.
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Thua in the sentence vi^va.1ita ya.jeta the additional 
word svargakamafr is to satisfy the akariksa regarding 
the fruit of action. In this way the two schools of 
Mimamsa give two different sets of akanksa according 
to the difference in the interpretation of the psycho 
logical factors involved in an injunction.
is found in the MimamsaT definition of a Mahavakya 
(compound sentence) on the basis of the mutual 
expectancy of the sentences or clauses that comprise it. 
It is this interdependence of sentences that make up a 
prakaraqa or context. Among the sentences in a particular 
context one is the principal (ahgin) and the others are 
aftgas subordinate to it. The general rule is that the 
principal clause and the subordinate clauses which 
are mutually connected together by expectancy,consistency 
and proximity form one large sentence,when they serve
a single purpose. Thus there is sentence unity in the 
followings "He shall sacrifice;heaven is the reward; 
a goat is the oblation;Agni is the deity." Here all the 
sentences have the same purpose,v i z t h e  performance of
An extension of this psychological expectancy
t
1.^astradlpika,p.442;Mimamsasutras T^TT.viii.4: — tad 
VSkyam hi tadarthatvat.
the sacrifice. This syntactic unity or ekavakyata is
based on a two-fold relationi that of a word to a sentence
(padaikavakyata) and that of a sentence to another
sentenoe(vakyaikavakyata). According to the Mimamsakas
only injunctive sentences have direct significance;the
Iothers are arthavadas,i.e» corroborative and eulogistic 
sentences and are subordinate. These arthavadab can 
indicate their meaning only as syntactically connected 
with the injunctive sentences. The relation of an 
arthavada to an injunction is that of a word to a 
sentence to which it forms a part. This is called 
padaikavakyata. But when sentences which are complete 
in respect of their own meanings again combine because 
of their relation of xadkjcktm principal and subordinate, 
they form a syntactic unity;this is called vakayaika- 
vakyata.
1 .arthavada is of three kinds:(i) gonavada or figurative 
statement,(ii)anuvada reiterates what is already 
existing or what is known by other means of cognition 
e.g. agnir himasya bheeajam (fire is an antidote 
against cold)states a fact that is already known,and is 
to be taken as a praise of Agni,(iii) bhutarthavada
or the statement or description of some past action.
2.Kumarilabhatta quoted in Vedantaparibhasa 
svarthabodhe samaptanam ang&hgitvadyapeksaya W  
vakyanam ekavakyatvam punas samhatya jayate.
The Vedantins also accept this view.See Vedantaparibhasa 
Chapter IV;Huparikar.The Problem of Sanskrit Teaching. 
pp.443ff*Among literary critics Vii^vanatha defines a 
Mahavakya as collection of connected sentences♦(Sahitya- 
darpana.11.i : vakyoccayo mahavakyam.
It is to be realized that the akariksa or the 
expectancy that holds between words in a sentenoe is a 
grammatical one and not merely psychological. It is only 
the need for the syntactic completeness of the sentence. 
The Naiyayikas have clearly defined Sk&riksa as a kind 
of syntactic need which one word has for another in a 
sentence in order to convey the interrelation of the
Iwords. It is the Skarik^a that leads to the knowledge 
of the syntactic relation of words in a sentence.
Nagesa,the great grammarian,says that 'ftkgrikg'a 
is the desire on the part of the listeners on hearing 
a word in a sentence to know the idea which can be 
related to its meaning in order to get a complete sense; 
thus the expectancy is for the listeners and not for the 
words or their meanings;it is only in a figurative 
sense that this expectancy is attributed to the words 
and their meanings.
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1. Tarkasarigraha.p. 3Q: Kusuman.jali defines it as 
padSrthasaitisargavagamaprSgabhavaty. (Nyayako^a. p . 113).
2. Paramalaghuman.iusa. akariksa section^a^sa caikapadartha 
jriane tadarthanvayayogyasya yaj jriftham tadvi^ayeccha; 
asyanvayy arthah ka ity evamrupS purusanisthaiva, 
tathapi svavisaye frthe aropah."
YOGYATA
|
■'% " TOflyatg is the logical compatibility or 
consistency of the words in a sentence for mutual 
association! Heally it involves a judgement on 
the sense or nonsense of a sentence• When the 
meaning of a sentence is not contradicted by 
experience,there is yogyata or consistency between 
its constituent words* ^alikanatha says^that yogyata 
demands the words in a sentence to have competence 
for mutual eonnection,and that this competence is 
to be known from experience. In the sentence 
"He wets it with water" (auqsinacag payasa sincati) 
there is yogyata or consistency of meaning, since 
wetting is generally done with a liquid like water 
and there is nothing incompatible between the idee 
of wetting and that o£ water* But a sentenoe like 
"He wets it with fire"(agnine sincati)has no yogyata
or compatibility,since the idea of wetting is
• .
something incongruous with that of fire.
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1 .Tarkaaahgraha»p * 301 arthabadho yogyeta;Parama- 
laRhuman .i ugff, p * 13 s para & paranvay a pray o j akadharma va t vara; 
fflattvaointamanij badhajcapramavirahah(NyS.yakosa, p. 675), |
2*yakyarthamatrkavali,p.9 : kim punar idam yogyatvam 
name? yat sambandharhatvam• sarrbendhErham iti 
katham jrlSyatc? samband hit vena dr^tatvat.
-  n  s“  -
There is difference of opinion about the 
exact function of yogyata in the comprehension of 
meaning from a sentence! Some Naiyayikas hold that 
a decisive knowledge of yogyata is & pre-requisite 
of verbal cognition;others argue that since a 
decisive knowledge of incompatibility prevents 
verbal co*nition,what is required is only the absence 
of such a counteracting agent. According to the 
former view it is a positive condition,whereas 
according to the latter it is only the absence of 
an impediment in verbal cognition.
It is necessary to distinguish between 
inconceivable combinations like’the circular square’ 
and the conceivable combinations which are against
our experience such as ’the rabbit’s horn’.Kumarila
3
bhatta says that incompatibility with the actual 
facts does not prevent verbal comprehension,but 
only the validity of the knowledge. Wittgenstein 
also says that what is conceivable is also possible.
1 .^uppusvami Sastri,A Primer of Indian Logic,p.334f.
2.Nyayakosa.p.6 7 £j badhani^cayHbhavo yogyata iti 
navya ahub.
3 * okavarttika, p. 4 6 (on sut ra 1.1.2)i atyantasatyapi 
hy arthe jhanam ^abdab karoti hi badhat tu na prama 
tatra tataty pramanyani^scayafi. f
4.Philosophical Investigations, j k 282?"The fairy tah 
only invents what is not the case;it does not talk 
nonsense."
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Strictly speaking it is the inconceivability of 
the ±k* mutual association of the word-meanings 
that renders the whole sentenoe nonsensical;!! is not 
the lack of correlation with the actual facts,but the 
impossibility of connecting the word-meanings that 
stands in the way of verbal comprehension* The 
other condition is not for mere verbal knowledge, 
but only for a valid judgement*
Sometimes the lack of yogyata ape may be 
only apparent and could be ex lained away by 
resorting to the metaphorical meaning of a word 
in the sentence;if the incompatibility is thus 
removed and yogyata is understood,there is no 
difficulty in comprehending the meaning of the 
sentence. The apparent incompatibility of the 
expressed sense is an essential condition for 
lakgana or transfer.^"
1 .This is discussed in the chapter on Lakgana*
P ‘ sn su
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SANNIDHI ■» -f"' g' /v ‘ Y.\ Y*'1- \ . ; .
r • Sannidhi or asatti is generally explained as \  
the condition that the words in a sentence should be 
contiguous in time. This contiguity or proximity is the 
uninterrupted utterance or unbroken apprehension of 
words when they are in juxtaposition. 7/ordr uttered with 
a long interval intervening between each word cannot 
produce the knowledge of any interrelation anon- them, 
iven if there be akarikseT and yogyata. If the worus are 
separated by the intervention of irrelevant words,then 
also the connection of the meaning c nnot be understood.
Kumarilabhatta jistinguishes between sannidhi 
and mere immediate sequence of utterance(anantarasruti). 
He eyplains sannidhi as the continuous moving about of
thd words or their meanings In the mind (buddhau yr
3 /viparivrttih)* ^alikanatha also explains it in the same
4*way. According to the Bhatta school the lack of sannidhi 
is of two kinds* not being uttered together and not being 
signified by words. No syntactic relation is possible
1 .Tarkasanrraha, p. ?0: padanam avilambenoccarariam sanniuhih 
Vedentapari'bhasa ,1V: Ssatti^ cavyavadhanena padajanya-’ 
padarthopasthiti:. .
2.Tantravarttike»p.445: "akahksa sannidhanam ca yogyata,
. ceti c< trayam sambandhakaranatveria fclptam nanantarasru 
3.Ibid.,p.455.4.Yakyarthagiatrkavali, p, 3 •
3• Manameyodaya t p . 99 f . : sannihit;: tvabhavatMckatacto sabda- 
bocihitatvabhavac ca uvedha sannidhyabhavo bhavati.
in the case of the words "bring ...the cow" uttered 
at different times. And a sentence such as "Tie up 
the cow" cannot have syntactic affinity with the word 
1horsef,even when the horse is seen in front as 
requiring to be tied up\ Thus they hold that syntactic 
relation is possible only for what have been compre-
Sbhended through words.
3
The Prabhakara school,on the other hand,believes
that sannidhi is only the contiguity of cognition of
the sense and not necessarily of words actually uttered.
Thus in the case of elliptical sentenoes the syntactic
relation is known by supplying the necessary meaning;
the Bhatta school rejects this view and insists that 
% *
even in elliptical sentences the syntactic relation is
h0known only by supplying the missing words themselves
According to the Prabhakara school»again* sannidhi 
does not mean the simultaneous mental comprehension of
1 *Manameyodaya,p.100> *gara badhana* ity atra^bandhana- 
peksasya drs^amanasyasvasya kabdabodhitatvad eva- 
nanvayafc.
2.Ibid: feabdapratipannanam evanvaya iti niyamab siddhah.
3.VSkyarthamatrkavali,p.9 s sannidhis sabdajanmaiva 
vyutpattau nopalaksanam adhyahrtenapyarthena loke 
sambandhadarsanat.
4. Manameyodaya,p.101:"sabdadhyahara eva syad ity evam 
mad^ fijam matam." This point is explained inUetail 
in the section on elliptical sentences. '
the words;as in the case of akankga it works step by step 
in the order of sequence in which they are cognized)
The mutual connection of the meanings of words is 
comprehended step by step along with the knowledge of 
akariksa ,yogy at a and sannidhi. Thus in the sentence 
"Bring the cOw,which is white,with a stick" (gam anaya 
^uklam dandena),first the word 'oow’ is known as related 
to the verb 'bring'jthen this connected sense is 
related to the meaning of the next word 'white* and later 
with that of the next. This is on the basis of the
.*% • » - . ■ • -V ‘ . * < .anvitabhidhana theory. Some of the Naiyayikas also seem
••to favour this view.rv
According to the early Naiyaikas,however,the 
recollection of the meanings of words is simultaneous.
Like perception,recollection is also transient and, 
therefore,it is impossible to recollect the meanings 
of individual words one by one and then have a collective 
cognition. The method of simultaneous comprehension is
1.Vakyarthamatrkavali,p .9: akauiksavac ca sannidhav api 
sannidhapakakrameqaiva kramo veditavyah*/
2. Siddhantamuktavali.under verse 33 : y&d yad akank^itam
yogyam sannidhSnam prapadyate tena terianvitas svarthah 
padair evavagamyate. * v V
explained on the analogy of fthe pigeons on the
1
threshing floor*;just as pigeons,young and old,come 
down together to pick up grains,so also in a sentence 
the meanings of words become interrelated simultaneously*
The Navya-Nyaya school defines 'S.satti or sannidhi 
as an immediate recollection of the meanings of words
Ji.through their expressive power or laksana;even if the 
words are separated,as it sometimes happens in a verse, 
there is asatti,if the meanings of the words are 
recollected without any interruption* This asatti 
itself is the cause of verbal comprehension,not the
3knowledge of asatti as the early Naiyayikas believed*
This recollection is explained as a collective cognition
(samuhalambanajnana) • The perception of each word leaves
its impression on the mind,and when the last word is
uttered,its last letter acts as a stimulus^and a
collective recollection follows. It is a single cognition
arising out of the contact of the senses with a collection 
Hof objects.
l.It is called khalekapotanyaya* See Siddhantamuktavali 
under verse 83 : v^ddha yuvana^ ^i^avap kapotafr kliaie 
yathami yugapat patanti,tathaiva sarve yugapat padfcrthah 
paraspare^ahvayino bhavanti.
2.Nyayamanjari(See Nyayakosa,p.l35): vrttya padajanya- 
padarthopasthitih.
3* Ibid:sa ca svarupasati ^abdabodhahetuh,na tu jriata.
4* Huparikar.The Problem of Sanskrit Teaching*p p .436ff.
ELLIPTICAL SENTENCES
In the case of elliptical sentences where the 
intended meaning is understood from the context even 
though some of the words necessary for syntactic 
completeness are not actually expressed,what is the px 
process of verbal comprehension? Do we have to supply 
the omitted words before we can get the meaning of 
the sentence,or do we supply the general meaning from 
the context and understand the sentence?
The Mimamsakas of the Prfibhakara school hold 
that it is easier to supply the necessary meaning than 
to presume the omitted words as understood) The presence 
of the word can be understood only after understanding 
the meaning to be supplied in the context;whan that 
meaning is known,it is unnecessary to presume the 
existence of the words,since we are interested in the 
meanings and not in the words. Moreover,the presence 
of a word is not essential for the recollection of the 
meaning. Therefore they argue that in all such cases
1.Vakyarthamatrkavali,p.8 : sannidhiS Sabdajanmaiva 
vyutpattau nopalak^a^am adhyahrtenapy arthena loke 
sambandhadarSariat. Mghameyodaya.p.100 s gurus tl 
buddhisannidhimStram eva sannidhim manyate,na tu 
Sabdasannidhim •
2.VSkySrthamStrkavali,p.8 : na ca vacyam ^abda evadhya- 
hriyate,sa cSrtham upakalpayatlty anupayogad 
apramfcnakatvSc ca.
it is the omitted meaning,not the actual word,that 
is to he supplied.(arthadhyahara).
- l ? i -
rumarilabhatta rejects this view and maintains
that in all such cases it is necessary to supply the 
omitted words themselves in order that we. may have 
the verbal comprehension of meaning! In ordinary 
conversation when an incomplete sentence such as
cv wC. ^
*— the dotfrtHs. heard,We take^as understood, some word 
like 1 close1 or * open? form a syntactically complete 
sentence which can give the meaning So also in the 
Vedic injunction vi4va.1ita yajeta (The visivajit . 
sacrifice is to be performed) we have to supply the 
word 8Vargakamab( by one who desire heaven) in order 
to satisfy the expectancy and make it a complete 
sentence, Syntactic expectancy has to be satisfied by
supplying the actual words omitted. Verbal comprehension 
is possible only from syntaotically complete sentences 
and therefore the view about the supplying of the 
meaning is not acceptable. There are different means
of cognition such as perception and inference by which 
meaning nay be understood;thus the idea of a pot may 
be conveyed by just pointing to it 1 Combinations of 
more than one way are also possible,as in the sentence 
"Take this" ,^ yith pointing to the object intended • 
Similarly one who sees a white object and hears the 
neighing and the noise of galloping may understand
that a white horse is galloping,even without the
3bcognition of the words expressing the idea;but this
knowledge is arrived at either from inference or
arthaoatti( postulation or immediate inference from
negative concomitance) and is not verbal. The Vedantins
and the Naiyayikas also agree with the Bhatta MinKaxxkn
view of supplying the omitted words (padcTdhyahara)
in the case of incomplete sentences in order to have" >
3verbal comprehension. :i 7:.*’.
According to. the Mimamsakas it is through 
arthapatti that w.e oognize the omitted word or idea 
in such cas.s, tymologically arthaoatti moans the 
)QStulatioh(apatti)of a fact (artha);it is the process 
by which we get the knowledge of a fact that explains
1.Huparikar,op.cit.,p.441
2.^lokavarttikat pa^yata^ ^vetima rupam he?asabdam 
ca ^nvatalp khuranippe^a^abclam ca ^veto1 &vo dhavatlti
/ dhih.
5»Vedantaparibh?^sa>IV;SiddhSntamuktav^ li,under verse 8 %
\ jwhat,16 otherwise unaccountable. Sahara says that it
is the postulation of some fact,when what is seen or
So' -heafcd is otherwise inexplicable• Thus on seeing that 
Devadattawho is known to be alive, is not a:t, liome, • 
his presence outside Ib presumed;on hearing that 
Devadatta who is fat does not eat during day time, , 
it is presumed th'.t he eats during night. In such cases 
the postulation of a fact is necessary to explain
«* a* * " I , * : * ’ 1 , * h ’
two.known facts that.are apparently contradictory.
.T « V £  hi 'si ' \ Sfd  v *  i . %  ^ tyfl \ • ' -  ’* %  *',»•„ ■* . * i ■* *-4> • " ?  *’<■- ' • • * 1
/  _ _Sahara refers to two types of arthapatti.drgtarthapatttl
or postulation from what is seen and ^rutfirthapatti
:o r t u l a t i o n  from what is heard.
3'^ .r. According to the Prabhakara school, art ha patti 
consists in the postulation of a faot and not of a
' . * ’• V ■ ■'
* . •.  • . J • ■
word,and hence even in the case of elliptical,sentences 
it is only the general meaning that can be cognized - T  
through it ♦ But TCumarilabhatta explains drst&rthapatti 
as postulation from what is experienced,and gives a
1.Manameyoda.ya t p. 1131 anvayanupapatya yad upapadaka- 
kalpanam tad arthSpattih.
2. gabarabhagya( see Brhati,p.110) : arthapattiar api
'• dr Stas' hruto va1rtho'nyatha nopapadyata ityarthl^a- 
kalpanfi".
3«Vakyarthamatrkavali,p.8f.t na oa dvajram iti yatra- 
dhyaharas tatrapy aVriyatam savriyatam iti va kalpa- 
yitum arthapatteh prabhavisnuts',samanyakalpanamS.tra-' 
hetutvat.
-  U  Sf-
/ 'new interpretation for srutarthapatti: it is the
postulation of the omitted words to make out the 
syntactic relation in the case of elliptical sentences. 
The Prabhakara school does not accept such an inter­
pretation for s/rutarthapatti.
The Vedantins also follow the Bha’tta school
in their view about elliptical sentences. The Naiyayikaa,
also agree with them in emphasizing the necessity of
supplying the actual words in the case of incomplete
3sentences in order to have verbal comprehension;but
they do not accept arthapatti as a separate means
of cognition;instead they include it under inference
based on an invariable concomitance between the absence
of the major term and the absence of the middle term
U(anumana of the kevalavyatirekl type).
1 • Vanameyodaya, p. 12 3 : ya t r a tv a pa r i purr;a ay a vakya sy a - 
nvayasiddhaye ^abdo 'dhyahriyate tatra ^rutartliapattir 
i§yate;see also &1okavart t ika,artha pat t i section.
2.Vedantaparibhaga,IV t a&rutasthale tatpadadhyaharah*
3.Nyayakosa,p.l6f: naiyayikais sabdadhy~hara eva svi- 
kriyate,na tv arthadhyaharah.Also Siddhantamuktavali 
under verse 83.
4.NyayakoBa» p. 79 * atra naiyayikah - arthapattir na 
pramapantaram kim tu vyatirekavyaptya anumane »ntar- 
fekKxacdkfrifci bhavad iti.
• t ft t
\  c ■ . - t  . „ V  ~  ; . * r % . •
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Incomplete sentences are of two kinds: the 
normal elliptical sentence where the dyntactio 
expectancy is not fully satisfied,and the syntactic;' lly
complete sentenoe where the psychological expectancy
' I - >is not fully satisfied. Bhoja in his Srngaraprakasa
distinguishes these two types clearly;he calls the
«*■ « «  —  r * *  Jformer adhyahara and thr latter vakya. see a. Both are
incomplete sentences leaving something to be understood
in adhyahara the sentence is syntactically incomplete
and requires the postulation of the necessary word
as understood,whereas in vakya4ega it is the idea that
is incomplete. Owing to the purposive nature of speech
it is held that the ultimate meaning of every sentence
is to influence some action. Bven in cases where it is
not aotuaily expressed,it has to be assumed. Thus the
sentence "The road is full of thieves" means "Do not
go that way",and the sentence "There are crocodiles
in that pond" means that one should not bathe in it.
3These ideas are got through vakyasega.
1.Nyayakos^a.p.79: ^rutarthapatti^ ca dvividha,abhi- 
dhananupapattir abhihitSnupapattid ca.
2.V«Hag::avan,Srhgarapraka^a,vol.ii,p.!90. See the 
quotation there from Bhoja: ^abdakahkganivartaka 
’dhyaharah,arthak&hkg5nivartako vakya^esah.
^.Bhoja ’s drrigaraprakado.( quoted by V.Ragi avan,loc .cit.) 
earvavakyanam viahini^edhaparyavasayitvat sSk^St 
tada^rutav api tadupakalpanam vakya^eqah, sacoraly 
panthS ity ukte na gantavyam,grShas sarityam ity u ct 
na snatavyam iti vakya^eso bhavati.
It will be seen that Bhqja is striking a 
middle path between the two extreme views adopted by 
the two schools of Mimamsa, In the case of elliptical 
sentences it is better to supply the actual words to 
remove the syntactic d&ficiency;but. it is too much 
to assume that further ideas suggested or implied 
by the sentence have to be got through the presumption 
of the actual words expressing them,
Bhartrhari has discussed the problem of the
elliptioal sentences in the second chapter of the 
_ IVakyapadiya, He has no difficulty in explaining them 
at all;for from his point of view there is no elliptical 
sentence at all* If what appears to be part of a 
sentence is capable of conveying a complete sense 
in the particular context in which it is used,that is 
also a complete sentence. The sentence is an indivisible 
unit and the division into words,stems and suffixes 
is only an artificial means of analysing the language. 
The meaning of an utterance is that which is conveyed 
to the listeners by uttering it;there is no other 
definition of meaning. Even a noun is a sentence,!7" it
1.VP,ii.verses 326ff.
’2,VP.ii.328j jfasmirfis tuccarite, ^abde yada yo'rthati pra- 
tiyate tam ahur artham tasyaiva nanyad arthasya 
laksanam.
implies the verb and gives a complete idea;similarly 
a verb is a sentence if it gives a complete sense.
If Devadatta is known by Deva or Batta,all the three 
should be considered as different names for the same 
person;so also if the word 'tree’ gives the meaning 
of ‘The tree exists1,the two are to be considered as 
two different sentences;the shorter one cannot be taken 
as part of the longer one.
k similar view about the naturex of elliptical
sentences is given by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical
|Investigations .He says,"Is the call ’Slabi’a sentence 
or a word? It is our elliptic?1 sentence,i.c.,a 
shortened form of the rentence ' Bring me a slab' . Ceui 
we say 1 Bring me a slab1 a lengthening of the sentence 
' Slab!^ How do we understand it? Do we say the unshort- 
end sentence to ourselves? And why should I translate
*, j f w  {Ay- . ' t t V v \ - .  • ‘ 5* '*£$’.'* l£ '7 r« ^ ’•SfcBrTv *' &>• -*S. • * ' ' '  * .• V* *£* *•* 4- ■» v s  v *  ' 1 f
the oall'Blab!' into a different expression in order 
to say what some one means by it?".He seems to echo 
the views of Bhartrhari. "The sentenc^ is elliptical, 
not because it leaves out something that we think,when
we utter it,but because it is shortened - in comparison
1/with a particular paradigm qf our grammar."
-  1 8 5 '
I *3^K+1.Philosophical-Investigations. p . 19; 
2.1bid.,fc>20.
T at pa ry a j nana: -
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According to some of the later Naiyayikas 
a general knowledge of the meaning intended by the 
speaker is an essential factor in all cases of 
verbal comprehension. But the/ did not take the 
extreme view held by Prof. Schiller^ that the 
meaning of any utterance is the notion actually 
present in the mind of the speaker;but ,like Sir A.
pGardiner, they considered that ”the meaning of
any sentence is what the speaker intends to be
understood from it by the listener.n It is possible
Lfor the same sign to belong to different psycologioal 
oontexts;a word may mean different things in 
different cases. Even the same thing can be examined 
from different angles without exhausting it? 
characters;but from the linguistic point of view 
we are only concerned with so much of the thing 
as is required to elucidate what the speaker intended 
the listener to see.
1.P.W.Thomas.Parts of Speech,GPT.,1949*p«130n.
2.A .Gardiner,The definition of the word and the 
sentence.British Journal of Psychology,vol.XII>p.36l.
3.A.Gardiner,Speech and Language,p.52. He discusses 
the problem under the term ’Depth of Intension’.
19o
5 1 T- sTS These Naiyayikas who give great importance | 
to the speaker’s intention in fixing the nteillfog 
of an utterance maintain that even in ordinary - Vv:|£
sentences like ’•Bring the pot * (gha^am anaya)» it is 
'the intention of the Speaker that gives the meaning 
of pot to the word ’pot15 they say that if the 
intention of the speaker were otherwise, the word - g' ;/:V 
could, through lakgaqa, or the seoondary 
BHCDKdxry significative power, indicate even a 
piece of cloth.^ They also hold that it is the 
incompatibility of the expressed sense with the  ^
intention of the speaker that prompts the listener 
to interpret a passage by resorting to kxknt laksana; c 
thus, they say that in the sentenoe *The village is 
on the ganges^CgangSyam ghosafr) it is the intention 
of the speaker that gives the meaning ’the bank of the 
Ganges’ to the word ’GangesSand that if the intention 
of the speaker had been otherwise, the word 1villager 
could mean even a fish. This view ignores completely;
1. NySyakosa,p.3271 pare tu ghatadisabdosthale *pi 
gha$apadam kumbhaparam laksanaya pa^aparam veti 
sanuefaye ghatasabdabodhobhavat sarvatra tatparya- 
ni^oayah kiTrepara ity ahuh. . ‘ ^
2. See the chapter on Laksana. ( ^
-  A '
the statue of language as an objective instrument of 
communication,for,as "rof. F .’/.Thomas rightly points 
out,'1' the speaker's meaning and the normal signi­
fication have to be clearly distinguished. Linguistic 
discourse is impossible without assuming normal 
signification for words independently of the 
intention of the speaker. Humpty Dumpty said,
"When 1^ use a word,it means just what I choose it 
to mean - neither more,nor less .,f If such a view 
is accepted,no one can under>tana what the other 
means when he says something# "TVhat I intende I 
to rjefer to may be quite the other than what I did 
refer to,a faot which it is important to remember, 
if it is hoped to reach mutual comprehension. *
The Vedantins reject this extreme view of 
the Naiyayikas regarding the “importance of the 
speaker*r intention in determining the meaning of 
an utterance. ?/hen a parrot or a gramaphone 
repeats human expression,or when an illiterate
l.loo.cit#
2 . Lew is  C a r o l ! .T hrough th e  hooking  G la s s ,c h a p te r  VI.
3.Ogden and Rlchards.The yeanin/- of Meaning,p.182.
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brahmin chants the Vedic hymns without understanding
the meaning,the listeners can interpret them,even
though there is no real intention on the part of
the speaker in such cases.'*' The Naiyayikas say
that the intention need not be that of the actual
speaker,but could sometimes be traced to the original
2author of the statement. In the case of the Vedic 
sentences the Naiyayikas assume the intention of God. 
But according to the Vedantins and the MTmainsakas 
the existence ibf God is not accepted by all people 
and should not therefore be brought in?»the 
explanation of linguistic phenomena. They maintain 
that every word has an inherent capacity to express 
its meaning,and even the sentence has a natural 
capacity to produce the cognition of a unified 
sense in the form of the mutual association of the 
word-meanings. The primary meanings of a word is 
a power innate in the word itself on the basis of 
the natural and permanent relation that exists
1.VedantaparibhasS«IV.
2.Ny5yako^a,p .32b: prayokta cabhisandhapayitr matram 
na tu vaktaiva.
3. "Oven in the case of the parrot’s speech the 
Naiyayikas assume the intention of God,and not / 
that of the people whom it imitates sSee Nyfiyakosa» 
^ukavfikye bhagavadiocaiva gatih.
4 Vedantaparibhgsg". IV.
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between the word and the thing meant by it. The 
Mimamsaka's habit of attending too exclusively to 
the 'revealed* texts of the Vedas probably encouraged 
them to formulate a theory of verbal comprehension 
without any reference to the speaker at all. Even 
a sentence which is unintelligible to the speaker 
has an inherent capacity to convey its meaning. Thus 
the phrase "the pot in;: the room" conveys the relation 
of the pot and the room without any help of the 
speaker's intention.
The Vedantins admit,however,that the knowledge 
of the speaker's intention plays an important role 
in the comprehension of meaning in the case of 
ambiguous expressions. Thus in the case of equivocal 
expressions the meaning is restricted to one of 
the senses,in the absence of the speaker's intention 
to convey the other sense also.^
It is to be remembered thatuthe difference 
in the views of the Naiyayikas and the Mimamsakas
l.See Vedantaparibhasa.IV where in the definition 
tatparyc, the qualification tadanyapratlticchaya 
'nuccaniitatvam is addod to tatpratrti.]ananayogyatvam«
( a s  w e l l  a s  th e  V e d a n t in s  who f o l l o w  them) r e g a r d in g  
th e  p a r t  playAd by th e  s p e a k e r ’ s  i n t e n t i o n  i n  
d e t e r m in in g  th e  m eaning  o f  a s e n t e n c e  i s  u l t i m a t e l y  
due t o  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e i r  v ie w s  a s  t o  th e  
n a tu r e  o f  th e  k now ledge d e r iv e d  from  la n g u a g e*  
A c c o r d in g  t o  th e  N a i y a y i k a s , s a b d a *as a means o f  
k n o w l e d g e , i s  v a l i d  v e r b a l  t e s t im o n y  and i t  c o n s i s t s  
i n  th e  s ta te m e n t  o f  a t r u s t w o r th y  person.^* T h is  i s  
a lw a y s  baaed on th e  w ords o f  some t r u s t w o r t h y  p e r s o n ,  
human o r  d i v i n e .  But a c c o r d in g  t o  t h e  V e d a n t in s  and 
t h e  Mimamsakas, v e r b a l  t e s t im o n y  h a s  s e l f - e v i d e n t  
v a l i d i t y  ( sva tah p ram an ya) ; s i g n i f i c a n t  c o m b in a t io n  
o f  w ords c o n s t i t u t e * a  s e n t e n c e  w h ich  c o n v e y s  i d e a s ,
p
w it h o u t  any r e f e r e n c e  to  th e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  th e  speaker** 
E ven  i n  th e  c a s e  o f  w o r d -m e a n in g s ,th e  Mimamsakas 
b e l i e v e  t h a t  th e  s i g n i f i c a t i v e  power i s  in h e r e n t  i n  
t h e  w ords t h e m s e l v e s ,w h i l e  th e  N a iy a y ik a s  h o ld  t h a t  
i t  i s  im p orted  i n t o  th e  words by th e  w i l l  o f  God 
o r  o f  th e  s p e a k e r .  The N a iy a y ik a s  g i v e  th e  name 
t a t p a r y a  t o  th e  m eaning in te n d e d  by th e  s p e a k e r ;  
but th e  Mimamsakas and th e  V e d a n t in s  u s e  th e  term  
to /  m eaning  co n v ey ed  by th e  c a p a c i t y  o f  th e  w ords  
t h e m s e lv e s *
r*Nyayasutral*1 *71 aptopade&as sabdah* 
2*3*C*Chater.iee,Nyaya Theory of knowledge , pp* 345ff.
3 8 1 f f .
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Even among the Naiyayikas there is much 
difference of opinion regarding the importance of 
the speaker’s intention as a factor in the under­
standing of the meaning of a passage.^ Some of them 
believe that the speaker’s intention need not be 
treated as a separated condition of verbal compre­
hension, since it could be included under akankga 
itself,for according to them ak'anksa is to be taken
as the need one word has for another in order to
2convey the intended meaning of the speaker. Thus, 
in the statement, M ay am eti putro - rajnah - puruso 
’pasaryatam ” (Here comes the son - of the king - the 
man should be removed ), it is the knowledge of the 
speaker’s meaning that decides thatbthe word ’rajhah* 
(of the king) is to be construed with the word ’putra* 
(son),and not with ’puruga1 (man),to satisfy its 
akanksa.
According to some others the knowledge of 
the meaning intended by the speaker is essential 
for verbal comprehension,only in oases of equivocal
Nyayakosa,p»526 f;^uppusvami Sastri,op»cit»,p»335. 
Tarkadlpa quoted in .Nyayakosa,p,328: anye tu ... 
akanksagha^akatayaiva tatparyajnanam hetuh,na 
tu svfftantryena ity ahuh.
terms and ambiguous expressions* Thus, when
a man is asked to bring saindhava, he has to
infer from contextual factors the meaning intended
by the speaker before understanding what he has
to do, since the word 1saindhava1 means both salt
and a horsed Nagesa,the grammarian, also accepts
the importance of knowing the speaker’s meaning
2in such equivocal expressions*
Gange^opadhyaya and Vi^vanatha hold that 
a knowledge of the tatparya is the fourth requisite, 
along with akeuiksa,yogyata and sannidhi, for 
verbal comprehension* According to these Naiyayikas 
tatparya is the meaning intended by the speaker.
Other Naiyayikas consider that tatparya is an 
all-embracing factor and that it btxxxaucK has an 
important part to play in the working of the 
first three factors,akahksa,yogyata and sannidhi.
l*Nyayakosa,p*3271 kecit tu eaindhavam anayetyadau 
nanarthasthala eva tatparyasamsayades sambhavena 
tatratyasabdabodha eva tatparyani^cayo hetuh *.. 
ity ahuh; see also Siddh^taJ3iuktavali,p*316*
2. Laghumanju$a,p*324: nanarthasthale padavipayo ’pi, 
tadgrahakam ca prakarapadikam.
3# Vidyabhusana,A History of Indian LoKic*p.443t
Siddhahtamuktavali.p*315? vaktur iceha tu tatparyam*
4. Siddhantamuktava1i,p♦30 3 * tatparyagarbha casattih* “See-also f.V.Atheiye’s notes on Tarkasahgraha,p* 343 
"Perhaps,the speaker’s intention may be included 
in the second requisite,yogyataw.
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Even though what is in the liiind of the 
speaker at the time of utterance is something 
subjective,and not capable of being put to an 
objective analysis,the idea intended to be conveyed 
to the listener by the speaker could be determined 
to a great extent with the help of contextual factors^ 
"It is possible for the same sign to belong to 
different psychological contexts;but given the
psychological context to which a sign belongs, the
»} 2reference made by the interpretation is fixed also. 
According to many of the ancient writers on the 
subject,it is the contextual factors that determine 
the meaning of an utterance, and ,therefore, these 
should be considered as tke causes of verbal 
comprehension. But the Naiyayikas reject this view,^
1. What is in the mind of the speaker at the time 
of utterance may be different from what is intended 
to be conveyed to the listener, especially in the 
case of successful lying. Again, what is intended 
to be conveyed may be quite different from what is 
actually conveyed by the utterance. The term 
tatparya is used by^the Naiyayikas in the former 
sense,and by the Mimamsakas and the Vedantins in 
the latter sense. It is quite possible that what 
is actually understood by the listener is different 
from all these.
The Meaning of Meaning,p.115«
3. See the section on 'contextual factors1 / "VSO
4. Siddhantamuktavali.p.3151 na ca tatparyagrahakanam 
prakaranadlnSm ^abdabodhe karanam iti vacyam.
- a q ? -
and maintain that the contextual factors are not 
helping directly in the understanding of speech, 
but only indirectly by showing the meaning intended 
by the speaker.
The importance of knowing the speaker’s 
intention in the understanding of speech is recog­
nized by almost all schools of Indian thought. The 
difference in their views is. mainly based on the 
degree of emphasis laid on it. There is much 
truth in the view of the Naiyayikas that the meaning 
of an utterance is what the speaker intends the 
listener to understand; speech is mainly purposive 
in nature and can do its function only if the 
listener understands what is intended to be conveyed 
by it. But it is also true that for language to be 
an objective instrument of communication, it must 
be independent of the personal whims of the speaker; 
that is why the crude sentences of ordinary speech,
whose nuances are commonly indicated by intonation
*
and emphasis, become unsuitable for impersonal, 
rational logic.^ The distinction between the
1. F/V.Thomas, loc.cit.
-  m
’locutional sentence form’ which depends solely 
on words, and ’elocutional sentence form’ which 
depends on intonation indicating the speaker’s 
intention is also based on the relative strength 
between the normal meaning and the speaker’s 
intention.^*
The Mimamsakas use the term tatparya to 
the purport of a passage dealing with a topic, 
and refer to six lirigas or indications by which 
it could be obtained objectively without any 
refernee to the speaker or the author. These 
lingas arej (a) the unity of the introduction and 
the conclusion (upakramopasamharau), (b) repetition 
of the main topic (abhyasa)»(c) the novelty of the 
subject matter (apurvata),ftkMMggmfrfrgtafcra&grtgkaikgfrx 
(d) the result intended (phalam).(e)corroborative 
and eulogistio remarks as distinguished from the 
main theme(arthavada),and arguments in favour of
pthe main topic(upapatti).
1.A ;Gardiner.Speech and Language»p.201.Cf. Humpty 
Dumpty’s remark,”The question is which is to be 
master(words or the speaker)- that is all”(Through 
Looking Glass.chapter vii).
2.Nyayako^a.p.7141 upakramopasamharau abhyaso’purveAa 
phalam arthavadopapattl ca lingam tatparyanirnaye. 
The Vedantins also accept them.
In the case of the sentence also the
Mimamsakas maintain that the tatparya or the real
purport meant by it can be studied objectively
without any reference to the intention of the speaker.
Like the Naiyayikas,they also analysed a sentence
into two parts>udde^ya and vidheya. which correspond
roughly to the subject and prediaate of Western logic^
The first part (subject)^contains a sense that is *
fromalready existent and is known/other sources (siddha),
while the other part consists of the meanings that
are to be brought into existence (sadhya)« These
two parts are also called bhuta and bhavya.as well
as anuvadya vidheya. The Mimamsakas hold that
the tatparya. of a sentence is found only in the
3vidheya portion. The anuvadya (subject) is that 
which discloses to the listener what any utteranoe 
is about,and is not always indispensablef it is used
!•S.C.Chatterjee.Nyaya Theory of Knowledge ,pp.375ff•
In Sanskrit the copula is not considered as an 
essential part of the sentence. Modem writers in 
the west have also realized that the copula is only 
a formal element.(Cf. Bosanquet.Loftic,vol.1.pp.81ff: 
A.Gardiner,Speech and Language.pp.218ff.)
2.Nyayakosa, P«_34 x pram&nantarasiddhasya ki&oid dharma- 
ntaravidhanartham upanyasyatl. Wegner calls it 
y expositionT(Gardiner.op.cit.,p.265)
3»Kavyaprak|t^a,v (p.226) i yad eva vidheyam tatraiva
tatparya-n.
in a sentence only to help the listener to understand 
the meaning clearly. Prom the speaker’s standpoint 
it is enough if the vidheya alone is uttered;it is
in an exclamatory sentence like "Splendid!* it is
subject is to be understood by the listener from
whether the subject should come before the predicate
or vice"versa. Even though in Sanskrit the order of
sequence of the words does not normally affect the
literal meaning of the sentence, it is held by
writers on Mimainsa and literary criticism that
2the subject must come before the predicate. The 
violation of this rule is considered as a defect
by the literary critics. This deject is called
1.A.Gardiner.op.cit.,p.265f
2.This well-known rule is given in the old maximi 
"anuvadyam anuktva ca na vidheyam udTrayet."This
line is supposed to be from ^umarila,but is not 
found in the £lokavar11ika; Hemacandra quotes it
lus§sana,p.172). See also A.Gardiner.op.pit.
3.Sahityadarpana.p.2» Even though it was considered 
as a defect,the poets were.fully conscious that a 
change in the normal order could heighten the 
emotionalvattitude towards the statement. -
only that part that expresses something new. Thus,
only the vidheya that is given; the udde^ya or
the context 1
Great interest attaches to the question
avimrstavidheyam^a or vidheyavimarsa.
The Nffmarasakas and the Naiyayikas,who take the 
sentence to be a concatenation of the individual words 
that comprise it^  have necessarily to depend on the 
power of tatparya to explain how a connected meaning 
is comprehended from a sentence. It is clear that 
according to this view the sentence expresses something 
over and above the meanings of the words which compose 
the sentence. A string of unconnected .^isolated, senses 
given by the words cannot produce a unified meaning.
Or In other words we may say that there are two elements 
in the sentence-meaning* the meaning of the individual 
words and the mutual connection of these. We know that 
the words give their own meanings; the problem is to 
find out where the element of the relation between the 
word-meanings comes. The whole is always something more 
than the sum of the parts; and the Association’ theory 
cannot satisfactorily explain where the additional 
element comes from. Get Gestalt psychologists refer to 
the 'Association' theory as a ’brick and mortar® psychology 
which explains only where the bricks come from,but not 
where the mortar comes from. The followers of the
aJrfsjL
anvitabhidham theory of verbal comprehension explain 
the problem by resorting to the function of tatparya.
*  0 S
Speeoh is purposive in nature* Learned people
use words with the intention of conveying a connected s
sense. Hence from the use of words in juxtaposition
(samabhivyahara) it is assumed that the speaker has
uttered them with the intention of conveying a connected
sense;for the oo-uttenance would he of no avail,hut for
such an intention^ The anvitabhidhana theory considers
that the intention or tatparya makes the primary
significative power (ahhidha) convey the additional
significance of the sentence. Btiit according to the
abhihitanvaya theory, the power of abhidha can give
only the word-meanings; it is these word-meanings that
convey the additional significance on the strength of
tatparya, along with the three factors akankga ,.yogyata~
811(1 sannidhi . This funotion of the sentence to convey
the sentence-meaning on the basis of the speaker’s
2intention is called tatparya-vrtti * This is also
3called samsargamaryada by the Naiyayikas.
1.Tattvabindu,p.132: pratipitsitam khalv etad iti prati- 
padayi^jtantah pad anyuccarayanti; see also Kumarilabhatta 
(quoted thereon): vi^i^tarthaprayukta hi samabhivy&hrtir
jane.
2.Kumarasvaminfs commentary on Prataparudriya,p.32: 
abhihitariam padarthan&m arthabhidhSyinHm pKritaraana vfi 
padanam vi^igjarthapratyayana^aktis tstparyam iti 
mim&msaka varpnyanti. See also Kavyapraka^a, II,under 
verse 6: padarthanam samanvaye tatparyartho visegavapur 
apadarthopi vakyarthas samullasatltyabh^itanvayavadinam •
3.Kuppusvami Sastri,op.cit.,p.22 (matam.
0 •
C H A P T E R  T
T H E  M E A N I N G  O P  A S E N T E N C E  
ANVTTABgfDH?SkA, ABHIHITlNVATA ft VjjOTASPHOTA THEORIES
Relation of words in a sentenoet Bheda or Samsarga.
If every word has its own definite meaning, 
how is it possible for a sentenoe which is only a 
oolleotion of words to have a unified meaning? The 
same problem arises in the case of compound words also* 
Two explanation are given to this question.1 
Vajapyayana who,like the Mimamsakas, held that the 
meaning of a word is the universal or the jati* said 
that the meaning of a sentence is the eariisarga or the 
mutual association of the word meanings* In the base 
of a phrase like "the white cow" (gau^ suklah)* the 
word 'cow* connotes 'cowness1 merely; the other 
word whioh is syntactically connected with it 
association with the quality of whiteness. Thus, 
the sentence means the association of cowness and 
whiteness, and as that is one,the words constitute 
a syntactic unity.^
1. Regarding the two views about the import of 
sentences,see M*Hiriyanna,Vygdi and YSjapyayana. 
IHQ,XIV,pp.26l ff;Mbh.,i*,p.364;Punyargja on 
YP.ii.l55;Helara;}a on YP.iii.Dravyasamudderfa,verse5s 
Sabarabhagya on siTtra 2.1.14; KXimarilabhatfa,
Tantravattikatp.446 f;P5rthasarathimi^ra on 
S&okavgrttika * v . 854 *^
2*Halgr&.1a.loo .oit. jativadino vajapyayanasya tu mate 
sa&sargo vakyarthas sSmSmyam saAble samStrarupat vad 
vakyarthasya. Kumarilabhatta.loc.oit.,p.4471 sainsargo 
'pi padarthanam anyonyenanuraH^anam,gotve ^uklatva- 
satasargarf, ^uklatve va gotvasaihsargah.
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YJradi, on the other hand, held that the
meaning of a word is any particular (dravya) of a class
It is a ooncrete thing rather tkan a quality. According
to him the function of a word in a sentence is to
distinguish the thing it means from all similar 
1things. Thus, a fcowv means not so much 'what is 
characterized by cowness1 as 'what is distinguished 
from a horse'. In a sentence words signify things 
not as having certain attributes, but rather as 
excluding some. Thus, in the case of the phrase 
'•the white cow*, the word'cow' oan point to any 
concrete particular,which includes cows of all 
colours,white,black and so forth; therefore, the 
word 'white' does not indicate the connection of white­
ness with the cow; it should be explained as 
negatively qualifying the cow, denying all colours 
other then whiteness to it. Similarly, the term 
'white'dan denote anything that is white,including 
white cows,white horses and so on; hence, the term
l.KUmarilabhatta, loc.cit.i bhedo nSma padarthariam 
vyavacchedali parasparam. Yyaktipadarthapakse sarva- 
vyaktin&m gavadipadanaivopattatvad vi$aya£abdai^ 
^ukladibhih krsnSdivyavacchedakamStram vaktavyam. 
HelSrfija, loc.cit.s Yyl<Jinate bhedo vakySrthah, 
padavacyanam dravyanam dravyantaranivrttitatparyena- 
bhidheyatvat.
•cow* in the phrase means only the exclusion of all 
white things other than cows. In this flew of VySdi 
we find the early stage* of the Apoha doctrine 
maintained by the BAddhists.1 Kumarilabhatta refers 
to this view,that the import of a sentence is bheda
or the mutual exclusion of the word-meanings, as a
2theory held by the Buddhists.
3Kaiyata says^that these two views are not 
mutually exclusive, since each view implies the other. 
In the discussion of the meaning of the term samarthya, 
that is given by Pacini as the condition that should 
exist between the members of a compound word, Pataiijali 
says* that,according to some,samarthya means either 
samsarga (mutual association) or bheda (mutual 
exolusion. Even though Patanjali is discussing 
compound words, the principle involved is the samv.
1.This doctrine is discussed separately in the section 
on Apoha. Note that Dignaga*s theory about the 
import of sentences is the same. Thus, in the phrase
•the blue lotus* he also maintains that the term *blue* 
means the exclusion of all lotuses that are not blue 
and the term * lotus* means the exolusion of all blue 
things that are not lotuses.(y,^^ )
2.Tantravarttika.p^AfoE 447.
3. Pradlpa under varttika 2 of Panini,2.1.1i Tatra 
bhedas satosargSvinabhavitvad anumlyamana samsargas 
samarthyam, samsargo va bhedavinabhavtoumeyawntKbhedob*
4. Mbh. under Panini, 2.1.11 bhedasamsargau va 
sSmarthyam ity apara aha.
-  '
Anvitabhldhana theory of verbal comprehension
Prabhakara and his followers denied that the 
words conveyed a meaning except in theoc context of 
a sentence, even though they regarded words as real 
and aotual constituents of language* Each word has 
a definite meaning, but it is also clear that the 
purpose of the word is to serve as part of a sentence* 
On hearing the words of a sentence, we get a ratified 
unitary sense which is the meaning of the sentence.
The problem is whether this unitary sense arises 
direotly from the collection of the words, or indireotly 
through the recolleotion of the meanings of the 
individual words that comprise it. Anvitabhldhana 
theory takes the former View,while the abhihitanvaya 
theory takes the latter one.
The meaning of a sentenoe is made up of the 
the individual word-meanings and their mutual relation. 
According to the anvitabhldhana theory, both the ,/ 
individual word-meanings and their mutual relation 
are conveyed by the words themselves; but according to 
the abhihitanvaya theory, the words convey only the
individual word-meanings; the mutual relation is 
conveyed hy the word-meanings,and not by the words. 
Among modern writers on linguistios? Wundt seems to 
represent the anvitabhidhana theory;for he says that 
nin determining the nature of a sentenoe, no addition 
to what is expressed by the words should be assumed".^ 
Polemizing against this view, Paul maintains the
abhihitanvaya view that such an assumption is usually
2necessary. The commonplace statement in modern 
linguistics that the sentenoe is the unit of speech^ 
is oomparable Am with the anvitabhidhana theory.
The statement of procedure adopted by the 
followers of the anvitabhidhana theory is quite 
similar to many modem statements. w Thus a root or 
suffix is analysed out on the basis of a paradigm, 
and complete words are recognized on the basis of 
substitution, in sentences. The Prabhakarag who 
follow the anvitabhidhana theory lay particular 
stress on the natural method by which ohildren 
learn the meaning of words. It is by watching the
l.Gardiner.Speeoh and Language,p .58
2* Ibid* 5see also Paul,Prinzipien,p.130n.i. His 
leanings towards the abhihitanvaya theory Awatasiy 
x k ^oolx are not quite clear.
3. Gar diner, Ant op.cit. .p.63
4. J .Brough, Some Indian Theories of Meaning,TPS,1953>
p.165.
usage and activity of elders in daily life that 
children come to know the significance of wordsi One 
person, addressing another, says;>" Bring the cow"
(gam ahaya); the latter thus addressed immediately 
brings the cow. A child,who hears the sentenoe uttered 
by the former and observes the action that follows, 
infers vaguely that the meaning of the sentenoe is 
a command to do the act of bringing the cow. At this 
stage what the child understands is only that the 
whole of that statement means the whole of what is 
signified. Later, the child hears one man saying to 
another, "Bring the horse"(a^vam anaya), and observes 
the latter bringing the horse. Prom this he again 
infers that the meaning of this sentence is a command 
to do the act of bringing the horse. By comparing 
the two sentenoes he understands that the term 'bring*
(anaya) common to the two sentences must mean the 
command to bring, and that the terms cow (gam)
and horse (asvam) must refer to the two different 
animals. Thus by comparing the various sentences 
uttered by people and by observing the action produced, 
the child is able,by the mental prooess of exclusion
l.Yakyarthamatrkavali.p.5;^lokavarttika,sambandha 
verses 140-143;Siddhgntamuktavali,^abda section; 
ggvyapraka^a.V.etc.See also the section on
*How we learn the meaning of words?*. ( -ftO
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and inclusion (avapodva-pa or anvayavyatireka) to have
a general idea about the meaning of individual words.
This process of substitution is natural and subconscious
rather than deliberate and conscious. Later, the child
is able to understand the meaning of even new sentences
1
containing the words he has already come across.
It is only the injunotive sentences that
normally produce a visible reaction on the part of
the listeners, and therefore, it is only from such
sentences in the imperative mood that the meaning of
2words can be naturally understood. The Mimamsaka 
preoccupation with the injunctions of the Vedic texts 
with regard to religious duties led to the view that 
a typical sentence should be in the imperative mood, 
since the whole direct denotation of the Veda must, 
according to them, lie in the enjoining of something 
to be done. In cases where such an interpretation 
is not possible, the comprehension of meaning must 
depend upon something indirectly connected with the 
injunction. The Vedantins, on the other hand, held
1. Jha,Purvamimamsa in its sources.p. 155.
2. Ibid,p.136;Manameyodaya,p.92. According to the Bhatta 
MImfimsakas and the NaiyByikas,reaction on the part of 
the listener is visible even in the case of indicative 
sentences. Thus,^putras te jatafr*(A son is b o m  to you) 
may produoe joy,and*kanya te garbhinRYour unmarried 
daughter is earrfrjeirfce^ a shook of despair to a Brahmin.
- a. t a  -
that the direct denotation of the important Vedio 
texts lies not in commanding something,but in pointing 
out some well-established facts; thus to them the 
importance lies in indicative sentences. The later 
Indian logic also deals with such indicative sentences 
Prabhakara holds that even in the case of indicative 
sentenoes, the comprehension of the denotation of 
the words oan be obtained only by observing the 
usage of elders,and that this cam be known only from 
imperative sentences.3*
If the meanings of words can be known only 
when they occur in injunctive sentenoes, it follows 
that every word must express its meaning only as 
related to the other factors of the injunction. The 
verb denoting the oommand to do the act is the 
principal word in a sentence, and a the remaining 
words possess a meaning only in relation to the action 
Thus, the Prabhakaras hold that no word oan be
comprehended as having an independent meaning, when
• 'ii* ■ - o. 2isolated from a sentence. Prabhakara says that all
usage is through the sentenoe and its meaning.
1.Brhat j,p.47;Jha ,loc.c it.
2* Brhati.p.l88t v&kyarthena vyavahhrah
Accord ing to him what is permanent is the relation
that the sentenoe hears to its meaning^ Commenting
on that statement, Salikanatha says, " The word alone
by itself, never expresses any meaning; it is only
the sentence that does it; as is clear from the faot
that we learn the meaning of verbal expressions only
from the usage of older people,- and this usage is
only in the form of sentences; and every single word
is understood only in so far as it is related to the
other words in the sentence;hence it is established
that what is expressive of the meaning is the sentenoe
2only,not any word, alone by itself."
The Prabtiakaras do not deny the existence 
of individual words and their isolated meanings; they 
only assert that it is impossible to comprehend the 
isolated meaning of a word apart from its relation 
in a sentenoe. Words certainly recall their senses 
separately;but they d& not stop with that. Even 
though the listener knows the general meaning of the 
words, his experience tells him that the words are
1.Brhati»p.l55
2.Rjuvimala on the same,p.135 • See Jha, Purvamimamsa 
in its sounces»p.137
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meaningful, only when they are connected in a sentence 
and not when isolated. The words themselves oonvey 
their meanings only as related to one another on the 
strength of the three well-known factors akahkgg~, 
yogyata and sannidhi. The words convey not only their 
individual meanings, tout also their syntactic relation. 
Thus, the sentence-meaning is directly oonveyed toy 
the words themsfclves.1
The ancient Mimamsakas seem to have held the
anvitatohidhana theory; Mlmamshsutra 1.1.25 gives tacit
support to iti tadtohutanam kriyarthena samanvayafr.
arthasya tannimittatvat.^  But the satoaratohagya passage
explaining the comprehension of the sentence-meaning
x -seems to go against this theory,when it saysi padani 
hi svam svam artham atohidhaya nivrttavyaparani. athedanlm 
padSrtha avagatSs santo vaky5rtham gamayanti. ( The words 
perform the task of expressing their own individual 
meanings,and cease functioning when this task is finished; 
the word-meanings thus conveyed later produoe the
1.Yakyarthamatrkavali ,p•5*akahkg8^ annidhipr8^ tayogya- 
, rthBntarasangatSn sv&rthan “Shuh padarilti vytpattis 
samcfritS mays. ^
2.See also Jha,oj?.cit. .p. 125 
3 * Satoaramdtacac tohasya on sutra 1.1.7
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meaning of the sentenoe)• Prabhakara and his followers 
explain this passage as supporting their theory; 
according to them what is brought about by the meaning 
of a word is the notion of a qualified thing - the 
meaning of words as qualified by one another. 1
trAbhnavagupta refers to this theory as the
- 'V
dirghavyaparavada. since according to the anvitabhi­
dhana theory there is no limit to the extent of the
2meaning that an expression can convey. Just as the 
range of an arrow is not limited, but varies with 
the difference in the power with which it is discharged, 
so also the range of abhidha or the expressive power 
can be extended farther and farther. Not only the 
word-meaning, but also the syntactic relation is 
oonveyed by the function of abhidha. Bhartrhari 
seems to refer to this idea when he says that 
according to some the meaning of an expression is
3just what it conveys,neither more nor less. This
theory is said to explain even the subtle implications
4and suggestions in literary language.
l.See Brhatl on the passageSee also Sxa VSkyartfca- 
matjrk?LVali,p.21. In the Nyayaratnamala (v&kya section) 
this interpretation is criticized as unjust.
2.Locana,p.l8ft yo »py anvitabhidhanavadi yatparas 
babdas sa babdSTrtha iti hrdaye gphltva £aravad 
abhidhavyaparam eva dirghadlrgham icchanti...
3. YP.ii.328.
4. See the chapter on Yyan.jana. ^  j
2/(4. -
According to the anvitabhldhana theory the 
sentence has a unitary meaning of its own; the 
constituent words possess meaning only as they are 
related to this unitary sentence meaning. Thus,in the 
sentence "Bring the cow" (Ram Snaya). the word ‘oow’ 
means not the isolated concept of oowness, but 
'cow as related to the action of bringing'; so also 
the word 'bring' means the 'action of bringing in 
relation to the cow'. The words give their own meaning 
and their syntactic relation to the other words in 
the sentence, so that the sentence meaning is directly 
conveyed by the words themselves. Though there are 
many words ,and therefore many meanings, the unity 
of the sentence meaning is achieved through the unity 
of purpose.^"
This theory has been strongly criticized 
by the Mimamsakas of the Bha^ta school. They argue^ 
that,if it is held that the first word or any one word 
in its full sense means the unitary sense of the 
sentence itself, the other words in the sentence will
1 «VakySrthamatrkavali, p. 2 1 bhtlySiAso yadyapi svarthah 
padanam te prthak p^thak prayojanataya tv ekav&kyS- 
rtham sampracakgate.
Tattvabindu,p.9 31 padSntarasya vaiyarthyam 
arirut&nvayabodhane.
toe superfluous. This argument is similar to the one 
brought against the Sphota theory alsd. Two possible 
explanations are that the subsequent words repeat the 
same sentence-meaning so as to make it clear, and that 
the other words are used to restrict the meaning 
indicated toy the first word. Another objection is 
that this theory involves the fallacy of interdependence! 
If one of the words, say the first, in a sentence is 
to convey its own meaning as well as its relation to 
the other words, the full meaning of the word can toe 
comprehended only after understanding the other words; 
similarly,the meanings og the other words depend on 
this word. Thus, in the sentence *ukhayam paoet1 
(cook in the pot),the word ukh£yam(in the pot) can 
convey its meaning and the relation to the other word 
only after knowing the meaning of the word pacet(cook); 
so also the meaning of 1paoet1 depends on that of
_ — p1ukhayam* 7 If it is held that the individual word-meaning 
and its relation to the other words are not conveyed 
simultaneously,tout gradually,the individual word-meaning 
toeing conveyd first,and the relation later , then there 
will toe no £kkksc fallaoy of interdependence; tout then
1 .Tattvabindu,p.93> ^rutanvitantohidhane tu vyaktam 
anyonyasamdrayam
2. Ibid.p.93 f.
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this explanation will involve the unwarranted assumption
of two separate functions for the primary fat power
ahhidha^- The anvitabhidhanavadins argue that there
is only one potency for words to express the meaning
as related to the rest of the words* It is through
recollection that we remember the meanings of words,
and this is by rousing up the mental impressions of
previous experiences of the use of the words. It is a
matter of experience that we never come across words
except as related in a sentence; isolated words have
no existence in everyday speech aotivity ( one-word
sentenoe is a sentence,not an isolated word). The
word-meaning and the relation to the other words are
2known by abhidha itself.
The Mimamsakas of the Bhatta school wkms take
3objection to this view also. They say that even though 
we observe words functioning only in different contexts 
of situations,in all of which they occur as related 
in a sentence, still we are able to understand the 
isolated meaningsjof the words separately also. Otherwise
1. Tattrobindu, p. 9 4 
2.Ibid»p.94 f*100f.
3.Ibid.p.95
a word learned from its use in one context cannot be 
applied in another context. Moreover, the very 
principle of recognition is based on our capacity 
to recognize something isolated out of its context; 
we are able to recognize a person in a place and time 
different from these when we met him previously. It 
may be observed here that even In such cases we 
recognize him only in some place and time,not as 
isolated from all situations.
Another objection raised against the 
anvitabhidhana theory is that the meaning of a 
sentence can be known from the meanings of the words 
remembered,even though the words might have been 
forgotten. It is a matter of experience that in long 
sentenoes we forget the earlier words,but remember 
only their meanings,and even then we are able to have 
the meaning of the sentence. The relation of the 
words in a sentence is not the same as that of the 
letters in a word; in the case of a word we do not 
understand the word,if we forget some of the letters.
1.Tattvabindu.p.Il6ff.
2.^erstradlpika.p .4401 pErvabhagepu vakyasya vismrte^v 
api dr^yate vakySrthavagatih puihsam padarthasmjrfci- 
Adlil&fim.
-  -
AbhihitSnvaya theory of verbal comprehension
According to the abhihitanvaya theory of 
verbal comprehension upheld by the tflmainsakas of the 
Bhatta school and by the Naiyayikas,^ ilhe meaning of 
a sentence is a concatenation of the individual items 
expressed by the words. The individual words have at in 
themselves meanings which can be iqoxxlc comprehended 
separately. On hearing a sentence,we have first an 
understanding of the separate meanings of the words 
one after the other; then we put together these 
meanings according to the three factors akanksa, 
yogyatfi and sannidhi. and we arrive at the meaning of 
the sentence.
Sahara seems to refer to this theory, when he
2 -  _ *  saysi padani svam svam artham abhidhaya nivrttavyaparani.
athedanim padartha avagatlSs santo vakyartham gamayanti.
/ *(In a sentence the words express their own meaning^and
stop with that; the meanings of the words thus known
convey the meaning of the sentence).
1. SastradTpika.pp.440 ff; Nysyaratnamala.vakya section; 
Tattvabindu, pp. 91-161; Manameyodaya, pp. 9 3^f; Siddhanta- 
muktsvali.sabda section.
2. sTabarabhfisya on sutra 1.1.7
3. The Prabhfikaras explain it differently,taking artha 
in the sense of syntactic relation (anvaya). See 
Vakyarthamatrkavali,p.22i arthafeabdena bhasyak&ro 
•nvayam aha.
Kurorilabhatta says^that the meaning o£ a 
sentence is always conveyed by the meanings of words^ 
got from the words themselves. Unlike the words, the 
sentence does not have a meaning of its own independently. 
"The meanings of the words are expressed by the words 
independently of one another; from the connection 
among these word-meanings t the meaning of the sentence 
is also understood ^ 3>The three factors akidikga,yogyata 
and sannidhi constitute the groun^s^relationship. ^
It may be noted here that this theory of 
abhihitSnvaya is based on the theory advocated by 
the great grammarian Vajapyfiyana that the meaning of 
a-sentence is the saAisarga or the mutual association 
of the individual word-meanings expressed by the 
words.* Thus, it is one of the earliest theories about 
the nature of a sentence-meaning. The other theory, 
of Vyadi,that it is the mutual exclusion of the word- 
meanings was later developed into the Apoha theory.-*
l> Tantravarttika»p .446: padarthaih padavijnatair 
vaky&rthah pratipadyate. ^
2. Ibidi prthagbhutair eva padair itaretaranirapekgisfe 
sve§u padarthesuktfesu tatsamsargad eva padavyaparS- 
napekgo v&kyarthapratyayo bhavati.
3."ak8dik9^  sannidhanam ca yogyata ceti ca trayam 
sambandhakarapatvena klptam. "(Ibid.,p.455)
41 See the section on *The relation of words in a 
sentence* C  **
5. By the Buddhist logicians. See the section on Apoha.
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There are two different views about the nature 
of cognition produced by a word. It is by observing 
the use of words in actual contexts of situations 
that we learn their meanings*; therefore, a word can 
indicate its meaning only by rousing up mental 
impressions of such contexts, and hence, the knowledge 
of the meaning of a word is only a kind of recollection. 
This is the view held by the anvitabhidhana school 
of Prabhakara and also by some scholars of the 
abhihitanvaya school like Cid5nanda,author of the 
Nltitattvavi rbhava^ Kumarilabhatta himself refers to 
this view when he says that a word is nothing more 
than a reminder of the meaning, Vacaspatimi^ra also 
says that,strictly speaking, the relation between the 
word and the meaning is that between the "recollector" 
and the recollected and that the word produces the
1.Manameyodaya.p.931 iabdo 'pi satoskarodbodhanadvare- 
paiva pad&rtham bodhayatlti smarapam eva padartha- 
jnanam iti cidanandaprabhptayah.
2. Slokavarttika,iabda|section.verse 106-7(P.432)i
padam apy adhikabhavat smarakan na vibisyate 
te »pi naivasgirta yasmhd vakySrtham gamayanti na^ 
tasmat tatsmarapesvaiva samhate^u pramSpatd
3.Tattvabindu.p.1601vffoyavgcakatvam ca pratyHyyapratyh- 
yakatvam,tac ca vicSryamapam smaryasmarakatvam eva.
See also p.l51i na ceyam sakpad arthadhiyam adhatte, 
yena tatsSdhika syht,api tu samsk&raodbodhanakramena.
cognition of the meaning not directly and independently, 
tout toy rousing the mental impressions of the things 
previously known. But according to Parthasarathi- 
mi^ra and some other scholars, the meaning of a word 
is oonveyed by the primary significative potency of 
the word (abhidha). it is a matter of experience 
that a word conveys its meaning directly and not by 
reminding us of the various contexts of situations 
in which the word was used; moreover, it is simpler 
to assume that the word conveys the meaning through 
its expressive power than to oonsider that it 
reminds us of our former experiences of situations
when the word was used and thus give* us the idea of
2its meaning.
Of these two views the former is based on 
the psychological analysis of the process of learning 
a language;for the use of language itself is a kind of 
conditioned n  reflex; The experiments of Pavlov
1. Mahameyodaya,p.9 31 padaift padarthabodhanam ^abda- 
^aktijanyatvgd abh’dhanam eveti pSrthasarathimi^ra- 
dayab•
2. NySyaratnamSla»p.1031 ^abdSnantaram arthadar^aiiat 
tasyaiva tatra karapatvam kalpayitum yuktam, na tu 
^abdat samsk&rodbodhas tata£ oSrthapratltir iti 
yuktam;prarialyam pramanAbh&vfft. tasmad abhidhayakam 
eva padam, na smarakam.
- Stail*.-
have demonstrated how such reflexes can be produoed 
even in animals."When a oontext has affected us in 
the past, the recurrence of merely a part of the 
context will cause us to react in the way we reacted 
before"^. We learn language through the observation 
of various contexts of situation; the linguistic 
phrases uttered are associated with the oontexts of 
situation; having experienced several such situations, 
we assume a kind of relationship between the utteranoes 
and the oontexts. Meaning can be explained only in
terms of a relationship of the utterance with the
pabstraot context of situation. The Mlraa&sakas were 
fully conscious of this process; but to them the 
relation between the word and the meaning is something 
natural and permanent, and the experience of situations 
only reveals this natural relation. The primary 
signifioatory power of the word is based on this relation; 
when once this relation is known,the word can direotly 
denote its meaning,says Parthasarathimi^ra.
1.Urban,Language and Reality,p.102
2lThe ^ context of situation^ theory is given by
Malinowski in the Appendix to The Meaning of Meaning 
by Ogden and Richards. Prof. Firth has pushed the 
analysis of 1 context1 much farther in his 
dealings with ’formal scatter1 and ’meaning bycolUc^on'. 
ooatter ’ . See Modes of Meaning.Essays and Studies,1951; 
Technique of semantics,TPS,1935.etc•
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When we hear a sentence,we have first an under*- 
standing of the separate meanings of the words one after 
another; then these word-meanings are related on the 
basis of akaAkga( expectancy) .yogyata( consistency) and 
sannidhi(proximity).and we arrive at the unified 
meaning of the sentence as a whole. The expression of 
the individual word-meanings precedes the knowledge 
of the logical connection among them. The different 
isolated ideas expressed successively by the words are 
put together by the collective memory of thh listener 
(samuhalambana-smrti). The individual word-meanings 
are remembered separately until all the words are 
heard; then there is a simultaneous cognition of the 
sentence-meaning in whioh all the word-meanings are 
properly related to one another on the basis of akankga, 
yogyata and sannidhi
The sentence-meaning is something more than the 
sum of the word-meanings. When the meanings of the at± 
different words in a sentence are related with one another
1. According to the anvitabhidhana theory,on the other
handi*. each word,as it is being uttered,contributes to 
the meaning of the sentence which is revealed step by step, 
becoming clearer and clearer with the utterance of 
subsequent words.
on the basis of the akahksa etc.,there arises some
 7 .  -
additional signification whioh is distinct from the
1totality of the word-meanings. This unified sentence-
n _ _meaning^referred to by different terms: vakyartha
(sentence-meaning),samsarga(association of the word-meah- 
ings) and tatparyartha (the purport or the intention 
of the speaker). It is difficult to explain where this 
special signification comee|from. Some call it the
power of the sentence to convey a connected sense
  » _ _(vakya&akti). others call it sadisargamaryada or the
law of association, and yet others postulate a power
called tatparya&akti,the power of the sentence to
convey the intended sense in the form of a related
2
and unified meaning.
"How is this sa&sarga conveyed? It is mysterious
and has not yet been satisfactorily explained. In
sentences we have a juxtaposition of wordst and the elemen*
of the relation between the words is conveyed,we have
3to say, by suppression.11 This suggestion of the
1 .Kavyaprakaga,IIt akahkgayogyatasannidhiva^at padartha- j 
nSm samanvaye tatparyartho viie^avapur apadarthopi 
vakyfcrthaji samullasatity abhihitanvayavadinam matam.
2.YP.ii,41: sambandhe sati yat tv anyad adhikyam upajayat 
* vakyarthameva t&ra prShur anekapadasam&rayam; see also
Pupyaraja*s commenatry thereon} pad&n&m parasparanvaye 
padarthavasad adhikyam samsargas sa vakyarthah. ' 
3*KUppusvami Sastri,pp.cit.,p.21.
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connection of the word-meanings is on the basis of 
the intention of the speaker and the incompatibility of 
the isolated word-meanings to convey the intended sense. 
Speech is purposive in nature,and people normally use 
words with the intention of conveying a connected sense.
The individual words have exhausted their function 
by conveying their own isolated meanings; so they cannot 
be considered to be capable of performing another function, 
pamely,that of conveying their mutual relations also,in 
order that the sentence-meaning may be understood.
Moreover, the words cannot directly convey the mutual 
relation,since between the words and the sentence-meaning 
lie the word-meanings. So it is the word-meanings that- 
that convey the sentence-meaning,and this is in the 
form of their mutual relation. This is the view of the 
abhihitanvayavadins.^ There is a slight difference 
between the Naiyayikas and the Bhatta Mimamsakas regarding 
the way in which the mutual connection is conveyed. To the 
Naiyayikas the sentence-meaning is only the mutual relation 
of the word-meanings; but the bhatta Mimamsakas explain
1.Manameyodaya,p.93f.
■that the sentence-meaning is always conveyed by the 
secondary power of words.^ The two condition off lakgana, 
namely^ the incompatibility of the expressed* sense 
and the relation between the primary sense and the 
intended sense,apply here also. In a sentence the iso­
lated words are by themselves unintelligible,since they 
refer to the generic form without any syntactic relation 
This is against the purport of the sentence,which is 
to convey a unified sense. So the general sense of the 
words,through secondary implication,give?the particular 
senses consisting in mutual syntactic relation.
This does not mean that the sentence-meaning 
is not derived from the words♦ an d h e nee- kras*. Kumarila 
bhatta says,"Even though the words convey the word- 
meanings directly,they do not stop with that;the mere 
knowledge of the word-meanings is of no use to the 
hearer. The conveying of the individual senses by the 
words is indispensable for the cognition of the sentence 
meaning,just like fhe production of fire by fuel is 
Aaindispensable for the purpose of cooking."
1.Kumarilabhatta,quoted in .Tattvabindu,p .153> 
vakyairtho laksyamapo hi sarvatraiv%ti nas sthitib.
2.^1okavar11ika,p.943 (Also quoted in Tattvabindu,p.133)
The abhihitanvaya theory is supported by the 
following reasonst "If the words of a sentence have no 
separate meanings of their own, then the classification 
of words into nouns, adjectives, verbs, etc., becomes 
meaningless. Further, in every case in whioh we are
* ■ .;*• ■ * .  ‘ “  7 '■ *  v  . . .  ito understand the meaning of a sentence, we must first 
understand the meaning of its component words. Without 
a previous understanding of the words no one can under­
stand the meaning of a sentence. Moreover, if the 
meaning of a sentence were quite independent of.the 
meaning of its constituent words, then any sentence 
could oonvey any meaning. Lastly, when we understand 
the meaning of a new verse, we do so obviously on the 
basis of our knowledge of the words and their separate 
meanings. This cannot be explained by any understanding 
of the sentences, since they are new and unintelligible 
to us. So it is concluded that the meaning of a 
sentence is just the synthesis of the separate meanings 
of its words.*11
The anvitabhidhana theory seems to be an
- 2 advance**!!* on the abhihitanvaya theory. The meaning
of a sentence dominates the meanings of its words;
1. S. C. Chatterjee, op.cit., p.372
2. Ibid. p. 374f.
both the speaker and the listener are concerned only 
with the sentence-meaning. We use words without fully 
understanding their exact meaning; that does not mean 
we are talking nonsense. "It is obvious that knowing 
a language consists in using words appropriately 
and acting appropriately when they are heard. It is 
no more necessary to be able to say what a word means 
than it is for a cricketeer to know the mathematical 
theory of impact and projectiles."^ The ubiquitous 
importance of context as a deciding faotor in deter­
mining the meaning of a word in a sentence points 
out the fact that the claim of words to have an 
independent meaning in isolation is very weak.
The well-known statement by St.Augustine applies to 
fctaxwanedts words also* "quid est ergo tempus? si nemo
ex me quaerat soio; si quaeranti explicare velim
• *  2 nesoio."
Later writers in India tried to reconcile the 
two theories. Thus, Mukulabhatta,in the AbhidhSvrtti- 
matrka, says that both the anvitabhldhana and the
1.Bertrand Russell,An Inquiry into the theory of 
Meaning and truth,p.2b
2.Confessions,quoted by Wittgenstein,Philosophical 
Investigations,^.77•(See also Frege's view that fa word 
has meaning only as part of a sentence1 *9 .46).
abhihitanvaya theories contain partial truth: looked
at from the point of view of the words the abhihitanvaya 
theory seems to be preferable;but looked at from the
point of view of the sentence preference must be given
to the anvitabhidhana theory. Mukulabha^a accepts a
combination of the two views and calls it the theory of
Isamuccaya.
Bhartrharifs theory of akhaqda-vakya-sphota.
According to Bhartrhari the words have no 
reality of their own. The entire sentence is to be 
taken as an indivisible,integral unit; and its meaning 
is also an instantaneous flash of insight(pratibha) 
which has no parts. The indivisible sentence is 
analysed into words and again into roots and suffixes 
by the grammarians for facilitating easy study of the 
language; but these divisions should not be considered 
to have ir real existence,apart from the sentence.
1 .Abhidhavj»ttimatrka. p. 15< aryjgain tu mate padanam 
tattatsamgnyabhuto^ 'xltear vaoyo ,rthah,vakyasya_tiii 
parasparanvitab padartha iti padapekgayabhihitanvayao 
vakyapekgaya tv anvitabhidhanam. evam caitayos... 
samuccaya iti.
In language as we find it in the world there are only 
complete utterances which may be called sentences; we 
do not notice the words or the word-meanings or the 
letters in language in operation. Of course in language- 
material considered and described by the grammarians 
they do have an existence; that is only based on 
grammatical analysis,and has no absolute reality.
Even though the sphota theory envisages different
subdivisions of the sphofta, Bhartrhari accepts only 
the indivisible sentence-sphota as the real unit of 
speech. The existence of tta words in language is on
a par with avidya stage; words have only a pragmatic 
existence; they are useful units of language which 
build up the higher unit of speech,the sentence.
The sentence which is"a single undivided utterance1
2
conveys its meaning in a flash. The sentence-meaning is 
not built up gradually on the basis of the word-meanings. 
It is grasped by the listener in an instataneous flash 
of insight (pratibha). This pratibha is indivisible; 
and it is grasped in the mind. It is because of the
1 .K.A.Subrahmania Iyer,Pratibha as the meaning of a 
sentence ^ POC., 1940,pp. 326>ff. jGopinatha Kaviraja,
The Doctrine of Pratibhg in Indian Philosophy»AB0RI,1924.
2.Pui^yaraja on VP*i.66: spho^atmake vakye pratibhalak^a^e 
vakyarthe vakyavakyarthayor adhyasarupas sambandhaty
1
indivisibility of pratibhfe, which is the meaning of a
sentence, that the grammarians reject the abhihitanvaya
and anvitfrbhidhhna theories of verbal comprehension,
in both of which the meanings of individual words have
an absolute reality. According to Bhartrhari the
sentence-meaning is not only indivisible; it is also
indefinable.^Uhen we have understood the meaning of a
sentence, we cannot explain to another the nature of
this understanding. He saystwThis(pratibha) cannot in
any way be explained to others in terms such as ’It is
this1;its existence is ratified only in the individual’s
experience of it,and the experiencer himself cannot
describe it."1 Bhartphari identifies this pratibha
with the instinctive urge in animals which prompts^bhem
to act. The behaviour of animals is prompted by this
instinctive urge of pratibha; it is this that teaches
the cuckoo to sing in spring,and the birds to build their 
2
nests. It is the same kind of urge that results from a
sentence. A sentence becomes productive of this urge,
%because of repeated usage.
1 . V P . i i . 1 4 6 .  T r a n s la t io n  by J .B ro u g h ,Some In d ia n  T h e o r ies 
o f  M ean in g , p . 171
2 . V P . i i . 1 5 1 ,1 5 2
3 .V P . i i . l l9 s a b h y a s a t  p ra t ib h a h e tu s  sarvafc A a b d o *p a ra ia is  
sm^tal^
Santirak^ita quotes this view in the fcrndfcia 
Tattvasangraha,and while explaining this Kamala^ila 
says'*’ that by repeated usage words produce an intuition 
in the mind* of the listeners, and that they do not 
actually denote any external object. Words are like 
a goad to an elephant.Jt is fgi insight or intuition 
leading to an action. If words had been direotly grounded 
"in an^objective reality,there would have been no occasion 
for the conflicting interpretations of texts or contra­
dictory expositions;and fictions and stories could not
2have been possible." A sentence produces an urge to 
do something,rather than creating an image of something 
in the mind; this urge varies with each individual and uaA  
each sentence. Punyaraja goes one step foreward and 
says that even/ those who do not know the exact meaning
of words,there is a feeling that he is to do something,
3when he hears a sentence.
Bhartrhari!s theory of the non-reality of words 
met with strong opposition from other Indian philosophers! 
Even though It is accepted only by the grammarians in 
India,L the importance of the linguistic principle under­
lying the sphota theory is very great.
1.Tattvasangraha,verse8921and Pafijika thereon.
2.Satkari Mookerjee,Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux,
3.Puqyaraja on VP.ii. 119 (p.H3f•
4.J.Brough,op.cit,p.l67ff.
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C H A P T E R  VI
L A K S A  H i
M E T A P H O R
rSometimes a word is used to denote a referent 
other than its normal one. Suoh metaphorio usage is 
common in all languages. If we take the word as 
denoting its normal primary meaning,the sentence 
may become nonsensioal in the context. This produces 
a "psychio resistence* in the listener,and there is 
a sort of break in the flow. It excites attention 
and requires interpretation for understanding the 
purport. The actual referent of the word has to be 
taken as different from its normal one,but in some 
way connected with it,either through similarity or 
through some other relation. This function of the 
word to denote a referent different from its normal 
and primary one,but somehow related to it,is called 
laksana or upaoara: other terms like gauni vrtti 
and bhakti are also used to refer to this secondary 
significative function of words.
The three essential conditions generally 
accepted by the later Alankarikas as necessary in a 
laksana or transfer are (a) the inapplicability or 
the unsuitability of the primary meaning in the
-  ^  V |  ~
context, (b) some relation between the primary and 
the actual referent of the word and (c) sanction 
for the transferred sense by popular usage,or a 
definite motive Justifying the transfer! Of these 
three conditions the first two are accepted by all 
writersjbut the necessity for the motive element 
Justifying the use of a metaphor which has not 
received the sanction of established usage,is not 
stressed by the earlier writers;even later writers 
belonging to the other schools of thought are not 
interested in the motive element in a lakgana; it is 
only the literary critics who give great prominence 
to it.
The well known example of laksaqa in Sanskrit 
is the sentence Rahwayam ghosah ( The village is on 
the Ganges). Here the primary meaning of the word
1 .Kavyaprakasa, ii.9: mukhyarthabadhe tadyoge rudhito
*tha prayojanat anyo »rtho lak^yate yat sa lakgana} 
ropita kriya. See also Sahityadarpaqa,ii.5.
1gangayam1 is 'on the river Ganges';this is not 
suitable to the context,since the village cannot 
actually be on the stream itself;hence the actual 
meaning of the word Gariga is taken to be gangatata 
or 'the bank of the river Ganges';the relation 
between the normal meaning of the word and its 
actual meaning here is one of proximity (samipya) }  
This secondary meaning of the word is not understood 
directly from the word,but only indirectly through 
its primary and normal meaning. It is 1ihe normal 
meaning that occurs to our mind immediately on hearing 
a word;when this is found to be incompatible with 
the context,we resort to laksana and get the actual 
sense which is related to the normal one and which 
removes the incompatibility. The special motive 
underlying the metaphorical usage is rather vague 
and depends mainly on contextual factors;in the 
present case it may be to indicate that the village 
has the qualities of sanctity and coolness associated 
with the sacred river.
■ " ■ ■ ■ ■ ■' i i " i ■■■■■.■■ i i i .I i m i     ■■ ...     i i . i. i ■ .....
l.In English the expression'A village on the river' 
does not seem to be a transfer,since it is sanctioned 
by everyday usage, tteve <3ne of the normal meanings 
of the preposition 'on' is accepted to be 'nearness', 
so that 'A village on the river' can directly mean 
'A village on the edge of the river'.But in Sanskrit 
nobody seems to have considered the possibility of 
taking one of the meanings of the locative case to 
be proximity.
-  *  v *  -
Relation between the normal. and |the actual meanings 
in a transfer;-
Gautama in his Nyayasutras^applies the term 
upaoara to this seconadry function of words. He says 
that such transfer of meaning is quite common,when 
the actual referent is closely related to the normal 
and primary referent,and he enumerates with examples 
ten auoh relations.
(a) Association.e.g.,yastikam bhojaya (Feed the stick). 
In this sentence the Brahmin is referred to as stick, 
as he is, always associated with the stick which he 
carries. Another example for the same relation is the 
use of the term kuntafrClances) for the lance-bearers 
in the sentence kuntah pravisanti (The lances eivter).
(b) Location,e.g. maneah kro^anti (The cots cry).Here 
the term manea (cot) is used to refer to the children 
on the cot.
(c) Purpose. e.g. katrm karoti (He makes a mat) used 
in the sense of ’He collects reeds for the purpose of 
making a mat’. Here the reeds intended for making a 
mat are referred to as a mat.
1 .Nyayasutra.il.2.62 : sahaoarap.a-sthana-tadarthya- 
vrtta-manet-dharaija-samrpya-yoga-sadhana- * dhipatyebhyo 
brahmapa-*man c a-ka 1} a-r a j a - s ak t u-c and ana - gahga - s a t ak£-
*nna-puru9e§v atadbhave ’pi tadupao&raty.
See also V&tsy£yana’s Bh&gya on the sutra.
. - A  1 *0  -
(d) Behaviour. e.g. yamo ra.ja (The king is the god 
of death). Here the term yama (god of death) is 
used in the sense of 'one who acts like yama'.
(e) Measure.e.g. “adhakasaktavah (Adhakas of meal).
Here the term adhaka for the measure is used to
mean 'that which is measured'( adhakena mitas saktavafr).
jm
(f) Weighing. e.g. candanatula ( One tula of sandal).
Here tula is used in the sense of 'that which is
\weighed oil the balance1 (tulayaih dhrtam candanam).
(g) Proximity, e.g. gahgayam gavas caranti (The cows 
are grazing on the Ganges). Here gahga is used in 
the sense of 'the edge of the Ganges'.
(h) Inherent connection.e.g. krsna^ satakah (The black 
cloth). The word 'black' primarily means 'blackness' 
but here it means'the in thing having blackness'.
The use of the arit£Ka±±Mc term for quality tor the 
thing qualified (e.g.'I love beauty') come under this.
(i) Cause.e.g. annam pranab (Pood is life). Here food 
which is the cause of life is referred to as life itself.
1. (e) and (f) are similar;the former refers to the 
measurement of volume,and the latter the measurement 
of weight. Adhaka primarily means the measure and 
secondarily to the volume measured by it;tula primarily 
means the balance which gives a particular w4ight,and 
secondarily to that which is weighed by it.
Ganganatha Jha's translation of the term dharana as 
'container' does not bring the idea clearly.
(j) Prominence. e.g. ayam kulam ( He is the family). 
Here kulam is used in the sense of the prominent 
person in the kulam(family).
In all these examples Gautama is giving
popular examples of figurative usage from everyday
life5the list is intended only to be illustrative,
Iand not to be exhaustive. He also refers to the 
Mlmamsaka view that the primary meaning of every 
word is the universal and that the particular to 
which it refers in a sentence is known through the 
secondary funotion upaoara:but he does not accept 
that view,since according to him a word means the 
universal,the form and the particular.
In the Mahabhasya Patan.lali, also discusses 
such transferance of meaning. He gives four different 
relations between the primary and the actual referents 
in such cases,and illustrates them with examples.
1.Nyayasutra.11.2.65
2.MBH.ii,p.218:^caturbhilji prakarair atasmin sa ity 
etad bhavati s tatsthyat,t&ddharmyat,tatsamlpyat, 
tatsfchacaryad iti.
r(a) Location, e.g. manoa hasanti ( The cots laugh), 
girir dahyate ( The hill is burning). Here the cots 
stand for the children in the cots and the hill 
stands for the trees on the hill.
$b) Quality, e.g. jati Brahmadattah ( Brahmadatta is 
an ascetic). It means that Brahmadatta is behaving 
like an ascetic;the qualities of an ascetic are 
superimposed on Brahmadatta.
(c) Proximity, e.g. gangayam ghogah( The village is 
on the Ganges),kupe gargakulam (Garga’s house is
on the well).
(d) Association, e.g. kuntan pravesaya (Fetch the 
lances).yastih pravesaya (Fetch the sticks). Here 
lances and sticks are used for those who carry them.
The Mimamsakas in their attempt to find out 
the basic rules of interpretation so as to explain 
the Vedic passages in a sensible manner have 
naturally to deal with metaphorical transfers of 
meaning. In the Mimanisasutras« Jaimini enumerates 
six bases for figurative description;these are 
explained in detail by Sahara in his Bhasya.
(a) Tatsiddhifr (Accomplishment of the purpose)
Xe.g. ya.jamanah prastarafr( The grass-bundle is the 
sacrificer ),,yajamanalg ekakapalafr ( The purodasa cake
3prepared in one bowl is the sacrificer). These Vedic 
sentences are not to be taken literally,sinoe in 
that case they would be nonsensical. They have to be 
explained in a figurative sense. The grass-bundle 
and the cake accomplish the purpose served by the 
sacrificer,and hence are indicated by the ter^ 
fsacrificer.
-  V" _ 5“(b) Jatifr (Same origin): e.g. agneyo vai brahmanafr
(The brahmin is Agneya). This figurative use is
based on the fact that both the Brahmin and Agni
are said to have had the same origin from Prajapati.
£(c) Sarupyam (Similarity).e.g. adityo yupah (The 
sacrificial post is the sun). This metaphor is 
based on the similarity of the post to the sun 
in brightness and height,and is meant to eulogize 
the post •
1♦Mimamsasutra.1.4.22: tatsiddhijatisarupyaprasamsa- 
bhUmalihgasamavaya iti gujqa^raya. See also Sahara's 
Bhfjiftya on that.
2.TaittirIya Samhita,2.6. ~j\ Taittiriya Brahmana, 1.6.3.4
3.ekakapala means that which is prepared in one bowl, 
and refers to the purodasa cake.
4.See £>abara,loc♦ cit.jatir iti catra janmopadanam 
vivakqitam.
3.Taittiriya Samhita.2.6.3.
6. Taittiriya Brahmana,2.1.3•2.
(d) Prasamsa (Praise): e.g. apa^avo va anye goasvebhyafr
(Those other than oows and horses are not animals),
yan malinam avasas tat (Dirty ones are cloths),yad
aghrtam abho.janam tat (That without butter is not food).
In these cases the pregn^t use of the words pa^u
(animal) ,vasas(clothe) and bho.1anam(food) are used
Iin the sense of praiseworthy animal etc.
(e) Bhuma (Preponderance): e.g. srstir upadadhati 
(The srsti brioks are placed). Here the word srsti 
means the bricks that are associated with a group 
of hymns with and without the word srsti.
(f) Linga samavayah( Presence of indicative sign): 
e.g. ohatrino yanti (People with umbrellas are 
going). Here the reference to the umbrella is only 
to indicate the people,not to describe them,and the 
sentence may be used even if there be only one 
umbrella. Similarly the sentence dandino gacchanti 
(People with sticks are going) can be applied for a 
group of people with and without sticks.
1.These are similar to the arthantarasamkramita 
variety of Dhvani of the later Ilahkarikas. Even 
the pregnant use of words as in A is A ('An explosive 
is an explosive,it must be guarded with constant 
precaution)k m  are similar (cf. Empson.The Structure 
of Complex words.p.3513
These examples could also be explained by 
taking the negative prefix to mean incomplete or 
imperfect nature,rather^than complete negation.2. The examples of bhuma and 1iftgasamavaya come under 
yfche- a.1 ahatsvSrtha variety of laksana.
According to Mukulabhatta,Bhartrmitra the
great Mimamsa teacher noted five relations that
generally exist between the primary and the actual
referents in the case of a laksanai-
(a) Abhidheyena sambandha ( Some indirect relation
with the literal meaning):- e.g. dvirepha (literally,
fhaving two ’r's) which indicates the bee through
the word bhramara. Another example is turahgakan t a-
Znanahavyavahab in the sense of the submarine fire, 
through its relation to the word badavamukhagni.
(turangakSntS. S n&re- badava; gtnana a face- mukha;
3havyavSha - fire = agni). Such a laksanS is acceptable 
only if it is sanctioned by popular usage,or if there 
is a special motive for resorting to such circum- 
locution^otherwise it is a defect. This defect is 
called neyartha by the Alankarikas. If the speaker 
invents such new words at will without any purpose, 
the listeners will not be able to understand him,and 
hence it is a defect.
-
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1* Abhi dhSivr t1im51rka, p. 17: abhidheyena sambandhat 
sfidr^yat samavayatah vaiparltySt kriyayogal 
,lakgana pafLcadha mata.
2. Si^upalavadha, m  f 33.
3 • Abhidhavrtt imStrka.p.Ilf.
According "to Mukulabhatta all cases where 
the expressed literal sense indirectly leads to some 
other idea are to be considered as instances of this 
type of laksana:thus in the well-known example of 
arthapatti."plno devadattah diva na bhunkte* (Devadatta 
who is fat does not eat during day),the idea about 
Devadattafs eating during night is got through 
laksana. According to this all implied meanings will 
have to be brought under laksana. This is not accept­
able to others. According to many writers laksana 
applies only to words and not to sentences.
(*0 Sadyeya (Similarity): e.g. simho manavakah 
(The boy is a lion).
(c) Samavaya( Association such as proximity): e.g. 
gahgaySm ghosafr (The.village is on the Ganges).
(d) Yaiparltya(Contrareity): e.g. brhaspatir ayam 
murkhah (This fool is the teacher of gods). All 
ironical sentences come under this type of laksana.
Many other similar lists are given by later 
writers also. Nagesa gives a list of five relations, 
adding tadarthya (purpose) to the four given by 
Patanjali. Mammata,Visvan§tha and Hemacandra also
1.Paramalaghuman.1usa, p. 7: tatsthyat tathaiva taddhar- 
mySTtjtatsSmipyStjtathaiva ca tatsahacaryat tSdarthyat 
jffeya vai laksana budhaih.
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/give similar lists. All these various relations 
between the primary and aotual referents necessary 
for a laksana could be divided into two classes: 
similarity and relations other than similarity. 
Kumarilabhatta distinguishes clearly the transfer 
based on similarity or common qualities between the 
primary and actual referents,and that based on other 
relations. The former function is called gauni vrtti 
and the latter lakgana.According to Kumarilabhatta 
and other Mimamsakas gauni and laksana are two 
separate functions of words;but other schools of 
thought,who also accept this distinction,consider 
them as two varieties of the secondary power of 
words,and they use the term lakgana to cover both, 
the former being called gauni lakgana or upacara 
and the latter suddha(pure) lakgana. There has been 
some confusion among writers in the use of the various 
terms,but there is no difference of opinion about the 
distinction hause^xaxxKkmtlKztlEyxasdb between metaphors 
based on similarity and those based on other relations.
1.Kavyaprakasa.under 11,6; Sahityadarpana.il; Kavya- 
nu^fisanafK&vyamala edition),p.29.
2. Tantravarttika.p .354: abhidheyavinabhute pravrttir 
laksanocyate; laksymanagunair yogad vrtter igta* tu 
gaupata•
3.Haradatta Sarma,The meaning of the word tupacarat, 
Poona Orientalist,vol.I,pp.26 ff.
Modern writers on sematics like Stern and Ullmann 
also give the same distinction between transfers 
based on similarity and those t a u  based on other 
relations
m t PMammata in his gavyaprakasa quotes gumarila 
bhatta’s definition of laksana and gauni and says 
that pure laksana there need not be any invariable 
concomitance between the primary and the actual 
referents. If there is an invariable association 
between the two,there ±x could be no transfer in
cases like manea kro^anti (The cots cry),since the
%• •;.* “' . ^relation between the cots and the children a «  only 
temporary. Moreover,there will be no necessity for 
resorting to transfer,since the related sense could 
be got through inference itself. If the relation is 
one of similarity,the transfer is qualitative(gauni)» 
if it is any other relation such as that of oause 
and effect,owner and the owned,measure and the 
measured,part and the whole>eto. it is pure laksana.
1. Meaning and Change of Meaning; Semantics.passim.
2.gavyapraka^a, p. 50 (He quotes it as abhidheyavinabhuta- 
pratftir ...)j avinabhavo ftra sambandhamatram 
nantariyakatvam,tathatve hi manca kro^antityadau
na laksanfi' syad,avinabhave cakqepenaiva siddher 
laksanaya nopayoga ity uktam.
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It is clear that the various schools of 
thought in India were unaaimous in accepting that 
in a transfer there must be some kind of relation 
between the primary and the actual referents.^ The 
secondary meaning is resorted to when the primary 
meaning is found incompatible with the oontext. This 
secondary meaning is not got immediately and directly 
from the word,but only through the primary meaning. 
The knowledge of the actual referent arises only 
indirectly;first we understand the primary meaning 
of the wordjwhen this is found unsuitable in the 
context,the meaning is transferred to something 
related to the primary sense.
1. Hence it seems strange that some of the later 
writers should have overlooked this fundamental point 
in the course of their arguments. Thus to show that 
the condition for a transfer is not the impossibility 
of the literal sense in the context,but its incompati­
bility with the intention of the speaker,it is aqg 
argued that in the well-known example gahgayam ghogah 
(The village on the Ganges),it is the intention of 
the speaker that gives the meaning * the bank of the 
Ganges1 to the word gahg:a»and that if the intention 
were otherwise,the implied meaning of the term 
ghoga(village) might be fa fishf,sinoe even by 
resorting to that sense the impossibility of the 
literal sense in the context could be removed.
See Siddhahtamuktavali. p. 506: .vadi cSnvayanupapattir 
laksanabijam syat tadS kvacid gangapadasya tire kv&cik 
tirapadasya matsyadau lak^ajjeti niyamo na syat. Also, 
Laghumahjugka,p.116. in this argument they forget 
that there is no conceivable relation between the 
’village* and ’fish* and that such a transfer of 
meaning is not at all possible.(See the section on 
Tatparya also for further discussion of the problem).
(Jpv >811,0
Gauni vrtti (Qualitative transfer):-
Following Sahara,Kumarilabhatta discusses 
some of the theories about the real nature of a 
qualitative metaphor such as siifaho Devadattah ( Deva- 
datta is a lion).
(a) One theory is that the word ’lion’ is 
denotative of the whole aggregate of the class,its 
qualities and actions. Even though all the elements 
of this meaning are not applicable to the boy Devadatta, 
the word is applied to him indirectly on the basis 
of some of the elements found in him. Sahara rejects 
this view on the ground that an aggregate cannot 
refer to one part separately. As Kumarilabhatta says, 
the term ‘hundred1 cannot refer to ’fifty* even 
though the latter is part of the total aggregate.
Fore over, according to the Mimaidsakas, the primary 
meaning of a word is the universal^and not actions 
or qualities.
1. i^abarabhasya.p.5561 anyeqam tu dar^anam sarva eva
hi sidihadi^abda jatigupakriyasamudayavacinas sama- 
starthasambhave devadattadisu katipayagunakriya- 
yogad upacaryata iti.
2. This is similar to the view mentioned by Stern 
(Meaning and Change of Meaning.P*304): nIn this 
case,as in most other cases,it is one element of 
the many in the meaning of ’lion’ that is intended 
rby the speaker.”
3♦Sabarabhagya»with Kumarila’s commentary,p.356: 
samudayarthavaoitve naika^abde bhaved gatib 
*fata^abd&n na pancSsan mukhyarupena gamyate.
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(b) Another theory that Sahara discusses is 
that in a qualitative metaphor the character of one 
is imposed on another.^ In the sentence sifoho deva- 
dattah (Devadatta is a lion) the complete nature of 
the lion is imposed on Devadatta on the basis of the 
actions and qualities of DevadAtta which are found 
to be similar to those of the lion, Sahara and 
Kumarilabhatta criticize this view on the ground 
that such an iiapogeible in absolutely impossible, 
since the Than and the lion have distinct character- : 
istics. It is only under delusion on the part of 
the speaker or the hearer o\r both that the chara­
cteristics of one objects can be imposed on another. 
There is,thus,the imposition of water on mirage.
But in the case of a metaphor there is no delusion; 
both the speaker and the listeners are equally aware 
of the difference between the man and the lion;hence 
none can have the power to impose the character of 
the lion on the boy. Here an important linguistic 
principle is pointed out that in all cases of 
intentional metaphors there must be the awareness
I.Sabarabhasya.p.357; kascit punar aha samaropita- 
tadbhavo gauna iti.
2.KumSrilabhatta on ^abarabhasya.p.353:_dvav api
pratipadyete simhapuihsor viviktatam nadhyaropayitum 
s'aktis tenaikasyapi vidyate.
-  3s.S’3 -
o f  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b etw een  th e  prim ary and th e  a c t u a l
referents.As the criterion of the definition of a
1metaphor. Sthhlin observes the same point that 
"the transfer does not involve an essential identity 
between the two referents."
( c )  The Mimamsaka v ie w  i s  t h a t  a q u a l i t a t i v e
m etaph or i s  b a sed  on th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  c e r t a i n  common
q u a l i t i e s  b etw een  th e  prim ary and th e  a c t u a l  r e f e r e n t s .
They a rg u e  t h a t  a l l  s i g n i f i c a t i o n s  o f  a word a r e ,
in  some w a y ,c o n n e c te d  w ith  i t s  p rim ary  m eaning
and t h a t  we sh o u ld  n o t  assum e any o t h e r  p o te n c y  in
a w o r d , i f  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  to  e x p la in  th e  seo o n d a ry
2m ean in gs a l s o  a s  d e r iv e d  from  th e  prim ary  o n e s .
In  th e  s e n te n c e  sim ho d e v a d a tta h (D e v a d a tta  i s  a l i o n )  
th e  word sim ha ( ' l i o n 1) c o n n o te s  th e  u n iv e r s a l  
sim h a tv a  ( l i o i m e s s )  w h ich  i n d i c a t e s  su ch  q u a l i t i e s  
a s  c o u r a g e ,th e  p r e s e n c e  o f  w h ich  in  D ev a d a tta  
j u s t i f i e s  c a l l i n g  him  a l i o n .  T h is  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
1 . Q uoted by S t e m , l o o . c i t .
2.Tantravarttika,p.35& t ajahatsvartha sarvS 
iSabdapravyttayah,purva4aktyanusara sambha v e/aktyan- 
tarakalpane pramanhbhhvSt.
3.I b i d . , p .354s v a h n i t v a la k s i t a d  a r th a d  y a t  p a in galjT ad i 
gam yate te n a  maqavake b u d d h is  sadr^ySd u p a j a y a te .
i s  q u it e  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  e x p la in  th e  u s a g e .  I f , o n  th e  
o t h e r  hand,w e b e g in  t o  assum e t h a t  a  word h a s  
d i f f e r e n t  m ean ings in  d i f f e r e n t  c o n t e x t s , t h e r e  w i l l  
be c o n f u s i o n ,s in c e  i t  w i l l  be d i f f i c u l t  t o  u n d ersta n d  
th e  p r e c i s e  m eaning o f  a word and s in c e  one w i l l  be 
f o r c e d  a t  t im e s  t o  assum e f o r  w ords m ean in gs n o t  a t  
a l l  w e ll-k n o w n .
W henever we h ea r  a w o r d , i t  i s  o n ly  th e  
we1 1 -k n ow n ,n orm al p rim ary  r e f e r e n t  t h a t  we r e c o g n iz e  
im m e d ia te ly .^  Then we f in d  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  c o m p a tib le  
w ith  th e  c o n t e x t  and sow we know t h a t  th e  word h a s  
b een  u se d  f i g u r a t i v e l y  on th e  b a s i s ^ o f  th e  s i m i l a r i t y  
b etw een  th e  prim ary and th e  a c t u a l  r e f e r e n t s .  Hence 
th e  Mlmlmsaka a s s e r t s  t h a t  th e  f i g u r a t i v e  m eaning  
p r o c e e d s  d i r e c t l y  from  th e  prim ary m ean ing i t s e l f .
The pow er t h a t  r e s i d e s  in  th e  word a s  s i g n i f i c a t i v e ­
n e s s  i s  o n ly  w ith  r e f e r e n c e  t o  th e  prim ary r e f e r e n t ;
o th e r  f i g u r a t i v e  m ean ings a re  d e r iv e d  from  t h i s  and
2
a re  d ep en d en t on t h i s .
1.Tantravar11ika.p.358: purvanubhuta evarthas 
smaryate prathamam padat.
2 . I b i d . , p . 358: sa r v a th a  ta v a d  ayam gaubam ukhya-
v ib h S g a s  s'rotr*iam a r th a v ise s& v a d h S ra b e  v y a p r iy a t e . 
t e  ca  padaver&y&m a n a d h y a r o p ita s v a r th a v v t ty  eva  
siinhadipadam  a d h yavasS ya  d e v a d a tta d ip a d a sa m a n a d h i-  
karajpyanyathanupapatya  gaunatam  k a lp a y a n t i .
There is a discussion about the necessary 
factors for a qualitative metaphor like agnir 
manavakafr (The boy is a fire) in Sthiramati's 
commentary on the Trim^ika.The three relevant 
conditions that are essential for a qualitative 
metaphor are given there^ as (a) the primary 
referent of the word,(b) the actual referent 
resembling the primary one and (c) a common quality 
existing between the two. In the case of the example 
considered,the primary meaning of the word a&ni is 
fire,the actual referent is the boy who resembles 
it and the qualities common to both are the bright, 
tawny colour and the fiery nature. An objection is 
raised to this common view.The metaphor cannot be 
applied to the boy either on the basis of the 
universal common attribute of fIreness or on the 
basis of the qualities in a particular fire. The 
colour or the fiery nature is not the essential 
quality of the fire,as otherwise the fireness will 
be present in the boy also and there will be no 
necessity for a metaphorical transfer. Again it cannot
1.Vi.iftaptinfetratasiddhKEdited by Sylvain Levi),
Part I,p. 17: upacErohi tri$u bhavati rf&nyatam&btfiurve 
mukhyapadarthe tatsadp^e tayo^ ca s'&drdye. Tad 
yatha mukhye *gnau tatsadv^e iriSnavake tayos ca 
sadhSranadharme kapilatve t“Ik§natve va saty agnir 
maqavaka ity upac&rah kriyate.
1. Vijhaptimatratgsiddhi,part I,p.17 javinabh&vitve 
copac&rabhavo !gnav iva manavake 'pi jatisadbh&vSfcA* 
tasmSn na manavake jatyupacaras sambhavati. napi 
dravyopacarah samSlnyadharmabhavat.na hi yo 1 gnes 
tlksno gunati kapilo va sa eva manavake....evam 
agnigunasyaiva ma^avakagupe sadr^yad upacaro yuktah
2. Ibidi'mukhyapadgrtho nasti,tasya sarvajnSnabhidhana 
visayatikrantatvat...api ca sarva evayam gauna eva, 
na mukhyo ' sti.
3.Vigrahavyavarttini>p •1s sarve §am bhihvanam sarvatra 
na vidyate svabhSva^ cet tvadvacanam asvabh&vam na 
nivartayitum svabhavam alam.
be applied to the boy on the basis of the qualities 
in a particular fire,for the quality being inseparably 
linked with the substrate,the brightness of the boy 
is essentially different from the brightness of the 
boy. What we can say is that the quality of the fire 
is similar to that of the boy;the quality can be 
metaphorically applied to that of the boy,but not to 
the boy himself .^*
Moreover,according to the Buddhists there is 
no primary referent for a word;for the essential 
nature of an object transcends the pale of all forms 
of knowledge and expression. Kaoh word is applied 
to its object only indirectly through upacara,based 
on the quality. The thing-in-itself cannot be directly
pdenoted by a word. In the vigrahavy5vartini of the .
-  -  3Buddhist writer Nagarjuna also we meet the same view.
- -
There,as a prima faeie objection,it is said that if
the words themselves are devoid of essential nature,
it should not be possible to apply them to refute
that essential nature* Non-existent fire does not
bum;then how could words which have no reality be
1used to prove that very unreality? The answer is
to be found in the Buddhist view that even though
direot
words have no/ockliM**: m  connection with the 
ultimate reality,they have the power of practical 
utility (arthakriy&karita) as they can refer to the 
objects indirectly through laksana.
It is interesting to note that the 
Mimamsakas of the Bhatta school also accept£ that; 
it is through the secondary significative power that 
words denote the particular objects in a sentence. 
According to them the letters of the words in a 
sentenoe convey only the universal concepts directly. 
As theses oannot be related to one another,they give 
way to the particular meanings got through laksana. 
Thus the sentence meaning is always known with the
1.Vigrahavyavartt ini»p.10: na hy asatagninfi sakyam 
dagdhum... evam asata vacanena na sakyah sarva- 
bhfivaprati^edhah kartum.
C-p • Mol cjno
cOx^a-wO!^
help of the secondary significative power of words#•*, 
For example in the sentence "Bring the cow",the word 
&gDtaeatri 1 bring* directly connotes the act of bringing 
in general,and indirectly indicates the particular 
act of bringing at the given time* Similarly the 
word fcow1 connotes the universal cowness and 
indicates the individual cow as related to the act 
of bringing* . Thus in every sentence each component 
word directly connotes its meaning in the general 
form and indirectly indicates the particular as
related to the meanings of the other words* This
- 2 is the view of Kumarilabhafta and his followers*
Jahallaksa&5,A.1ahallaksana and Jahadajahallakganat-
We have seen that in all oases of metapho-x 
rical transfer of meaning there should be some 
intimate relation between the primary and the actual 
referents. Now according to the degree ef iirt-imaoy
1 *Manameyodaya.p.941 vayam tu padartha lak^anayaiva 
vSkySrtham bodhayantTti brumah. See also the t
well-known line generally attributed to Maijtdanamisra 
Vakyartho laksyamap.o hi sarvatraiveti na£ sthitih 
(Quoted in SSlikanSTtha*s VakyarthamatrkSvali)
2.Ganganatha Jha*PuiryamlmSitisg in its Sources,p*152.
to which the primary meaning is retained in the 
actual meaning it is possible to distinguish three 
kinds of laksanas. Of course in a transfer one 
cannot exclude completely the primary meaning of
Ithe word;but its retention may be larger or less.
(a) Jahallaksana or Jahatsvartha:- In a
sentence like #ai%gayam ghosah (The village is on 
the Ganges),the primary sense of the term ganga 
(Ganges) is abandoned and the secondary meaning 
'the bank of the Ganges* is taken. This is a case 
where the primary meaning of the word is abandoned 
and a secondary meaning which is related to the 
primary one,but which excludes it,is accepted.This 
is jahallaksana. In this type of lakgana there will 
be the non-intelligibility of the syntactical relation 
between the terms,if we take the primary meaning of 
the word;henCe the primary sense has to be rejected 
to a great extent and another sense connected with it 
has to be taken to suit the context. Mammata calls 
it lakganalaksana.
I.of. Sankara.Brahmasutrabhasya.4.1*6 (Kashi Sanskrit 
Series,p .9145 * lakgana ca yathasambhavam sannikr^tena 
viprak^stena_va svSrthasambandhena pravartate.
Also KuMarilabhatta.Tantravarttika.p.356: 
ajahatsvartha sarva sabdapravrttayah.
-/as'V
(b) A.jahallaksana or ajahatsvarthat- 
It is not necessary that the primary sense should 
be excluded in all cases of transfers. Sometimes 
the primary sense is not substantially modified, 
but only specified by context,or restricted by its 
syntactic function or extended by the inclusion of 
another sense. In all such cases the secondary 
sense includes the primary sense also. In the example 
kuntah pravi^anti (The lances enter) the word kuntah 
indicate through laksana the lances and the men who 
carry them. The sentence chattrino yanti (People with 
umbrellas are going) indicates,through laksana,both 
those with and those without umbrellas. And in the 
Vedic example srstlr upadadb&ti (The srsti bricks 
are placed),the word srsti means,by laksana,the 
bricks that are associated with a group of hymns 
with and without the word srsti. This type of 
transfer is called A j ahal1aksana. Mammata calls it 
upadana laksana. According to the Bhatta Mimamsakas 
the primary meaning of a word is the universal;its 
power is exhausted on expressing the general sense, 
and the meaning of the particular has to be got 
through laksana of the a.1 ahatsvartha type. Mammata
1 «loc«oit.
2. See the section on the Primary meaning: of a word.
|
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does not accept the necessity of assuming lakgana 
to get the idea of the particular from that of the 
universal;he follows the Prabhakara school of 
Mimamsakas in maintaining that,on account of the 
invariable connection between the universal and the 
particular,the latter is g a s  implied in the former.
(c) Jahadajahallaksana:- Besides these two
varieties of laksana the Vedantins accept a third
variety,called jahad-a.jahal-lakgapa, in cases where
only a part or an aspect of the primary meaning is
1preserved,while the rest is rejected. In examples 
like pato dagdhab (The cloth is burned) or grgmo 
dagdhah (The village is burned),it is only a part 
of the cloth or village that is actually meant as 
having been burned. Only a part of the primary 
meaning of the word pata or grama is retained.
Again in a sentence like so !yam devadattah (This is 
that Devadatta,the term sah(that) refers to Devadatta 
as determined by the past time and space;and the 
term ayam (this) refers to the same Devadatta as 
determined by the present time and space. The
1 .Datta,op.cit.,p.283;Huparikar,op.cit.,p.470f;
Vedantaparlbh&sg,IV»v 4: ;.v.' '
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sentence does not mean that the two incompatible 
determinants fthis’and 'that1 are identical;nor 
does it mean that the person as determined in the 
term 'this* is identical with him when determined 
in the term 'that'. It only means the identity of 
the substantive I)evadatta,by rejecting the incom­
patible elements. The two qualified entities cannot 
be identicaljbut they refer to the same substantive 
Devadatta. So the identity here refers'to the 
individual Devadatta who is unrelated to time,past 
or present. The Vedantins are very much interested
in this type of laksana.since they have to explain
/
Vedic sentences such as tat tvam asi (Thou art That)
and aham brahmasmi ( I am Brahman). In the sentence
tat tvam asi.tvam(thou) as part of the sentence
/does not mean Svetaketu as son of Udd£laka,but as - 
stripped of all individual attributes such as limited 
intelligence;tad (That) means the Universal Soul, 
stripped of all qualifications such as omniscience.
It is only the Pure Consciousness in the individual 
soul that is identified with that in the Universal Soul.
1.Chandogyopanisad,6.8*7*
2. Bfhadgranyakopanisad.1.4*10.
-  i -
Such instances where a word signifying a qualified 
entity gives up one part of its primary meaning 
and retains another part,belong to the jahadajahal- 
lakgan^Sadananda in his Yedantasara^ calls it 
bhagatyagalaksanS (literally,a transfer where a part 
of the primary sense is rejected.)
Discussing such sentences as j A is B 1, 
William Empson says^that if the identity is acoeptedg 
literally,it becomes nonsense and consequently,there 
is a feeling of resistance. When the machinary of
interpretation is brought into play,there is a feeling
* * ■ . • * +
of richness about the possible interpretations. This
view is similar to that of the Indian philosophers;
4but later,when Empson says that n people who believe
j'hoc corpus1 or fThat art Thou* would strongly 
deny that they are metaphors",he seems unconscious 
of the fact that the Indian philosophers actually 
included the sentence tat tvam asi under metaphor,
1.Mallinatha in his commentary on Ekavali (p.68) 
defines it thus: svarthaikSm^atyagad amsantaram 
eva laksyate yatra,sa~ jahadajahatsvartha tat tvam 
asltyadivi^ayadrsyeyamjsee also Safikara, gvatma- 
nirupana.verse 35: jahadajahatlti sa syad ya vacya- 
rthaikadesam apahSya bodhayati oaikade^am so'yam 
dvija itivad arrayed en5m|Yedantaparibhhsa,IYtyatra 
hi vi^istavacaka^ s'abdah ekade^am vih&ya ekade^e 
vartate,tatra jahadajahallaksanfi.
2.Vedantas5ra.p.lQ.
3.The Structure of Complex Words,p.334
4. ibid., p. 337. ~----
though they distinguish it from purely qualitative 
metaphors like "The boy is a lion*• But it is true 
that the Alankarikas and the Naiyayikas do not 
recognize this type of metaphor.
The theory of lakgana is important in all 
philosophical systems which try to discuss the nature 
of the ultimate Reality which is beyond expression.
In the ordinary sense of the word the Absolute is
/ ,beyond any definition. Sankara himself says in the
Brhadaranyakopanisadbhagya11hat words denotes things
through one or the other of the followings name,form,
action,distinction,genus and qualityjbut in Brahman
there is none of these differences and hence It cannot 
2be described. When Brahman is described as Intelligence, 
Bliss etc.,It is described by means of a name,form 
or action superimposed on it. If we want to describe 
Its true nature free from the difference due to the 
limiting adjuncts,it is an impossibility. The only 
way is by negation,HNot thus,not thus". However,it is 
possible for words to suggest meanings and ideas 
beyond the range of their expressive power. Vague
1. BUB.2.3.6.
2. But see Bhartrhari who says that there is nothing 
indescribable;if there is anything,then the word
indescribable* will apply to it."avacyam iti yad 
vacyam tadevacyatvena vacitam"(VP.ii. )
suggestion, may be useful in poetry,but in logical 
discussion of philosophical problems. Metaphorical 
expressions which are fundamentally based on the 
literal meanings are useful in extending the range 
of expression without making the ideas too vague for 
objective communication.
%. . : fY? *
(d) Lakgitalakgana:- A fourth variety of’ :Y • Yf- Y Y. ’ ' • * i
—  i 1laksanB called laksitalaksana is recognized by !
some of the early writers; this ocours when the
relation between the primary and the actual referents
is not direct,but indirect through some other word,
as in the case of the word dvirepha\ Here the
literal meaning of the word is "a word having two fr ,sf
and it indicates the word bhramara,and through that
word it means the fbeef. According to the modem
Naiyayikas,however, it can be included under jahallakgana
itself. Aocording to the Vedantaparibh&sa even
qualitative metaphor (gauni vrtti) come under this
type of laksana.since the relation between the two
referents in such cases is only indirect,effected 
through the implication of the common quality.
1. Nyayakosa,p.702;Datta,op.cit.,p.285»
2.Thus "You are a lion" means "You possess the courage 
which is implied in lionness". See Datta.loo.cit.
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duddha,Saropa and Sadhyavasagat
If'ulculabhat'fca in the Abhidhavrttimatrka T " ■ ■ 1 ’ 1 < ■■ -
gives another threefold classification of laksana.
(a) l/7hen the actual referent appears to be aloof 
and clearly distinct from the primary referent,it 
is the suddha or pure type.(b) When the difference 
between the two referents is not clear and there is 
superimposition of the one on the other,it is called ., 
the saropa (superimponent) type, (o) And when the 
apparent closeness of the two referents is so great 
that there is no apprehension of the difference at 
all,it is the sadhyavasguaa type of laksanaCintro- 
susceptive). In this third variety the object of
superimposition is completely eelipsed or swalloWed
former :vi; . * • 
by the thing superimposed;the/Ittttflcr is not expressed
in a word,only the latter is expressed instead.
The saropa and the sadhyavasana types of laksana3.
especially when thry are based on similarity,play
a great part in the literary figures of speech.
1* Abhidhavrttimatrka,p.9: tatasthe lakpajia suddha 
syad STropas tv adiXrage nigirne1dhyava&Snam tu 
rudhyasannataratvatah.
the saropa type is the basis of the figure rupaka, 
as in mukham candrah ( The face is the moon),and the 
sadhyavasana type is the basils of the figure 
rupakati^ayotki as in ayam candrah ( This is the moon) 
referring to the face. Criticizing this view 
Mammata says^that there can be no complete aloofness 
between the primary and the actual referents even 
in instances like gangayam ghosafr( The village is 
on the Canges),since the motive element underlying 
the transfer could be got only by apprehending thefir 
identity.^
We have seen that laksaqa could be classified 
from various points of view: (a) on the basis of the 
nature of the relation between the primary and the 
actual referents,(b) on the basis of the intensity 
of that relation and (c) on the degree of the 
distinction between the two. Again the transfer can 
be intentional {prayojanavati) or natural (nirudha). 
There are minor differences of opinion among scholars 
about the subdivisions;but the main bases of classifi-
CUHC.
cation fee accepted by all.
1.TOvyafcakasa.11,under verse 5.
2.It is clear that the identity referred to for a 
laksana is a kind of false identity,as otherwise 
there will be no incompatibility of the primary 
sense. Cf. Kumarila's statement about gauni vr.tti.
- $  -
Inconrpat ib i 1 i t y of the primary sense t-
Incompatibility of the primary sense in 
the context is another essential condition for a 
laksana,since no recourse to a secondary figurative 
meaning is necessary so long as the primary
meaning itself serves the context. The direct and 
natural relation of the word is with its primary 
meaning,and it is this primary meaning that comes 
to our mind as soon as we hear the word. It is only 
when this meaning brings about some resistance to 
the understanding of the* sentence owing to its 
unsuitability to the context,that we try to explain 
it with the help of the secondary significative 
force of the word. As Sankara points out,it is to be 
resorted to,only when the direct meaning of the word 
is clearly impossible in the context;whenever the 
direct statement and the implied meaning are in 
conflict,preference is to be given to the former^
1 .Brahmasutrabhagya on sutra 1.4.11: srutilaksana«,«y*y 
£rutir ny§yya na laksana.
According to the MiraamsakaB and the Vedantins 
the secondary meaning of a word is known through a 
reasoning of the arthapatti type,which consists in 
the postulation of a fact to explain two known facts 
which are apparently unaccountable. In the well-known 
example "pTno davadattah diva na bhunkte* (The fat 
Devadatta does not eat by day),the two known facts, 
viz. Devadatta being fat and his aat±±ng not eating 
during day are unaccountable unless we postulate the 
fact that he eats during night. In the case of lakgapa 
we have to find a way to reconcile two known facts, 
viz.tthe primary meaning of the word known through 
remembrance and the intention of the speaker inferred 
from the context. "When a dog is spoken of as a lion, 
the primary meaning is found to be impossible and the 
secondary meaning is known,through immediate inference 
of the arthapatti type,to be * similar to a lion in 
courage etc.* as the only one which is related to the 
primary meaning and which can remove the conflict 
between the primary meaning and the contextual meaning.
1. Datta,The Six Ways of Knowing.p.284*
Now, what is meant by the incompatibility 
of the literal sense(mukhyarthabadha or annpapatti)? 
Aocording to the ancient Naiyayikas and the later 
Alankarikas it is only the impossibility*^ of 
establishing the logical connection in the sentenoe.
The Mimamsakas of the Prabhakara school also take 
this view;Salikanatha defines laksana as "that which 
is resorted to torconveyva new sense which can be 
related to the sentence-meaning through the cognition 
of its primary sense,when that primary sense of the 
word has no logical connection with the sentence- 
meaning." But according to the later Naiyayikas 
and the Vedantins,as well as the later grammarians, 
the incompatibility of the primary sense lies not 
merely in the difficulty of establishing the logical 
connection in the sentence,but in the unsuitability 
of the primary sense with the intended sense in the 
context( tMparyanupapatti). The Mimamsakas of the 
Bh£tta school also favour this view;in the Tattvabindu
1.Vakyarthamatrkavali,p.151 vacyasyarthasya vakyarthe 
sambandhanupapattitah tatsambandhavasapraptasyanvayal 
laksapa mata.
2.Siddhantamuktavali,p .285 ; laksana sakyasambandhas 
tatparyanupapattitafr;Laghuman.iusatp. 116: vastutas 
tatparyanupapattir eva xach tadbljam;Vedantaparibhasa ,IV
^ 1 o  - 
/_Vacaspati criticizes Salikanatha*s definition of 
laksana and says that any kind of incompatibility 
of the primary sense should be taken as the condition 
of lakgana,not merely its incompatibility with the 
sentence meaning.
In all cases of laksana where the primary 
meaning is not retained ( ff.jahallaksana) such as 
"gangayam ghoaah** (The village is on the Ganges)
there will be the unsuitability of the primary 
sense of the word in establishing logical connection 
with the sentence meaning. But"i®t cases where the 
primary sense is not completely rejected ( A.iahal-
laksana ) there will be no impossibility the
• ■ ■■ ' ^
sentence meaning if the word is taken in its 
primary sense,and henoe there will be no laksana, 
if we take the ±axaak former explanation of 
’incompatibility of primary sense*. Thus the 
sentence "ohattrino yahtj* (The men with umbrellas 
are marching) can mean*a group of people with 
and without umbrellas are marching’, * even though 
the literal meaning refers only to the umbrella- 
bearers. Similarly,in a sentence "k&kebhyo dadhi 
raksyatam**( Protect the curd from crows),the primary
meaning of the word kaka (crow) is not impossible' 
in the context;but it is also clear that the intention 
is to have the curd protected from all animals.
To include all such instances under laksana we 
have to take incompatibility with the intended 
sense as the condition for a laksana. Moreover, 
all cases of impossibility of establishing logical 
connection with the sentence meaning can be explained 
by the incompatibility of the literal sense with 
the intention of the speaker or the purport of the 
sentence.^-
Those who hold impossibility of establishing, 
the logical connection with the sentence aeaning 
as the condition of laksana explain such instances 
by taking the words to be the upalaksana for the 
actual referents. Thus in kakebhyo dadhi raksyatam 
the word kaka(crow) is an upalakgana for all 
animals that might eat the curd (dadhyupaghatakas). 
UpalakgaQa is the act of implying any analogous 
object where ibnly one is specified. The word kaka
1. Datta>op.cit.,pp.ft&frfcix 283 f;Huparikar»op.cit., 
pp.#60ff.
f' 1 -
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(crow) is an indication for the animals that eat
the curd;the word is a means of referring to the
whole group including ±fac the crow which is the
Iliteral meaning of the word.
Now,one of the conditions for a sentence 
is aocepted to he yogyata or congruity of sense; 
a decisive knowledge of congruity is a pre-requisite
a,of arriving at a valid judgement from a statement. 
Thus the statement "agnina sincati" (He wets it 
with fire) is given as an example for the breach 
of this condition,since the concept of fire is 
incongruous with that of wetting. If there is any 
incompatibility of the primary sense,as we find 
in all cases of lakganas.how can there be yogyata 
in the sentence? The explanation is that in the case 
of laksana.the incompatibility of the sense is only 
for the sense when taken literally,and is not 
real. This could be removed by resorting to the 
secondary meaning of the word. Even in cases like 
agnina sificati,if the incongruity could be explained 
away by resorting to some secondary meaning,it can 
be taken as a correct sentence.
1*Nyayko sa.p.17 2.
2.See the section on Yogyata. ( b
-Nirudha laksana or Faded M e t a p h o r ;
The third condition for a laksana is that 
the secondary sense must have the sanction of 
everyday usage or that it must be resorted to 
with a special motive to suggest some new ideas.
The ancient writers stressed the necessity of 
sanction by popular usage;but not the motive element 
in the use of words in the figurative sense. It is 
the later literary critics who give great prominence 
to the suggestion of new ideas as a motive for 
resorting to laksana.
t _Sabarasvamin remarks that laksana is 
based on the usage in everyday life. It is an 
arbitrary assumption of a sense by society. Some­
times the newly assumed sense becomes so prominent 
through usage,thAt the primary,original,sense of 
the word is not normally noticed,except by the
grammarians. The secondary sense is generally
.<•' uk.accepted as the primary sense itsief,and the
original sense is taken as the etymological sense.
 7--------------- - ------------------1 -----------------------------  1 ---------------------------1.Sabarabbagya,on sutra 1.4.2j lak^a^a iti ced
varam kalpit£,na yog&bhidhanam. laukikl hi 
laksana hatho fprasiddhe kalpana.
-VJt*--
*• :V* -!?£'"*•-*. * r— >>-0 :£* •;•*' • \  ; .-'• ?..« : qlj.\ ^  « -/5*' f , - . . f* V ^ 'r - .  -._ V ^ ' ; -
Kumarilabhatta says that old and deep-rooted 
laksagas express the secondary sense as if it 
were the primary sense itself,and that in the case 
of modem and newly made laksanas»some are possible, 
but some are impossible,since they are not allowed
by usage.^ This classification is accepted by
2 _ __ Mammata also . In the case of ntrudha lakganas
(Faded metaphors) the actual meaning is as good
as the normal meaning itslif and there is no need
for incompatibility of the original meaning or any
speaccial motive to sanction its usage.In the case
of these faded metaphors the association of the
word with the original,primary,meaning has almost
disappeared,and the word becomes an ordinary name
for the actual referent without any other cognitive
or emotive association. 3very language is full of
such faded metaphors,and Sanskrit is abundantly
rich in them. Many of t£e synonyms in Sanskrit can
be classed under this category. For all practical
purposes the metaphoric meaning has become the
normal meaning of the expression.
1 .Tantravarttika.p.jOO; nirucjha lakganafc kSscit 
samarthySd abhidhanavat kriyante sampratam k&^cit 
kS^cin naiva tv as'aktitafr.
2.Sabdavyaparavicarg.p.7:niru^ha kacananya tu karya 
s& kficid anyatha.
Mukulabhatta saysVthat we recognize 
laksana only in those cases established by the 
usage of ancients,and that analogous oases must 
also be warranted by usage,as otherwise any word 
might have any meaningjif there is a special motive 
which is clear enough,metaphors can be resorted to.: 
Thus on the analogy of the existing word dvirepha 
(a word having two !r fs,viz,,bhramara) for bee, 
we cannot coin a word like dvika(a word with two *k’s, 
viz,,kokila) for the cuckoo.
In the 3ahityadarpana,Vi^vanatha says 
thatv we should not confuse the etymological sense 
of a word with its primary sense. If we take the 
the meaning of'expertness'as the secondary meaning 
of the word kusala (etymologically taken to be 
’one who cuts the ku^a grass1),even the meaning 
’cow’ for the word gaufr will have to be taken as 
secondary,since etymologically it could be explained
pas ’one that walks*( from the root ’gam*). <
1. Abhldhavrttimatrka»p»llf* vrddhavyavaharabhyanu- 
jfiS'te^ u eva dabdeeu ta jjatTyas'abdadar^anal lak$$na- 
tvam abhyupagamyaje,na tu sarvatra;anyatha sarvepam 
eva feabdSham yenakenacij j§t Helena sarvan arthan 
prati laksanffs&bdasya vaktum ^akyatvat.
2>Sahityadarpana, p. 9;anyad dhi ^abdanam vyutpatti- 
nimittam anyac ca pravrttinimittam;vyutpattilabhyasya 
raukhyarthatve gauh 4ete ity atrSpi laksana syat.
Hemacandra is definite that we should take all 
such instances of nirudha laksanas like kusala 
and dvirepha as the normal meaning (mukhyartha) 
itself.1
It is interesting to note in this connection
the clear distinction laid down by the Mimamsakas
between interpretation based on analysis rad or
etymology (yoga) and interpretation based on
conventionally established usage (rudhi). "They
taught that rudhi is always stronger than yoga;
that is,one must always interpret a word in
accordance with its conventional meaning when that
2can be determined." They never denied the 
importance of etymology in interpretationjbut they 
said that it must always be overruled by conventional 
usage. This is known as the maxim of the rathakara. 
In the interpretation of the Vedic text laying 
down that * fire should be installed during the 
rain* by the rathakara* ,doubt arises about the
1.K~avyanu^asana, p. 30 * ku^aladvirephadvipadayas tu 
sak sS t saAketaV i ^ ay at van mukhya eveti na rutjhir 
laksyartJ^asya hetutvenasmSbhir ukta. See also_ 
Sarvadarsanasangraha,p.Ill;na ca vyutpattibalad / 
eva earvatra sabdaji pravartate.
2.Edgerton,F..Etymology and Interpretation, 
Proceedings of" the American Philosophical Society, 
vol.79,no.40:938),pp.705 - 714;See also Jha, 
PurvamTmgmsa in its Sources»pp»314»384*
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meaning of the term rathakara;etymologically it
means the •chariot-makerf;but it is conventionally
used in the sense of a man belonging to a mixed
/sub-caste• Jaimini says that the conventional
meaning should be taken in preference to the
etymological one* This maxim is accepted by Nagesa
in his commentary on paribhesendu^ekhara and by
3Jayantabhatta in his Nyayamua.1 ari.
The Mimamsakas,while discussing the relative 
importance of the six means of evidence in the 
treatment of injunctions of application (vinlyoga- 
vidhi) lay down the principle that liiiga or the 
conventional word-meaning established by usage 
(same as rudhi) is a stronger evidence thaii 
samSkhya or Mkma twr the etymological meaning (yoga). 
It is interesting to note that the samakh./a is 
given last in the list of six pram&nas for 
subordinating the details of a sacrifice to the 
main utpattividhi*' 'Vv
1 > Mlmamsasut rafo * i. 50
2.Under Paribhasa 98*
3.P.140 ,
4.They are srutifdirect statement),linga(word meaning), 
vakya(syntactic connection),prakarana(context), 
sthana(position or sequence) and samakhya(etyinologjioal 
meanin^jof these each preceding one is stronger
than the succeeding ones* See Huparlkar*op.cit.p.251ff♦
Motive element in Lakgaga
In India it is the later literary critics 
like Anandavardhana and his" followers that made a 
clear distinction between intentional metaphors ,
(prayojanavat 1 laksana) and unintentional metaphors 
(nirudhalaksana) and pointed out***the importance of 
the former vodMgr in enriching the content of 
literature by suggesting new ideas and by stimulating 
subtle shades of emotions. Even earlier Alarikarikas 
like Dandin and Vamana had noticed that metaphorical 
expressions play an important role in literature..
pDandin considered metaphorical expressions as the 
basis of samadhi guna in literature*while Vamana 
included all qualitative metaphors under the figure 
of speech called Vakrokti. The Naiyayikas egad the 
Mimamsakas were not interested in the motive element. 
It is the later Alankarikas who stress #a this 
aspect of laksana.
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1 . Vavyaprakasa, II.
2.Kavyadarsa.1.93: anyadharmas tato *nvatra 
lokasTmShurodhina samyag adhlyate yatra sa 
samadhis smrto yatha.
3.Kavyalahkarasutravptti,4.3*8? sadrsyal laksana 
vakroktih. - -1
According to Ananflavardhana the motive
element in laksana iA apprehended by the function
of suggestion only^ In an Intentional transfer 
*/>
the motive^apprehended from the word alone;thus 
in the well-known example gangayam ghosah(The village 
is on the Ganges),the suggested sense of coolness 
and purity is apprehended from the word ganga;but 
the word has no such conventional meaning. The 
motive element can neither be included in laksana» 
because the three necessary elements,viz. incompati­
bility ,relation to the primary sense and sanction 
by usage or special motive,are absent in this case. 
The function of lakgaqa is exhausted when the 
incompatibility of the primary sense is removed by 
adopting the secondary sen; e ,and should not be 
extended to the motive element. But the Mimamsakas 
and the.Naiyayikas,who do notmaccept suggestion 
(v.yan.iana) as a separate function of words,take
the motive element in intentional transfers also
— 2as part of the main lakgaqa itself. Moreover,
1.Kavyaprakasa.II»under verse 8: prayojanam hi 
vyafljan^vySparagemyam eva; also verses 10,11.
2.This is discussed in the chapter on Vyan.jana.
in many cases the motive underlying the transfers 
is vague and ambiguous and depends entirely on 
contextual factors,and cannot,therefore,be 
objectively ascertained with a reasonable degree 
of certainty and accuracy,however great its 
importance may he in literature.
It is true that in the example gahg&yam 
ghosafr the qualities of coolness and sanctity 
suggested by the word gariga are associated with the 
village;even if the eentence had been gaiigatate ghogafr 
(The village is on the banks of the Ganges) these 
qualities could be implied. This suggestion belongs
4t>  ___to the suggestive power(v^n.1 anavyapara) of the word. 
The definite purpose of the laksana is to help in 
the process of suggestion. In a laksana there is a 
break in the flow,due to the incompatibility,and the 
listener has to think about the possible interpreta- 
tions^hus the laksana stimulates our attention to 
the suggestive elements that formed the motive in 
resorting to "the metaphorical expression.Hence there 
is a great deal of truthiin the argument that the 
motive element in a transfer do not form part of it, 
but that it is conveyed by the suggestive power 
of the word.
Compound Words:-
-  \ -
According to the Naiyayikas and the Mimamsakas 
no special denotative function need be accepted in 
the case of compound words;they explain with the 
help of laksana all cases of compounds where the 
intended sense is not got directly from the members 
of the compound themselves. Thus in the case of a * 
Bahuvrihi compound like citraguh (possessing brindled 
cows) they resort to lakganS to obtain the sense 
of the owner. But the grammarians assume a special 
power to explain the new meaning distinct from those 
of its members,since laksana in regard to either 
citra or gauh is not sufficient to bring about the 
signification of the owner of the brindled cows'*’.
The word citra cannot indicate the owner of brindled 
cows,and if the word gaufr were to indicate the 
owner of cows,thebmeaning of the word citra will 
be incompatible with that of the owner,since it is 
not the owner that is brindled.2 The grammarians
1.Yaiyakaranabhusana.under verse 34: citragur ityadau 
svamyfcdipratitaye &aktir avasyaki,na ca laksanaya 
nirvahah;see also MBH.under sutra II.1.1.
-  -  ' *  12.Tattvacintamani»Sabdakhanda.p.702: na ca citrapadam 
c itrago svami 1 ak$akam, tatra gopadarthSnanvayat.
napi gopadam lak^akam gosvamini,citrapad5rthananvaya- 
patteh. See also Chakravarti.Philosophy of Sanskrit 
Grammar,p .309.
assign' the power of expressing such additional
senses to the compounds,taking the whole as an
1 —indivisible unit of sppech. The Mimamsakas 
explain this difficulty by taking the whole sentence 
as l&ksana. In a Tatpurusa compound like rftjapurusafr 
(The king's man) for rajnah purusah,the relation 
denoted by the genitive is got through laksana*
The Naiyayikas resort to laksana only in the case 
of one word,either citra or gaufr .and take the other 
as suggestive of the purport(tatparyagrahaka)*
The Tatpurusa compound has lakganet for the first 
word only;in the case of a Karmadharaya compound 
there is no necessity to resort to laksana*since 
the sense of identity of the members is got from 
the relation* of the meanings themselves.^
The Mimamsakas assume that since the natural 
relation of a word is to its primary meaning,no 
recource should be taken to the secondary function
1. Ibid.
2.^abdasaktiprakasika.* samasa section: na hi 
bahuvrXbau samastapadah&m lSkganikatvam... eka- 
padalakgapayapi bahuvrlher vyavasthapakatvat.
3- Yaiyakaranabhugana, p»159: karm&dharayc na lakgapa 
pad§ithayo£ padabhySTm abhedasya sanisargataya ISbhSt.
of words,if it is possible to explain the passage
by resorting to the primax*y meaning itself. This is
stressed in their discussion of the meaning of the
term nisadasthapati.^  If it is taken as a Karma-
dharaya compound,it means fa king who is a nigada*;
but,if taken as a Tatpurusa compound,it means ’king
of the nlgadas1 * Their final conclusion is that
the word has to be taken as a Karmadtf&raya compound,
in which case;the members retain their primary
meanings,and not as a Tatpuruga compound,since that
-  Xinvolves recourse to laksana.
Bhartrhari * s Views on Laksana s-
Bhartrhari believes that the unit of speech 
is the sentence which is indivisible and that the 
meaning af a sentence cannot necessarily be grasped 
from a knowledge of the meanings of the words. He 
refers to the usual division of meanings of words 
into primary and secondary,and gives various popular 
views about the distinction between the two.
1. Mnmamsasutras,6.1.51-52.
2.Jha,PurvamlnigtiDs§l in its 5ources,p.315*
"(a) According to those who hold that a word 
can have more than one meaning,the distinction 
between primary and secondary meanings is based on 
the relative frequency of usage;that which Is well 
known through constant usage is called the primary 
and normal meaning,while the less frequently used 
meaning is called secondary*VThe samarlwo^l can have 
more than one meaning,but not simultaneously; it is 
the context or the connection with some other words 
that determine* the meaning to be taken in a parti-
tcular sentence*
(b) One theory,Jattributed to the great
grammarian .Vyadi by Pupyaraja,is that the primary
meaning of a word Is that which is well-knwwn and
which depends only on its form,whereas the secondary
meaning is that whioh is established with effort
with the help of* the context. The former is what thd
word conveys by itself,whereas the latter is different
from this and depends on the other words in the
Asentence and on the context.
-  w  ~
1.YP.ii.265
2.VP.ii*266-267,280
(c) A third view considers the words to 
refer to the qualities. That object which possesses 
these qualities to a greater extent is called the 
primary referent and the other is called the secondary. 
Bhartrhari does not support this view,since it is 
against usage.
(d) According to some others the secondary 
usage is based on similarity."Devadatta is a lion" 
only means that Devadatta possesses some qualities 
similar to those of the lion. Or,it may even be 
based on some confusion of the one for the other 
because of the similarity.
According to Bhartrhari it is meaningless 
to discuss the primary and secondary referents of 
an individual word;the sentence has to be considered 
as a whole,and in the particular context in which 
it is.uttered. In many of the familiar instances 
the individual word meanings have no special
v  k " • * /  _  * , i .  ;  v  u  *
significance in the context. Thus when a mother says 
"Tiger eats children who cry",she does not mean
■l.VP.ii.275
2.VP.ii.322.
that if her child cries,he will be eaten by the
tiger*, what she really means is that the child
should.not cry.1 Similarly,if a traveller says to
his companion,"We must go,look at the sun",the
meaning conveyed is not merely that of looking
at the sun;the implied sense here is that it is 
ogetting late. Again,if a child is asked, "See 
that the* crows do.-not steal the .butter",he knows 
quite well that he should not interpret the 
sentenoe literally and allow dogs to steal the 
butter? Sometimes in compound words the component
parts may not real meaning of their own; thus the
» »thing meant by frrahmemakambala (the brahmin*s
blanket) does not contain the thing meant by the 
- 4word brahmafta* It is not satisfactory to explain
1.VP.ii.322 and Punya*raja’s commentary thereont 
yatha rudantam vy&hf^ro bhaksayatXti balasyocyate p 
na tu vyahjsrabhakgapam vastusthitya sambhayati 
keyslam ma kadacit tvam rodlr iti rodananisedha 
eva tasya kriyate.
2.yp>ii*3i2
3.VP.ii.314: kakebhyo raksyatam sarpir iti balopi 
coditah upaghStapare vakye na ^vadibhyo na raksat
4*VP.ii.14sbrahmanfcrthd yatha nasti ka^cid brahma^a 
kambale.
all such usages by Besorting to the secondary 
significative power of a particular word in the ‘ 
sentence. In cases like ironical statements*the 
meaning of individual words give an entirely different, 
sens# front the actual meaning of tbte* sentence in 
the context. It is true that many of the later 
writers have tried to include allwuch instances 
under laksana;itself; but Bhartrhari lias clearly 
shown the unsatisfactory nature of a theory 
depending entirely upon word“meahings,even though 
he is not oblivious to the usefulness. of'i^h# ,w- 
discussion of word-meanings as an easy method in 
the study of language. The Dhvani theory propounded 
by -.the great literary + critic Anandavardhana is ;
partly an answer to this problem. £' ‘f ; . % 't ■ £
1.VP.ii*24j? :sfcztinindapradhahesu vakyesv artlio 
na tadr^ah.
T  fs2.Qf.J .Brough,Borne Indian Theories of ^eanin,;, at., 
1953,p.172.
- -
Clagsif icotioij of Laksana
Basis of classification Name of the subdivision
a)Nature of *: 
relation between 
primary; and .S 
a c tua1 re fe rent s ?
1.Similarity
2.Other .
& delations .
Gaual lakaana 
or G-aunx. vrtti
3uddh*a lakgana
(b)Intensity•of 
relation between 
the referants*
( This division .: 
is not applicable 
to vgauttl 1 akfcana V*«
1.Primary sense 
rejected
2.Primary sense
:■, • retained ' ^ v
I.Primary sense * 
5 • partly retained
4.Relation being 
;■ indirect^
Jahallakgana or i p U pad*^ nalakgang *
fA.jaliallaksana:; or|V 
^akganalaksanfi". .^4-
J ahada jaha1laksana 
3 hB ga t y 5 ga lak ^ ang *
I^aksit a laksana*.
(c) Degree of
distinction ^between the 
two referents*
1 .Completely
'distinct
2.Actual referent 
identified with 
the primary one.
3*Actual referent
>•.' identified and 
eclipsed by the 
primary referent
Suddha . ( noi> 
applicable;to the 
GaunT laksang" ) . ;
Sarooe.
Sadhy a va eana*.
(d) Purpose 1. Intentional 
2 .Unintentional
Prayojanavati 
Nirudha.
- 5 V * ? -
C H A P T E R  YII
T T A f f j A N X
S U G G E S T I O N
( AND THE DOCTRINE OP DHVANI )
-  2 5 6  -
Yyanjana or Suggestion
It is only in the 9th century A.D. that the
theory of literal and metaphorical meaning, developed
by the Mimamsakas and the Naiyayikas, was further
extended by Anandavardhana in the Dhvanyaloka.1
2Centuries earlier, Bhartrhari had exposed the 
unsatisfactory nature of a linguistic theory which 
depends entirely on individual words and their lexical 
meanings; the sphota doctrine which he brought forward 
emphasized the importance of taking the whole utterance 
as a significant unitary linguistic sign. Bhartrhari 
had also shown that the meaning of an utterance 
depends on contextual factors, and that the logical 
interpretation of the sentenoe-meaning on the basis 
of the individual word-meanings is defective in many 
cases. At times the meaning of the whole utterance 
is different from what the individual words indicate. 
Anandavardhana took the cue from Bhartrhari and 1 
developed the theory of language on the lines
1.First published in the Kavyamala Series. It is in the 
form of karikas(short verses) and their explanations 
in prose called the vrtti.The problem as to tta 
whether the two portions are by the same author or by 
different authors is still hotly discussed(P.V.Kane, 
History of Sanskrit Poetios,pp.154-190;for bibliography 
see p.l54f of the same).
*0n Bhartphari's date,see H.R.Rangasvami Iyengar,
JBRAS,1951,PP.147-9
suggested by him; but as he was concerned only with 
the question of literary appreciation, he did not 
proceed with the full disoussion of all the intricate 
problems connected with speech activity. He oonfined 
his attention to his own field of poetic meaning.
In the Dhvanyaloka, he openly declares his indebted­
ness to the sphota doctrine.
Even the Vedic sages understood the fact
that the literal meaning of an utterance is only a
part of its total meaning and that those who try to
analyse the literal meaning may completely lose sight
of the real significance of speech. One of the
well-known hymns of the Rgveda^distinguishes between
the man who understands only the literal meaning of
a poem and the man who looks more into the innrr
significance of the passage than to the meanings of
the words therein; the former"sees,but does not see;
he hears,but does not hear; it is only to the latter
that Speech reveals herself completely,like a wife
to her husband."
utak tvah pa^yan na dadarba vabam 
uta tva^ br^van na s^QOty enam 
uto tvasmai tanvam visasre 
jayeva patya usati suvasah
1.Rgveda.X.71•4.This is also quoted in the Nirukta.1.19 
and the Mahabhagya»i.p.4
-*3^1-
- 5 ^  a -
In another passage in the Rgveda1it is said that
great poets oompose poems selecting their words,
*winnowing away the chaff from the grain**, and that
it is only men of equal sohoadarship and literary
2taste that oan fully appreciate such poems.
Anandavardhana does not attack the usual
division of speech utterances into sentences and words,
into stems and suffixes, and the distinction between
ttu,
the primary and ^ transferred or metaphorical senses 
of words (abhidha and laksanfi). He accepted all these, 
but in addition he postulated a third potency of 
language, which he called the capacity to suggest 
a meaning others than its literal meaning. This suggestive 
power of language is oalled Vyahjana.
1.Rgveda,X.71*2i_ saktum iva titaiina punanto yatra 
dhlra manasa vacam akrata. atra sakhayas sakhySni 
janate bhadrai^am laksmfr nihitadhi vaci.(This is 
also quoted in the Nirukta,IV.10,and in the Maha- 
MKgfohSsya.i.p.4
2.Cf. A .Gardiner,Speech and Language>p.6li
A curious position sometimes confronts the commen­
tator of latters or ancient texts. The sentences 
hang together and yield a sense which is satisfactory 
and certain up to a point,but no further. To the 
audience addressed by the author the background of 
fact was known,so that he could*see what was meant*. 
But the interpreter is left perplexed and baffled, 
beoause for him that background is unascertainable.
3 . See a l s o  J .B r o u g h ,Some I n d ia n  T h e o r ie s  o f  M eaning , 
T P S ,1 9 5 3 ,p . 173
' Y H  - -
a
It isjjnatter of oommon experience that an. >
utterance means much more than its literal sense. The
Naiyayikas and the Mimamsakas,more interested in
accuracy and precision in the use of words which they ; j
want to analyse objectively than to the fullness of
meanings and the possibilities of extending the range
of meanings even to the domain of the inexpressible,
are satisfied with the normal literal sense; but the
poets and the critics who deal with the totality of
human experience cannot neglect vast portions of
language behaviour. As Professor Brough says, 1
•Most philosophic discussions of meaning confine
themselves to a relatively small portion* of language
behaviour, namely,statements which desoribe or report
a state of affairs - the propositions of the natural
soiences,or, mor^generally,such statements &b are
traditionally handled by logio.” Thus Wittgenstein
dismisses the subject of oolloquial languages by
saying,"The silent adjustments to understand colloquial
2language are enormously complicated” .In the Philosophi- 
cal Investigations,he says,again;*It is only in normal
cases that the use of a word is clearly prescribed.
— -— - -— —  *.
l.logcit.,p.l76 
2.Traotatus,4.oo2
3*Philosophical Investigations142
Abnormal oases are only exceptions. Otherwise our
la n g u a g e  games w i l l  l o s e  t h e i r  p o i n t s " .  T h is  v ie w  i s
on the basis that every word had a definite and fixed
meaning and that this is all that need be considered.
1
But, as Angus Sinclair says," a word has in itself 
no fixed and definite meaning and has a slightly 
different meaning in every context". The Indian critics 
do not deny the existence of fixed literal meanings 
for words and sentences. But they believe that over 
and above all these,there is the suggested meaning
2or ’the social-cultural meaning’ as a recent linguist
puts it, which varies from context to context."In
addition to the regularly recurring responses to
the lexical items and structural arrangements, there
are also, throughout a linguistic community, reourring
responses to unique utterances or sequences of 
3utterances". These ’social-cultural meanings fall 
within the domain of the power of vyanjana. Ananda- 
vardhana’s basic postulate is that utterances possess 
a literal meaning, and can also convey a further 
meaning- the *sooial-cultural meaning.’ This includes
1 . The C o n d i t io n s  o f  K nowing, p . 170
2.C h a r le s C.P r i e s . M eaning and L i n g u i s t i c  a n a l y s i s , 
L an gu age,v o l .3 0 ,n o .1(1954),p.67
3 . I b i d j >.66
every thing other than the literal meaning(the primary 
and the metaphorical senses). And under the term 
* meaning*is inoluded not only information conveyed, 
but also the emotion induced; this naturally necessi­
tates the assumption of suggestive power for language. 
For even the Naiyayikas and the Mimamsakas could 
not argue that the emotions induced by language are 
brought about by the literal power of the words.
Again, Anandavardhana did not confine himself to the 
words and sentences as indicators of meaning; he 
included all the contextual factors, the intonation, 
stress, gestures and even the pure sounds used in the 
utterance,as well as the literal sense,as indicators 
of the full meaning of an utterance. Not only the 
expressive symbols(vaoakas), but the indicative signs 
(bodhakas) like gestures also form part of language.
As Russell says^"Music may be considered as a form of 
language in which emotion is divorced from information**
Or, using Bhartrhari *s terminology we may say 
that not only the prakrta-dhvanis or the normal sound- 
pattems which reveal the linguistic sign sphota. but
1 . Human K n o w le d g e . i t s  sc o p e  and l i m i t s . p . 73*
even the vaikrta-dhvani or the individual modifications
of the sound nave an important role in speeoh-activity.
orvU>-^*
id^
Thus, we have to include in language,"even the set of 
deviations from the norm of the sound segments that 
signal the meaning that a speaker is drunk, the 
whispering of an utterance that signals the meaning 
that the content of it is secret,and the unusual 
distribution that is the cue to a metaphor11 The voioe 
of the speaker can indicate whether it is a man or a 
woman,a child or a grown-up person and can give even
rtucthe identity of the speaker to those who know Hra voice. 
Anandavardhana is concerned only with poetic language, 
and therefore,omits many of these elements of speech 
from his field of observation. He is concerned only 
with the suggestion of elements that are of aesthetic 
value. Though vyan.jana.in the broadest sense of the 
term embraces all such elements,it is only in its 
restricted sense as applied to poetry that Ananda­
vardhana studies the problem. His aim is to establish 
the doctrine of Dhvani,which is vyanjana applied to 
poetry.
1.Charles C«Fries,loc.oit.,p.67n.
- T -
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Anandavardhana usee the term dhvani to his
.•'5* ' i  T-r J * '  Jl -* #4' -• . 3  v -  3 r - ^  !** %* *  **: 3  V 1 -  V ^  ^  . A j k ^  Safa
theory of poetio suggestion. He says^that this term 
is taken directly from the grammarians; just rb the 
sounds of utterances(dlvanl in the^grammarians• sense) 
reveal the integral linguistic sign (sphota).so also 
a good poem with its sound as well as the literal 31
sense reveals a charming aense over and above the 
literal sense. Just as the grammariansf dhvani reveals 
the sphota. good poetry(the sound and the literal sense) 
reveals a suggested sense which has great aesthetic 
value. On aocount of this similarity of function, 
the term A n  dhvani is applied to suggestive poetry.
The term is also used to the suggested sense or the 
function of suggestion* In the Dh vanyaIo ka.Ananda-
vardhana establishes his theory that suggestion is
2the soul of poetry.
Anandavardhana says that the beautiful ideas 
in poetry are of two kinds: literal(vaoya) and implied 
(pratlyamana). The latter is something like charm in
1.Dhvanyaloka.p.47 fi prathame hi vidvamso vaiya-r 
karapSh... te oa ^ruy amanesu varne$u dhvanir iti 
vyavaharanti. tathaivanyais tanmatanusaribhi^ suribhifc 
kavyatattvarthadariibhir vacyavacakasammi^rad dabd&tma 
kavyam iti vyapaderio vyanjakatvasamyad dhvanir iti 
uktafc.
2.Ibid,p. 1: kavyasyatma dhvanili
girls which is distinct from the beauty of the various
parts of the body; this implied sense is something
more than the literal meaning and depends on the
whole poem,and not merely its parted The expressed
sense is invariably an idea; but the suggested sense
may be of three kinds, an idea, a figure of speech,
«r an emotion. This suggested sense is not understood
by those who merely know grammar and lexicon; it is
understood only by men of taste who know the essence 
2
of poetry. This suggested sense is the most important
element in poetry; in fact it is the soul of poetry.
In all good poetry prominence is found to be given to
this element. Such poetry in which the words and their
literal meanings occupy a subordinate position and
suggest some charming sense( an idea,a figure of speech
or an emotion) is called dhvani? It is the highest type
of poetry. In oases where the suggested sense is
subordinate to the expressed sense,as in some of the
4figures of speech like saroasokti and paryayokta, there
l.Ibid,udyota 1 pratiyamanam punar anyad eva vastv 
asti vani^u mahakavlnam yat tatprasiddhavayavatiriktam 
vibhati lavanyam ivahganasu.
2.Ibid,1.7i riabdarthasasanajnanamatrenaiva na vedyate 
vedyate sa tu kavyarthatattvajnair eva kevalam.
3»Ibid,1.13* yatrarthas s(abdo vS tan artham upasarja- 
nlkrtasvarthau vyariktah kavyavi^eqas sa dhvanir iti 
suribhift kathitafc.
4.For details abour these figures see Sahityadarpana,%.
i s  no d h v a n is t h i s  ty p e  o f  p o e t r y  t o o  h a s  some charm, 
th o u g h  n o t  much? t h i s  ty p e  i s  c a l l e d  /sa in ibhutavyahgya♦ 
P o e t r y  w h ich  d o e s  n o t  c o n t a i n  any s u g g e s t e d  s e n s e  
ca n n o t  be c o n s id e r e d  a s  good p o e tr y ,h o w e v e r  charm ing  
t h e  e x p r e s s e d  s e n s e  may b e .T h e q u a l i t y  o f  p o e tr y  
d ep en d s  on th e  im p o r ta n ce  g iv e n  t o  th e  e le m e n t  o f  
s u g g e s t i o n  .
S t r i c t l y  s p e a k in g ,  th e  d o c t r i n e  o f  d h v a n i i s  
o n ly  an e x t e n s i o n  o f  th e  r a s a  t h e o r y  propounded by th e  
a n c i e n t  sa g e  B h a r a ta ,  a c c o r d in g  t o  w h ich  th e  m ain  
o b j e c t  o f  a d r a m a tic  work i s  k t e  t o  r o u s e  some r a s a  
o r  e m o t io n  l i k e  l o v e  o r  sorrow  i n  th e  a u d ie n c e .^  
Anandavardhana e x te n d e d  t h i s  t h e o r y  t o  k t a  p o e tr y  a l s o .  
Many o f  h i s  p r e d e c e s s o r s  had u n d e r s to o d  th e  im p o rta n ce  
o f  r a s a  i n  p o e t r y ; b u t  no one had s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  d e a l t  
w it h  i t  b e f o r e .  T here i s  no c o n f l i c t  a t  a l l  b e tw e en  th e  
t h e o r y  o f  d h v a n i and th e  t h e o r y  o f  r a s a ; t h e  fo rm er  
s t r e s s e s  t h e  method o f  t r e a t m e n t , w h e r e a s  th e  l a t t e r  
d e a l s  w i t h  th e  u l t i m a t e  e f f e c t .  S u g g e s t i o n ,b y  i t s e l f ,  
i s  n o t  enough i n  drama o r  p o e t r y ;  what i s  s u g g e s t e d  
must be ch a rm in g ,a n d  t h i s  charm can  come o n ly  th r o u g h  
r a s a  o r  e m o t io n .  The em o tio n  i s  n o t  so m e th in g  w h ich  can
1 •On the rasa theory see A.Sankaran.Theories o f  r a s a  \  j 
and d h v a n i ;K•C. P a n d e y .I n d ia n  A e s t h e t i c s . ( p o r  d e t a i l e d  
b i b l io g r a p h y  s e e  P .V .K a n e .H is t o r y  o f  S a n s k r i t  j P o e t i c s .
- v ••‘ . h • • ■: p . 3 5 0 .
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be expressed directly by the words, it can only be 
v. suggested# v,:/!'' m\'
The whole theory of rasa realization in
literature and drama is based on the well-known
, 1 _passage in the Natyasagtra\*vibhavanubhavavyabhicari-
r/■?,. Zi- saihyogad rasanisp&ttih.n Rasa is realized in some
way from the combination of the sthayibhava (permanent
and dominant emotional mood) with the vibhavas (the
objects of emotion,namely,the hero,heroine etc#, and
the exciting causes such as the spring,flowera,
2moonlight and the bower),anubhavas (the external
of the emotion such as the movement 
of the eye-brows,glance?,smile etc.) and the vyabhioari- 
bhavasCaccessory moods whioh come and go helping in 
the manifestation of the rasa.Bharata mentions^ 
thirty three such fleeting accessory moods like 
nirveda or despondency and glani or fatigue)# Bharata 
also mentions^eight dominant emotional moods,or sthaylbhavas 
that may be aroused by a dramatic representation into
1#Natya^astra,p.274# For details see P#V#Kane,History 
of Sanskrit Poetics,pp.340-356
2.Eight of these anubhavaa are called sattvikabhayasi 
these are perspiration,tears,etc#(Da6ar5pa,IY#3V 
3 #Hatya^astra,I ,pp.356ff.
4#Ibid,p#350ff.
the state of aesthetic pleasure. These are rati (love),
hasa (laughter),^oka (sorrow).krodha(anger).utsaha
(energy)«bhaya(fear),jugupsa(repu^gianoe) and vismaya
(wonder);the rasaa corresponding to these are respectively
called ^rngara,hasya,karuua»raudra,vlra,bhayanaka,
blbhatsa;and adbhuta. Later writers accept a nineth -
rasa called feanta corresponding to the sthayibhava of
1
nirveda(resignation).Really the rasa or the aesthetic
pleasure derived from literature is one and the same
in all oa8es;the division into the various rasas is
based on the difference in the sthayibhava which
2contribute to it. This rasa is a condition produced 
in the spectator, is a single feeling and a pleasurable 
one.
The sutra of Bharata^defining the process of 
rasa realization^ is interpreted differently by different 
scholars. Lollata,who is a Mimamsaka, believes that the 
rasa is produced in the hero or heroine;the spectator 
ascribes it to the actor because of the cleverness of 
acting, and the spectators delight is based on the
1.V.Raghavan.The Number of Rasas.
2. P.V.Kane.op.clt. . p . 343 ^
3*Pour main interpretations are by Lollata,Sankuka, 
Bhattanayaka and Abhinavagupta. jaganni*tha( Rasa gangs- 
dhara,p.28) refers to eight interpretations.
About these various interpretations,see S.K.De, The 
Theory- of Rasa.Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee 
Volume(III),pp.240-253*
appreciation of the realistic acting, ^ankuka, who is 
a Haiyaylka,considers rasa to be a matter of inference. 
The sthayibhava in the original hero is inferred to 
exist in the actor(though,actually it does not exist 
in him). The spectator forgets the difference between 
the hero and the actor, and infers the rasa in the actor 
Thesectwo views fail to explain how the spectator gets 
aesthetic pleasure by witnessing tragedies. Bhattanayaka 
theory of the enjoyment of rasa lays stress on the 
subjeotive aspect Wf rasa as the aesthetic experience 
of the spectator. He distinguishes poetio language 
from ordinary langa&g&+ postulates for the former
a.two,:funotions,bhavakatva and bhojakwtva in addition 
'to the primary function abhidha (which includes laksana 
also). Bhavakatva is the power pf universalization 
(sadharanikarana) whioh makes the vibhavas.sthayibhavas 
eto.stripped of their individual and personal aspeots 
and generalized in the minds of the spectators by their 
power of imagination; and bhojakatva is the power by 
which the sthayibhava reaches its climax and ill 
enjoyed by the spectators (this experienced is described 
as something which cannot be defined in words),.#
l.See Abhinavaguptafs commentary to the Natya^astra, 
chapter YI for the discussion of these views.The 
original works of Lpllata,£ankuka and Bhattanayaka 
are not extant.
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Abhinavagupta, following Anandavardhana, 
maintains that rasa is realized through suggestion. 
Aocording to him the sthayibhavas, as well as the 
flweting vyabhioaribhavas, are dormant in the minds 
of the spectators and are roused by the stimulus of
vibhavas etc.,and reach the state of rasa. He says
• ^ —. that rasa is suggested by the power of vynjana and
that rasa realization is not indescribable. His view
is similar to that of Bhattanayana whom he criticizes
for postulating new functions for words;for bhajakatva
is nothing but suggestion.^*
Abhnavagupta mentions three different psycho­
logical stages in the realization of rasa in literature. 
*The first stage involves the cognition of the formal 
or intellectual elements of the poem, and serves as 
a means to the second. The second stage consists of 
the idealization of things in poetry or drama by the 
power of imagination in the reader or spectator. The 
third stage can be marked as the climax of the 
inexpressible affective(emotional) condition of the
1. Rasagah/yadhara,I sbhogas tu vyaktih,bhogakrtvam tu 
vyarijanfid avidistam.
reader or spectator. When thus the formal or intellectual.
. :* '/• ',V' ' '
imaginative and emotional elements of a poem blend 
into one predominant sentiment and, making a simulta­
neous appeal , awaken the sthayibhava of the reader or 
spectator, the relish of ^ asa is manifested as a unity 
in the heart,leaving * no traoe of the constituent 
elements; and this is why the rasa dhvani is ehilaft 
asamlaksyakramavyahgya or the suggested sense with 
imperceptible stages.1,1
Criticisms against the Dhvani theory.
The theory of dhvani had to pass through an
ordeal of fierce criticism at the hands various
literary critics before it was accepted universally 
— . 2by the Alankarikasf The various sohools of philosophy 
in India, like the Nyaya and the Mlmamsa, do not 
reoognize the suggestive power of words at all. Later 
grammarians,however, accept it as necessary from the 
standpoint of grammar.
1. Huparikar, The Problem of Sanskrit ^eaohing»p.525*
2. Jagannatha says(Rasagangadhara.p.425)that the 
dhvanyaloka settled the principleads be follo^dd '<« 
in poetics.^
3* Laghuman.jusa.p. 160t vaiyakarapanain apy etadsvikara 
, avarfyaka^#! s . ;■ * V:* % ';
-
In the Dhvanyaloka Anandavardhana himself
refers to many of the views against the doctrine of
dhvani^some holding that it does not exist,some saying
that it is included in laksana, and others considering
dhvani to be something beyond the provinoe of words,
which is known to men of literary taste. He has also
referred to the oriticisms of the Naiyayikas who want
2to include dhvani under inference, Manoratha,a contem­
porary of Anandavardhana,seems to have ridiculed the
3idea of dhvani as absurd. In Jayaratha's commentary
on the Alankarasarvasva, nine anti-dhvani theories 
4are mentioned.
- ^ o 5 -
Dhvani and Anumana
The Naiyayikas rejeot the suggestive power of 
words, Mahimabhatta,in his Yyaktiviveka written with
the speoific purpose of proving that dhvani is included
5i*1 anumana or inference, says that the implied sense 
in literature is always conveyed by the expressed sense 
through the process of inference itsjjfelf and that there
1,Dhvanyaloka,1,1
2.Ibid,3rd udyota,p,448ff,
3,Ibid,p,8 and_the^commentary looana thereon: granthakrt 
samanakalabhavina manorathanfimna.
t-p-9•Yyaktiviveka,1.1:anumane1ntarbhavam sarvasyapi dhvaneh 
prakS^ayitum vyaktivivekam tanute...
is no neoessity to accept a new potency for words. 
Mahimabhatta is not the discoverer of this anti-dhvanl 
theory,for Anandavardhana himself anticipates this 
objection and criticizes it in the third udyota of 
the Dhvanyaloka.^  Anandavardhana•s main argument 
against the inference theory of poetic charm is thaV 
inference depends on the knowledge of vyapti or a 
universal relation between the middle and the major 
terms. In literature there is no such invariable 
relation between the primary sense and the suggested 
sense,and therefore, the latter cannot be inferred 
from the former. There cannot be valid inference* 
when there is the fallacy of undistributed middle 
(anaikantikatva) ♦ Anandavardhana illustrates his point 
by means of an analogy.%e says that the relation 
between the expressed sense and the implied sense is 
something similar to that between a light and a potf 
the light reveals the pot,even though there is no 
invariable relation between the two. Again, in inference 
the minor term becomes related to the major through 
its relation to the middle term. Thus a degree of
1.Dhvanyaloka.p.448fi vyatfjakatvam 6abdanam gamakatvam, 
tac ca lingatvam atad ca vyahgyapratltir lihgapratitir 
eveti lingalirigibhava eva vyarigyavyadjakabhavo 
naparalj kascit.
2.1bid.p.449s see also looana thereoni pradipialokadau 
lingalihgibhavasunye * pi vyangyavyanjakabh&vo * sti.
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mediae/ is an essential feature of inferential 
process,but *in suggestion one feels that the degree 
of mediae/ that is necessarily characteristic of 
inferenoe is wanting*1, •
In the Nyayamahjarr. Jayantabhatta refers to 
the dhvani theory as one adopted by a wiseacre, and 
dismisses it as unworthy of serious consideration by
p _scholars. According to the later Naiyayikas, the 
vyangyartha_or the suggested sense of a word is;
really inference from its primary and secondary
- xmeanings and is not separate from them.
Precision and aoouracy are the chief objects 
if logic and it should always demand the use of a « 
word in its plain,primary and unambiguous sense. The 
secondary meaning is also accepted, since it can be 
ascertained with a fair amount of accuracy through the 
pxiaK±|nt* primary meaning. But the suggested meaning  ^j 
is too vague and fleeting and subjective to have any
l.S.KUppusvami Sastri»Highways and Byways of literary 
. jjritioism in Sanskrit,p.38f
2.Nygyamaft jarlf viz ♦s. s). p. 481 yam anyal} panditammanyah 
prapede kancana dhwanim....athava nedr£i caroa kavibhis 
saha 6obhate • ;*
3.gabdasakt iprakasika,pp.64 f.
plaoe among logical meanings. Logic whose only appeal
ijp to reason, accuracy and preoision recognizes as
much of the suggested sense as can reasonably be
inferred from the expressed sense; the subtle and
subjeotive suggestions implied in language iS*"not «er •:
subjects of logical discussion. In the Traptatus.
Wittgenstein laid down that "whatever can be said, oan
be said clearly. And what we cannot speak about, we must
leave in silence". Great poetry is written on the
fringe of that silence; it aims at conveying the
inexpressible,by means of suggestion. Logicians may
dismiss it altogether as unreal,or include a part of it
in inference and reject the rest; but the literary
critic has to pay speacial attention to it, for the
suggested sense plays an important part in poetry
where the appeal is more to the emotion and sentiment
2than to reason. A philosophy of language which would 
eliminate whole areas of human discourse as meaningless 
and unintelligible has little significance for human 
culture. It is only through the power of language to 
suggest things which oannot be expressed,that it oan
1.D.M.Datta.The Six Ways of Knowing,p.284f*
2.As that of Wittgenstein. See Urban.W.M,Language and
Reality,p. 12 . J Jv y. < r y . y > .  >y * .
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1
convey philosophical truth. In the Introduction qt to
1
Metaphysics,Bergson says,"Language is incapable of 
apprehending and expressing reality. But language may 
be used in another way,not to represent,but to bring 
the hearer to a point where he himself may transcend 
language and pass to incommunicable insight. It is a |
dialectical ladder which,when we have ascended,may be 
kicked away." This insight and intuition cannot be 
expressed, directly by words,but i±xwoixta they can be 
communicated through the power of suggestion.
Dhvani and Arthapatti
The view that dhvani is to be included in
arthapatti^ is similar to the previous one* for arthapatti
is a kind of immediate inference based on the universal
relation between the absence of the major and the
absence of the middle terms. JespersGn defines suggestion
3
as impression through suppression. He says,"In all 
speech activity there are thrwe things to be distinguished 
—  expression,suppression and impression. Expression is 
what the speaker gives,suppression is what he does not 
give,though he might have given it,and impression is
l.See Urban.op.cit..p. 12 • __
2.Mentioned by Jayaratha in Yimarsini commentary 
on Alahkarasarvasva.p.9
3.Philosophy of Grammar.p.309
what the hearer receives....It is important to notice 
that an impression is often produced not only by what 
is said expressly, but also by what is suppressed. 
Suggestion is impression by suppression*. Prof. Kuppu- 
svami Sastri says that this kind of suggestion has to 
be accepted by all schools of thought and that in the 
case of ordinary sentences,the individual words give 
only their isolated meanings,leaving the samsarga or 
the mutual relation of the words to be conveyed by 
suppression or suggestion. The Naiyayikas call this 
sariisargamaryada, while the Bhatta Mimainsakas consider 
it as a separate function called Tatparyavrtti. There 
is apparent contradiction between the juxtaposition of 
words in a sentence and their not being related to 
serve some purpose; hence the samsarga is got through 
a process of inferenoe of the arthapatti type. We may 
note here that even in Laksana the transferred sense 
is got through arthapatti; and MUkulabhatta actually 
quote8 the well known example of the fat boy who does 
not eat during day as a variety of laksana.
1. op.oit.»pp.20-22
2.Abhidhavrttimatrka,p.21t..........   1 .'f...
The Bhatta Mimamsakas accept i^rutarthapatti % q 
explain elliptical sentenoes. This has to he distinguish­
ed from dhvani,for here the expressed sense itself is 
incomplete. Arthapatti. being a means of valid 
knowledge* implies accuracy and definiteness of the 
sense got through it; but in poetio suggestion the 
implied sense is rather vague and can be full£ 
understood only by men of literary taste.
Dhvani and Laksana
Some of the Alarikarikas like Mukulabhatta
-  •  t
tried to inolude vyanjana or the suggestive power
un<^ er lQ-^sana itself. They aooept that at times it is
possible to convey,through sentences,ideas different }
from the literal sense; but all such instanoes can
be included: Ih laksana itself. According to Mukula 
1
bhatta,one variety of lakpana mentioned by the 
Mimamsaka scholar Bhart^mitra is that wherein the 
expressed literal sense indirectly leads td some other 
idea (abhidheyena sambandha). Thus, even instances of 
arthapatti wi3,l come under lakgana. Mukulabhatta' 
defines laksana in such a way that all instances where 
the expressed sense indicates other ideas are included
1.Abhidhavrttimatrka.p.11
2.Ibid.p.3t arthffvaseyasya punar laksyamanatvam ucyate.
-  •&) a  -
in it, and says that dhvani,propounded as a new 
doctrine by some literary critics actually falls 
within the sphere Kffkkac laksana itself.1
Anandavardhana refers to this anti-dhvani
theory and says that laksana and dhvani differ from
each other with regard to their nature and subjeot
matter. Laksana operates when there is some kind of
inconsistency in the primary sense; it’indicates the
seoondary metaphorical sense after cancelling its
primary sense; but in suggestion the primary sense
2need not be disoarded. This argument is based An 
the: assumption that- lak^apa involves the-'impossibility 
of the literal sense and not merely the inconsistency 
of the literal sense with the intention of the speaker. 
For we know that in oases of ajahatsvartha laksana. the 
literal sense is not completely rejected.
Lakgana is based on the primary sense of a 
word and is its extension; it is part of the primary "vyy 
sense itself and some have called it the tail of the
> lUAbhldhavrtt imatrka.p.211 lakgaj^margavagahitvam tu 
dhvanes sahrdayair nutanayopavarpitasya vidytata •
2.Dhvanyaloka,111.33tvyanjakatvamarge tu yadartho *rthan- 
taram dyotayati,tada svarupam praka^ayann evasau 
anyasya praka^akafc pratiyate pradipavat.
3.1bid,1.21* n  vaoakatvasrayepaiva gunavrttir vyavasthi- 
taT*
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primary sense(abhidhapuooha). Dhvani,on the other
hand, depends acf on suggestion; and suggestion a an
*• *■ . ,•# 
occur even in cases where there is absolutely no
expressed sense, as in the case of emotion suggested
1by the sound of music or the sight of dances. The 
emotive element in language can never be explained 
in terms of the expressive or the metaphorioal senses 
of words. In laic gap, a the implied sense is always f . ^
indicated indirectly through the primary sense of the
word;but in the case of dhvani it is possible for both
. : :/ ::;-rv.^:v^ 2the meanings to m m *  ocour almust simultaneously.
Again,’the suggested sense is determined by the r 4 >
contextual factors,the intonation,the facial expression,
gestures etc.,whereas laksana.as well as abhidha, are
independent.
;■« Even the topics of lakgana and dhvani are ^
different. The meaning conveyed by lakgana is always 
an idea;but the suggested sense can be an idea, a figure 
of speech or an emotion.
1-Dhvanyaloka.p.19 3f£ glt&dhvanlnam api vyanjakatvam 
asti,na ca tesam vacakatvam laksana va kathanoil 
laksyate.
2. In asamlakgyakramavyahgya,evennthough the emotion
is based on the primary sense,the sequence is not felt. 
3*See Huparikar.op.oit..pp.493ff•
Even though dhvani is different from lakgana,
there is an element of suggestion in all oases of
deliberate and intentional metaphors. The motive
element underlying the deliberate use of metaphors
1comes under suggestion. Anandavardhana says that 
lakgana operates only when there is inconsistency 
of the primary sense and that its function is exhausted 
when this inconsistency is removed by resorting to the 
secondary meaning which is related to the primary 
sense. The motive element which underlined the use 
of khan** the metaphor cannot be explained by laksana 
itself. In the example gahgayam ghogafr (The village 
is on the Ganges) the primary meaning of the word 
ganga is the river Ganges;this cannot apply in the 
sentence,for the village cannot be on the stream itself. 
This hitch isn at the root of the secondary interpreta­
tion adopted. The term ganga is interpreted as indicating 
•the bank of the Ganges1. Thus the discripanoy is 
removed and with that the power of laksana is also 
exhausted. The ideas of holiness and purity that are
1.Dhvany aloka,1.20t mukhyam vyttim parityajya guna- 
vrttyarthadardEanam yam uddi^ya phalam,tatra 6abdo 
naiva skhaladgatih. See also Kavyaprakdsa,11.9-10s
Sahityadarpana.il.15
suggested by the statement cannot be implied by 
laksana itself,because this 'overtone1 of the word 
does not depend on the three conditions of laksana 
(inconsistency of the primary sense,direct relation 
of the implied sense to the primary sense and a clear 
purpose or the sanotion of popular usage behind the 
transfer); it is determined by the emotional atmosphere 
which envelops the word and is something elusive.
Even in the absence of lakgana» the word ganga can 
suggest the qualities of purity and sanetity;1lakgana 
does not give the suggested sense,but it points the way 
to the richness of the ideas associated with the word. 
What might be left unnoticed in ordinary cases is 
emphasized by the laksana; because the inconsistency 
of the meaning(or the strangeness of the collocation 
of words) produced a break in the flow, and makes the 
listeners fcoi think about the purpose behind it. Thus, 
laksana leads the way to the land of suggestion.
Dhvani and Abhidha
The Mimamsakas of the Prabhakara sohool who 
follow the anvitabhidhana theory of verbal comprehension 
consider dhvani to be included in the primary function
l.Thus, sanctity and purity can be implied even in the 
sentence gahgatire ghosah(The village is on the banks 
of the Ganges)•
-  I \ S' -
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abhidha itself| for aooording t<fc them the meaning of a 
word is what is conveyed by it. There is no restriction 
for the significative force of a word. In a sentence 
a word conveys not only its own individual meanlng9but 
also its relation to the other words in the sentence*
samsarga or the mutual relation of the word-meanings 
suggested by their Juxtaposition in a sentenoe is also 
included in the primary meaning itself. In certain 
contexts a^word may suggest new ideas beyond its normal 
sense, but all those come under abhidha itself. Just as 
the grange of an arrow can be extended farther and 
farther depending on the force with which it is dia^ » 
charged, the meaning of a word oan be extended to 
any k x * «  length.
1.Locana on Dhvanyaloka,p.234i prabhafcaradarsane *pi 
••; dlrghadirgho vyaparah* $5 . v ^ . { .
• Ibid»p.l8s yo *py anvitabhidhanavadi yatparas ^abdas 
sa ^abdarth iti hj*daye grhltva 6aravad abhidhavyaparam 
eva dlrghaadirgham ioohanti.
2.Abhinavagupta explicitely states that it is the view 
of the followers of Prabhakara and that it is based 
on the anvitabhidhana theory. Govinda,in the Pradipa 
commentary on jtne ^avynprakisa referred to it as the 
view of Ehat^s;and Jhalkikar refers to this theory 
as that of bhaVta matopajivinab (in his edition of 
the Kavyapraka^a).Dr. S.K. De pointed out this mistake
in the second volume of the History of Sanskrit Poetics. 
Still this mistake has crept even into the work of 
the great scholar P.V.^ane. In his notes on Sahltya- 
darpaua he refers to this theory as that #of some 
followers of Kumaritaf (p.64) • 1 - • ■*.%
Trivedi,in the notes on Bkavali (p.370) alludes 
to it as the view of Lollata. We do not know the basis 
for this assumption.
; Anandavardhana a&d hie followers attack thi»': 
view from the standpoint of the abhihitanvaya theory* : ^  
The suggested sense oannot be conveyed by the power; 
of abhidha .for it is only the definite conventional^ 
sense,which is directly related to the word, that le 
conveyed by abhidha. The power of the primary function 
of the word is exhausted when this task is performed.^?' 
Even the sentence meaning cannot be expressed by the 
words through the primary function alone. Another function 
has to be accepted to explain suggested meanings. The 
primary sense is directly related to the word,but the .A* 
suggested sense is,at times,known'only indirectlyv 
through the expressed sense. Moreover,suggestion need 
not always depend on words;the melody of music,gestures 
etc.,*are suggestive of sense. The primary sense is r 
definite and;fixed; but the suggested sense changes C  
according to thechanges ifh the contextual factors, 
fho primary sense of a word can be objectively learned 
by any one from a lexicon;but the suggested sen e 1& . 
poetry can be fully appreciated only by men of taste •
1.Sahara,1.1.7$ padani svam svam artham abhidhSya nivr- 
ttavyaparani; TCavyapraka^a.II.5> viseeyam riabhidha 
gaoohet keioa6aktir_vi£esaqe.See also Looana.p.lS
2.Dhvanyaloka.3» 33t vacyo hy arthas saksac chabdasya 
sambandhi,taditarastv abhidheyaeamarthyakpiptas 
sambandhisambandhl; avaoakasyapl grtaAabdfide rasadi ; 
laksanarthavagamadar^anad,a^abdasyapi oestader artha- 
V-i vieapraka^anasiddheh• ’; V  ."*1 \ : '.V*; , r-‘r- o ‘ ' •
3«Ibid,1.7t vedyate sa tu k&vyarthatattvajnair eva kevalaa
Dhvani and Tatparyavrtti
Some of the Mimamsakas of the flhatta school 
school inolude Ahvanfr under tat paryavrtti. a function 
of the sentence which they postulate to explain the 
verbal comprehension arising from. V* sentence• The direct 
jjNfrl&tlon of the word is to the permanent^ ♦universal*§ ; 
in a sentence the primary function of the words is y.-y 
exhausted ,g when the generic isolated senses of the 
individual words are presented* The particular sense 
necessary in the context of a sentence Is got through / 
the power of lakgana. But the mutual relation of the 
various words,or the samsarga as it is called, is not 
conveyed byneither of these functions. It is not expressed, 
it is only suggested. This is done byHhe tatparyavrtti.; 
Can poetic suggestion also be included in this?
Tatparyavgtti is postulated to explain the 
literal meaning ot a sentence,wheras vyanjana comes 
at the next stage. The power of the former is exhausted;
1st;establishing the logical connection of the word-**; 
meanings,and cannot give the further suggestions
iVJCayyapralcasa,II > padarthanam samanvaye tatparyartho 
Vi §a v a pur apadarthopi vakyfirthaji samullasatity y. 
abhihitanveyavSdin&m matam.** This "latyaryavrtti is the y 
same as the earn Bar gam&ryada of th*> Haiyfiyikas.
See KUppusvaact^Saetri,op.cit., p. 20ft Huparikar.op.cit •, 
pp.504-511.
Abhinavagupta says that when an expression gives its > 
own literal meaning,and in addition suggests some other 
sense,we cannot consider both these distinct senses 
t ob e conveyed by the same power. The former proceeds 
directly from the words,while the latter comes from 
this literal sense. Tatparya pertains to the expressed 
sense focmgskat 3c, whe re a s dhvani pertains to non-expre salve 
factors also such as music,gesture etc.
% Dhananjaya and Dhanika oppose the dhvani theory 
including it under tatparya; according to them the 
power of tatparya is not exhausted in giving the 
logical connection of the word-meanings,but can extend 
to any length. Some of the later Alahkarikas have 
accepted tatparya almost as synonymous with suggestion.
DhvanjT,ani^-Vakrokt^ r;: : .■ r'C : X  *
In the Vakrftkti.1ivita, Kuntaka denied the 
independent existence of dhvani, and included it under 
Yakroti or a striking mode of speech. His vakrokti is 
all-pervading and is almost analogous to dhvani itself.
!• Looana.p.13
2* Avaloka commentary on the Ba^arupa.p.121; etavaty eva 
-Vibrantis tatparyasyeti kim krtam? yaYatkaryaprasari- 
tvat tatparyam na tuladhptam. _
3• Yakroktijlivita.l.lit vakroktir eva vaidagdhyabhangi- 
bhanitir ucyate.
-
Classification of Dhvani
The main subdivision of dhvani is into two 
types^ avivakgita-vaoya and vivaksitanyapara-vacya.
The former is based on laksana and is also called 
l a k g a n a m u l a . in this type the literal meaning is not 
intended. The motive element in all cases of intentional 
metaphors come$ under this. Corresponding to the two 
varieties of lakpapa,namely, jahallakgapa and ajahal- 
lakgapa, the avivaksita-vacya type of dhvani is also 
subdivided into two: atyantatiraekrta-vacya where the 
literal sense is completely set aside and arthantara- 
safakramita-vacya where the literal meaning is shifted. 
This seoond sub-variety covers cases where a word is 
used in an enhanced or diminished sense. Edgerton
oompares this with the 'emphasis' of classioal western
' 2 —  
rhetoricians; though in fact the point of view here
3
is somewhat different. What Empson calls the pxcgMti 
pregnant use of words of the type A is A comes under
4 _ 3.
this variety of dhvani. The ancient MimamsakaB also
1.A faily detailed classification of the dhvani is given 
in the Dhvanyaloka( udyotas i & ii)»&avyaprakasa.IVg.
Sah i t y a da r paq^TI V etc.
2.F.Edgerton,Indirect suggestion in poetryiA Hindu Theory 
of Literary Aesthetics*,Proc. American Philosophical 
sooiety,1936,p.700.
3*J.Brough,Some Indian Theories of Meaning.TPS.1953.p.l74.
4«The Structure of Complex Wordepp.351. He gives the
example,*'An explosive is en explosive .it must be guarded 
with constant precaution*•
recognized the use of lakgana for praising an objeot.
and gave examples like"Dirty clothes are not clothes*
1
(yan malinam avasas tat)■. This pregnant use of words
is found in negation a l s o o r  negation can be partial.
Thus,.ii the previous example the word avSsaB (not
clothes) means only "not clothes in the fullest sense 
2
of the term".When Shelley says te the skylark,"Bird
thou never wert",he does not mean that the skylark
3does not belong to the class Aves* Around the logical
meaning of each word there floats an emotional
*** * atmosphere whioh envelops and penetrates it. The
pregnant use of the word either bring all thW
feeling tones associated with it along with the logical
sense, or can deprive all feeling tones from the sense
of the word. And such use by which the normal sense
is either enhanced or diminished can produce a ragguktin
suggestion of praise or blame. Ttee example of this type
of dhvani given by Anandavardhana is,"Only when favoured
* * •**' .• . :  • ■ •*by the rays of the sun are lotuses lotuses". Here
•lotuses* carries the meaning •lotuses in the full sense
of the word;lotuses with all the qualities of beauty
which make them worth calling lotuses*.
TV See chapter on Lakpaaa1. Cr : ’
2. Thus,the term *avidy5 * can be explained as ’imperfect 
knowledge * rather than ’absence of knowledge*.
3. See Ogden and Richardtop.oit.,p.233.
4. Vendryes,Language,p.182
5. f ravikirananugrhltani kamalBni kamalani*
The second subdivision of dhvani, vivaksitanya- 
para-vacya is also called abhidhamula as it is based
‘ I
on abhidtia or the primary meaning of the word. In this 
type the literal sense is in fact intended,but subserves 
the implied sense. This is also divided into two sub- 
varieties 1 samlaksyakraroa-vyangya where the stages of
realizing the suggested sense from the expressed sense j
■ ■ '?•<* ■ can be well perceived, and asamlakgyakrama-vyahgya
where the stages in the realization of the suggested
sense are imperceptible, The latter is more important
and is ooncerned with the suggestion of poetic emotion.
The permanent moods(sthayibhavas) latent in the readers )
are roused along with the understanding of the expressed
sense in the form of the vibhavas(pauses of emotion),
anubhavas(after-effects of emotion)and vyabhicari-bhavas
transient moods; the intermediate steps between the
understanding of the expressed sense and the realization
of rasa ai*e not perceived. In this case the rasa or bhava
.isa m  suggested by the express mention of the vibhavas etc., I 
and they occupies the principal position in the poem. If 
the suggested emotion is subordinate to the expressed
sense,we get guqibhuta-vyhgya variety of poetry. And if" - rVi/" -’r ■ ■ " . ■ i
the vibhavas etc., are not expressly mentionea,they have
to be gathered from the context and hence the stages in
1
the realization of the emotions will be perceptible.
1. And it becomes an instance of samlaksyakramavyngya
The type of dhvani called samlaksykramavyangya 
is again subdivided into„vastudhvani where a faot is 
suggested and alankaradhvani where the suggested sense 
is a figure of speech. It can again be classified from 
another point of view, as based on worda(^abda^aktimula) 
and as based on the meanings( artha4aktimuIa-)»; in the 
former the actual words used are vital to the suggestion 
and cannot be substituted by their synonyms,while in 
the latter it is the contextual factors and the social 
and cultural background that are important in bringing 
out the suggestion.
In the Sahityadarpana,Visvanatha criticizes^ 
Anandavardhana for including under poetry suggestions 
of a faot or a figure of speech. He says that the 
suggestion of poetic emotion alone can be considered 
as the soul of poetry and refuses to recognize any piece 
of poetry in which emotional elements are absent. Every
(Wstatement implies many other ideas thaA are not actually 
expressed. Thus, the statement *Devadatta went to the 
village* implies that 1*$ was being attended by a servant^ 
(in the social context of that time in India),but there is
l.p.4. He defines poetry as ^vakyam rasatm8kam,(p.5)
2.Ibid. anyatha devadatto gramam yatlti vakye tadbhrtyasya 
tadanusaranampavyaAgyavagater api kavyatvam syat.
-  %  -
no poetry in that* Anandavardhana himself was fully ^
oonscious of the importance of emotions in poetry. The^
facte and the figures of speech suggested must ulti-
mately lead to the realization of rasa. He says that
the real function of the figures of speech in poetry
is to serve in the development of r a s a Abhinavagupti 5
makes the idea clear by saying that really the suggestion
of rasa (rasadhvani) alone is the soul of poetry anA^
that the suggestion of ideas and figures Of speeoh
(vastudhvani and alarikaradhvani) ultimately terminate
2in the development of rasa.
Samlakgyakramavyngya based onSwords gives the 
feeling tones of a word. Sapir says that it is very 
difficult % o com# to any scientic conclusion regarding 
feeling tones.*To be sure there are socially aooepted
feeling tones or ranges of feeldbng tone for many words
■ f'v‘ , ; ■ . . ,( over and afrove the force of individual association#but
they are exceedingly variable and elusive things at
••• V  • " %best*.* It is determined by the frequency with which 
it is used in emotional contexts.^
1. Dhvanyaloka.11.17
2.Looeufe^on aSbvaxiya 1 oka,I ♦ 5i rasa eva vastuta atm5f: y r 
vastvalahkaradhvanT tu sarvatha rasam prati paryava-
• syete. ? . ■ : : / '• • ” •.
3. Sapir,Language ,p.41
4. See GokokiV.*r. »The poetic approaoh to Language,p.21 
On the emotive elements in language,see Ullmann.op.cit. 
pp.96ff;Ogden-Rlohards,op.cit.,pp.149ff.etc.
According to Mamma^a and Visvanatha, in the 
case of a homonymous word^or expression having more than 
one primary sense,when the contextual factors restriot 
it to one of the senses possible, the other sense that
a W S :/'' ; V- ■> 1still lurks in it is conveyed by the power of suggestion*
This they give as an example of vyahjana based on words*
2Jagannatha Pandita has rightly rejected this view on 
the ground that all the senses in suoh cases are primary 
and are brought to the mind of the listener through 
the power of abhidha itself. The contextual factors 
can only restrict its application, they cannot deprive 
it of its primary sensegV So there is no necessity to 
bring* in vy an jane here.
- 3  AS*-
3Jagannatha Pandita says that in the u c u  case 
yogarudha words like pahkaja(lotus,mud-born) where 
the etymologioal meaning is applicable,though it is 
restricted in its use by the popular usage,the power 
°* abhidha expresses its popular meaning. Sometimes 
the etymological sense is also conveyed by the power of 
suggestion, by a subtle supplementation.
1 *Kavyaprakasa.II.141 anekarthasya ^abdasya vacakatve 
niyantrite samyogadyair avacy&rthadhlkrdvyfivrtir 
anjanam;Sahityadarpana.il.14. On the contextual faotors 
see separate section in the chapter on abhidha.
2.Ha sagahgftdhara,p.108
3*Ibid,yogarudhasya ^abdasya yoge ruflhya niyantrite 
dhiyam yogaspr^o ’rthasya ya stite vyanjanaiva sST.
•We seem at times to glimpse behind a word 
another sense,deeper and half-hidden* and to hear 
faintly the entry of another meaning,in and with which 
others begin to sound* and all accompany the original 
meaning of the word like the sympathetic chimes of a k 
bell. Hence that deep and sonorous ring in words which 
£* lacking in artificial and invented languages; and 
henoe also the multiplicity,the indefiniteness, the
1
strange suggestiveness and evasiveness of so much poetry* 
Hugo von Hofmannsthal says that this is a peculiarity 
of oriental poetry* *It leads us into the innermost 
nature of oriental poetry,into the very mystery and 
being of language. For this mysteriousness is the 
deepest element in eastern language and poetry alike, 
in so far as everything it in it is metaphorical, 
everything remotely descended from ancient roots. The 
original root is sensuous,primitive,conoise and strong, 
but the word moves away from it by subtle transitions 
new related meanings and then meanings only remotely 
related; yet in the remotest meaning there is still 
some echo of the original sound of the word, still 
some darkly mirrored image of the first sensuous 
impression.* *
1.F.Wisemann,Language Strata.Logic and Language,edited 
by A.G.N.Flew,second series,Oxford,1953>P*13
2. Quoted by Wisemann.loc.oit,p.!3f•
-  3
The ancient etymologioal meaning that lurks
behind the normal meaning can be brought back to life;:
by a subtle supplementation* Examples can be found in all 
good poetry. In the Kavyapraleasa»Mammata refers to the
use of the word * lea pal in* by Kalidasa in the Kuma ra sambha vs
verse:1
: Dvayam gatam samprati ^ocanlyatam same game prart hana^ ;
i. ' ’ -I.* X ; piriakinah , _. :r';
> Kala ca sa leantimntl kalavatas tvam asya lokasya oa ^
/-■ 1 ;:;.v netrakaumudl
(By seeking association with kapalin - &iva,the holder
of the begging bowl - two things have beoome pitiable:
the brilliant digit of the moon and thyself tthe light
the eyes of the world)* Here the term kapalin
directly denotes ^ivaj stymo logic ally it means-
♦the holder of the begging bowl*t and therefore aptly
suggests his poverty and worthlessness*.
In the case of homonymous expressions (alega) 
if both the meanings are applicable in the context»the 
meanings are known through the primary sense abhidha; 
but if one is contextual‘ and the other noncontextual9 
the power of abhidha might bring the recollection of ■
both,but the contextual factors will restrict it to 
one of the meanings* The figure of speeoh such as simile
1* Kfivyapraka sa*p* 239 
2*Pdrvati
- -
that is suggested in sueh oases is through sabdo^aicti-" 
muladhvani, because the suggestion is based on the 
actual words used, and the words cannot be substituted 
by their synonyms.
Arthasaktimuladhvani is based on the expressed
meaning.The suggested sense need not be an idea or ac
figure of speeehf under this type are included instances ,
where the emotions and transient feelings are suggested
from contextual flwtors,without the express mention of
1
the vibhavas,anubhavas etc* Even though the primary 
sense of aword is definite and fixed,that oan suggest 
various other ideas through faotors such as the peculiar 
character of the speaker, or the person addressed,the 
sentence, the presence of another person, the expressed^ 
meaning,the occasion, the place, the time, the intonation 
or the gestures#
■ 7*-r -V--' ,. : *4 v. _' V , The other type,asa^Iak:gyak:rama-Yyangya> are also ,
3 V > : • a ' / •' .fe $classified as arising from individual sounds,words or 
parte of words,sentences,"stylistic structuredsahghatana)
1.Thus, bashfulness of Parvati is suggested in the 
IQffll^aaamhhava verse levamvadini devareau parive pitur 
adhomukhl lilakamalapatrani ■ gajjayamaea parvati.
2.Kavyapraka^a#III# 2-3;Sahityadarpana,II#14*16
3.Dhvanyaloka.Ill.2: See J.Brough.op.oit..p.175
-or the whole poem. Anandavardhana recognizes the 
importance of talcing the whole stanza or even the 
poem as a whole,in order that the overtones of the 
suggested sense are fully grasped.
It is interesting to note that the protagonists 
ofi the dhvani theory enlarged the term artha or 
moaning to include all that is conveyed by a poem.
It includes not only the cognitive meaningfbut also 
the emotive or volitional sensed as well. Another 
important point is that Anandavardhana and his followers 
accepted the grammariansf ■ view about the unity of the 
sentenoe-meaningj * the dhvani-the ory ppuartu to a large 
extent operates in terms of larger unities and not 
individual words11. But at the same time»it is possible 
from another point of view to indicate that the operative
factor in producing the overtones of the implied meaning
V > - ' ' *'r>. . * 2may on occasion be a single word or phrase.*
Many of the critioisms against the dhvani 
theory are based on the fact that the poets and the
literay critics did not oonfine themselves to a relatively
small portion of language behaviou# which is definite.
1.J.Brough,op.cit.,p.l74 
2.Ibid.
The importance of intonation as a factor in 
conveying the nuances of the natural sentences of 
everyday speech was not unknown to the ancient Indian 
thinkers. In the Natyasastra.Bharata refers to the 
different varieties of tone, tempo and pitch to he 
employed by the actors to bring out the subtle 
meanings in their speeches. Even the ealrly grammarians 
distinguished those variations of the sounds in length 
etc.,which aotually formed an integral part of the 
words themselves and could,therefore,be studied 
objectively, and those variations which suggest 
certain syntactic over-meanings and the subtle shades 
in the speaker’s intention. Thus, the division of 
vowels into short,long and prolated constitutes an 
integral part in the form of the words in Sanskrit; 
the distinction of the accents into high(udatta), 
low(anudatta) and circumflex(svarita) forms an integral 
part of the words in Vedic Sanskrit. They are part of
Intonation
1. Bines: Natyasastxra^ol.II,p.391f*
the prakrta-dhvani (in Bhartrhari1s terminology). But
other personal variations in the mode of utterance
such as those in speeed,pitch and intonation, as well
as the peculiarities of manual gesture and facial
expression cannot be put to a uniform objective
analysis, even though they play an important part in
£suggesting the shades of meaning. Thse belong to the
,V -t<r V '• - ‘
Vaikrta-dhvani( again,in Bhartrhari*s terminology).
The former play? an important part in bringing out the 
linguistic meaning, whereas the latter helps in 
suggesting meanings,especially the sooial-oultural 
meanings.
Bharata refers to two main types of kaku or 
intonation in a sentence* sakarikqa or expectant and 
nirakankga or non-expectant. The former intonation 
shows that the meaning of the sentence is not complete 
and that it requires something more to complete it, 
while the latter type of intonation shows that the 
sense is complete.'*’ Rajadekhara deals with the problem 
of intonation in speech in greater detail* he divides
1* ffaTtya^astra.vol.ll.p.591* dvividha kakuh sakanksfi 
,nirak&hkna ceti,vakyasya sakahksatvanirakankaatvat•
2. Kavyamimamsa,chapter VII.
the expectant intonation into three sub-varieties as 
suggesting (a) an objection or disapproval ( akgejpagarbha ) 
(b) a question (pra&nagarbha) and (o) doubt or uncer­
tainty (eamsayagarbha). The non-expectant intonation 
is also divided into three varieties*{a) denoting a 
statement (vidhirup’a ), (b) giving an answer (uttararupa) 
and (o) asserting a decision (nirpayarupa), He defines 
kaku or intonation as a quality in the mode of utteranoe 
whioh brings out the intention of the speaker clearly,'** 
With the change in intonation the same sentence can 
mean different things - a question, an assertion or 
a,doubt. Only the main varieties are given here, for 
there are innumerable distinctions in intonation,
i.civ , Vv/' ■ * ", r^>'-whai suggest subtle shades of meaning,oognitive or
/ 2emotive. In the Srhgaraprakasa.Bhoja also discusses
the importance of intonation in bringing out the 
vivakga or intention of the speaker. Later Alahkarikaa 
accept intonation bb a means of suggesting meanings 
not actually expressed by wordB. Intonation brings to 
light all manner of emotional attitudes;irony,pathos, 
argumentativeness,menace and so forth. More than one 
type of intonation may be combined in different ways 
to indicate various emotional attitudes.
l.Kavyamlmarnsa, p. 31* abhiprayavan pathadharmah kakufr 
2.See the summary of oontents,in Dr.Raghavan*s work on 
^rAgaraprakasa.vol.I»pp.!3ff*
3. Gardiner.A.op.cit.,p.202.
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Classification of Dhvani
(a) Literal sense completely 
set aside). Based on 
J ahallakganeT.
Avivaksitavacya 
or lakganfimula
I. (Literal sense 
not intended)
(b) Arthahtarasamkramitavacya 
(Literal meaning shifted) 
Pregnant use of words.
livakg i t anya- 
paravaoya or 
abhidhamUla
II.(Literal sense 
intended, but 
subserves the 
implied sense)
(a ) Asamlaksyakrama- 
vyahgya (St age s~of 
knowing the suggested 
sense imperceptable)
vastu
Sabdi
Alankara
(b) 3amiakgyakrama-
vyahgya (Stages of 
knowing the suggestei 
sense perceptable) (vastu
Art hi
fAlaiikara
(Vastu
Ubhaya
.lankSra
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